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ABSTRACT
This is essentially a three-part thesis on money demand, bank credit and real exchange rates in
Malaysia. Long and short run real money demand functions with money variously defined as
MO, M1 and M2 have been estimated using the Johansen cointegration technique and the error
correction approach respectively. While liberalisation and innovation in the Malaysian financial
system have not ruled out the existence of stable long run money demand relationships as
attested to by the presence of cointegrating vectors, they have rendered short run relationships
unstable. This called for a reestimation of short run dynamics over more recent periods and all
the revised estimates could withstand a battery of diagnostic tests akin to original full sample
estimates. The estimated short run functions appear to track the direction of actual changes in
the demand for money reasonably well.
The second part of the thesis is basically concerned with the possible practice of equilibrium
credit rationing (a la Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981 & 1983) amongst commercial banks in Malaysia
and the significance of commercial bank credit vis-a-vis other monetary variables in the
determination of economic activity in Malaysia. Two of the major implications of equilibrium
credit rationing are the irresponsiveness of lending rates to changes in the factors determining
loan demand and supply and the presence of a 'ceiling' on the lending rate. Via an application
of cointegration and error correction techniques, the lending rate is found to be insensitive to
determinants of loan demand while only nominally sensitive to loan supply determinants. This
is corroborated by an evidence derived from an application of Sims' VAR technique that
shows a lack of responsiveness of the lending rate to changes in the inter bank rate used as a
proxy for the cost of financial market funds.
With regard to the ceiling on the lending rate arising from equilibrium credit rationing, its
effect on the volume of deposits and hence loanable funds mobilised by banks and the interest
rate payable on them may depend on the interest elasticity of their flows. Two separate cases
can be considered namely the case of zero elasticity and the case of non zero elasticity. In the
former case, if it is against the banks' interests to impose a high lending rate owing to possible
adverse selection effects, banks may suppress the deposit rate instead. In the latter case
however, the higher is the interest elasticity of deposits, the greater will be the amount of
loanable funds derived and the interest rate paid on them. In our empirical analysis involving
the application of cointegration and error correction techniques, commercial bank deposits in
Malaysia are found to have a zero elasticity in the short run. Hence the extent of excess
demand arising from an any practice of equilibrium credit rationing may be relatively limited.
By applying the Sims' VAR technique, commercial bank credit has been found to exert a
greater influence than MI, M2 and the lending rate on the Malaysian GDP.
The final part of the thesis pertains to exchange rates. In an adaptation of Dornbusch's (1976)
model, it appears that any policy measure aimed at alleviating the asymmetric information
problem in the domestic banking system could lead to a depreciation in the long run
equilibrium exchange rate and a rise in the long run equilibrium price level. The impact effects
are a weaker domestic currency and a higher output level. However the magnitude of the long
run and impact effects would vary directly with the interest elasticity of money demand.
The cointegration and error correction techniques have also been relied upon for estimating
the long run equilibrium real effective and bilateral exchange rates of Malaysia and the short
run dynamics of these rates a la Edwards (1988a, 1988b & 1989). The estimates suggest that
there has been no sustained overvaluation or undervaluation of the Malaysian real exchange
rates. By implication then, the question of a real exchange rate misalignment does not arise
and that Malaysia's success in economic development so far has not been due to any deliberate
undervaluation policy. Moreover the analysis of causal relationships amongst real exchange
rate movements on one hand and exports and GDP on the other has highlighted no significant
relationships existing between them. Finally, the results from modelling the short run dynamics
of real effective exchange rates indicate that excess domestic credit could induce their
depreciation instead of an appreciation, contrary to popular belief.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
,
1.1 Research Objectives, Methodology and Structure
This thesis is made up of three principal parts on money demand, credit and exchange rates
with reference to the Malaysian economy. The first part on money demand with money
variously defined as MO, M1 and M2 deals with the estimation of long and short run real
money demand functions against the backdrop of liberalisation and innovation processes which
the Malaysian financial system has been undergoing. These processes could render the long
and short run demand functions unstable. This could erode the potency of monetary policy in
achieving its desired objectives given that a stable money demand function is a prerequisite for
its satisfactory conduct. In the process of estimating the demand functions, the possible
influence of exchange rate movements on money demand is also explored. The effectiveness of
monetary policy in regulating economic activity may be compromised if money demand is also
determined by exchange rate considerations alongside other factors such as income, interest
rates and inflation. Both the cointegration technique developed by Johansen and the error
correction approach are employed for the estimation of the long and short run functions
respectively.
The second part relates primarily to the study of bank credit in the Malaysian economy with
emphasis placed upon the possible practice of equilibrium credit rationing by commercial
banks and the relative significance of bank credit and other monetary variables in the
determination of economic activity. The notion of equilibrium credit rationing as advanced by
Stiglitz & Weiss (1981 &1983) is referred to in our analysis. Two major implications of
equilibrium credit rationing are the irresponsiveness of lending rates to movements in the
determinants of loan demand and supply and the presence of a 'ceiling' on the lending rate
chargeable by banks. The effect of equilibrium credit rationing on the volume of deposits and
hence loanable funds mobilised by banks and the interest rate payable on them could depend
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on the interest elasticity of their flows. This is demonstrated by using a simple profit-
maximising model of a bank.
The extent of excess demand for loans as a consequence of equilibrium credit rationing may
however not be very great relatively if bank deposits are not interest elastic (zero elasticity) or
highly interest elastic and if there is a lack of alternative investment outlets for banks. In the
case of zero elasticity, if banks find it unprofitable to increase the lending rate due to possible
adverse selection effects, banks may instead depress the deposit rate. In a separate vein
however, the greater is the interest elasticity of deposits, the larger will be the volume of
deposits secured apart from a higher interest rate payable on them. Cateris paribus, this may
limit the excess demand for loanable funds compared to a low elasticity environment.
Within the Malaysian context, alternative portfolio investment opportunities accessible to
banks may be limited due to legal restrictions imposed on banks indulgence in the stock
market and the mere existence of a captive market for government securities. Moreover
privatisation and government expenditure cutbacks have always been high on the Malaysian
government agenda.
In the context of financial liberalisation, the prevalence of equilibrium credit rationing may
defeat the objective of financial liberalisation as if banks are inhibited from raising their lending
rates, so are they in respect of their deposit rates. Hence financial liberalisation may fail to
produce the desired results if an economy is laden with asymmetric information problems.
In order to assess the possibility that Malaysian banks practise equilibrium credit rationing, the
income and interest rate elasticities of deposits received by commercial banks and the
sensitivity of the lending rate to factors determining loan demand and supply are estimated
using the cointegration and error correction techniques as in the money demand study. The
lending rate responsiveness is also explored using the Sims' Vector Autoregression (VAR)
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technique. With regard to the evaluation of the relative significance of bank credit and other
monetary variables to the Malaysian economy, the Sims VAR technique is also employed.
The third part of the thesis is centered on exchange rates in particular real bilateral and
effective exchange rates and has the following objectives:
I) To consider the implications for exchange rate, price and income (output) movements given
the presence of equlibrium credit rationing in the domestic banking system by adapting the
Dornbusch's (1976) model;
II) To consider the fundamental determinants of equilibrium real exchange rates a la Edwards
(1988a, 1988b & 1989). Both bilateral (MS vis-a-vis US$) and effective exchange rates
(trade- and export-weighted) are dwelt upon in the empirical analysis. Given the tendency
amongst developing countries to preserve an overvaluation of their exchange rates, it would
be interesting to verify whether there has been any misalignment of Malaysian exchange rates
or a deliberate undervaluation. This is pertinent to the fact that Malaysia has at times been
perceived by other developing countries as a role model for economic development. The
Johansen cointegration technique and the error correction approach are also applied in this
section of our study. Similar studies conducted by Edwards and others usually involve pooled
regression techniques with cross sectional data; and
III)To verify whether exports and economic growths attained by Malaysia have been dictated
by real exchange rate movements and to establish the direction of their causal relationships via
an application of Sims VAR technique.
The rest of this thesis is configured as follows. The subsequent section of this chapter
furnishes the background of the Malaysian economy. A review of the Malaysian financial
system is presented in Chapter 2 while Chapter 3 is concerned with money demand functions.
Credit and exchange rate issues are dwelt upon in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. Finally,
overall conclusions are made in Chapter 6.
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1.2 Background of the Malaysian Economy
Malaysia is a relatively small country situated in South-East Asia with a geographical area of
330,000 square kilometres. Rich in natural resources, it has a multi-racial population
comprising Malays and other indigenous people (62.4%), Chinese (29.1%), Indians (8%), and
Others (0.5%). Essentially based upon private enterprise with the Government assuming an
active role in mapping out national development strategies, the Malaysian economy is one of
the fastest growing in Asia. With a per capita income of US$2960 in 1992, it ranks third in
terms of economic prosperity in South-East Asia after Singapore and Brunei. Prudent fiscal
and monetary management amid political stability have been the prime factors contributing to
Malaysia's development so far.
Malaysia has been maintaining a favorable rate of economic growth annually since achieving
Independence in 1957 with relative price stability except during the recessionary years in the
early 1980s. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth accelerated from an average annual
rate of 4.1% in the latter half of the 1950s to 8 1% in the 1970s. However there was a
considerable deceleration in the growth rate in the early 1980s owing to a protracted global
economic recession that culminated in a decline of its real GDP by 1.1% in 1985. A strong
recovery was subsequently staged by the Malaysian economy with an annual real GDP growth
averaging 8.3% over the 1987-93 period.
Fundamentally, Malaysia is a trade-oriented economy with exports and imports of goods and
services on average accounting for 81% of the GDP in 1993. Initially based upon agricultural
and other primary commodities such as rubber and tin, it has over the years transformed itself
into a growing industrial economy. During its formative years, Malaysia depended heavily
upon rubber and tin resources as an amber of economic growth. It was already then the
world's leading producer and exporter of natural rubber and tin in 1957. While 60% of its
export earnings then were accounted by the exports of rubber, tin exports accounted for 11%.
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Hence with 71% of its foreign trade earnings hinging on rubber and tin, it is clear that the
Malaysian economy was highly susceptible to the vicissitudes of international trade. This called
for a governmental embarkation upon agricultural diversification and industrial promotion
programmes. Consequently, oil palm and timber gained significance on its list of exports.
Unlike some developing countries which are contented with being primary producers,
Malaysia pursued a series of industrialisation programmes that initially emphasised import
substitution followed by export promotion in the early 1970s and then heavy industrialisation
since the early 1980s. Since the pre-Independence days until the late 1960s, Malaysia's imports
largely comprised consumption goods as the domestic consumption goods industry had yet to
develop to an extent capable of serving domestic demands adequately. Hence the promotion of
import substitution was the main theme of the industrialisation programme then. The
programme succeeded in scaling down the share of imports of consumption goods in total
imports from 50.7% in 1961 to 32% in 1970 and then to a mere 16.3% in 1993.
At the dawn of the 1970s, it was felt that industrialisation based merely upon import
substitution would be inadequate to serve national development needs. Overseas market
ventures and hence an export-oriented industrialisation programme was then being increasinly
recognised as a force for employment generation and as a catalyst for meeting socioeconomic
redistribution objectives of the government as embodied in the New Economic Policy (NEP)
promulgated in 1970. The programme was then first implemented with the creation of Export
Processing Free Trade Zones (EPFTZs). The creation of these zones proved successful in
terms of employment and export growth. While manufactured exports accounted for a mere
11.9% of Malaysia's total exports in 1970, they accounted for 22.4% and 74% by 1980 and
1993 respectively.
Subsequently, the 1980s and 1990s have been identified by Malaysian economic planners as
decades of heavy industrialisation. It was perceived that Malaysia had already reached a stage
of fairly rapid industrial growth and should proceed to a more advanced stage of
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industrialisation. The establishment of the Heavy Industries Corporation (HICOM) in 1980
signified the launching of the heavy industrialisation programme in the country. The success in
heavy industrialisation so far is mirrored by a surge in the share of machinery and transport
equipment exports in total manufactured exports from 11.5% in 1980 to 48.5% in 1993.
All these industrialisation programmes aided by foreign direct investments have structurally
transformed the economy from one critically dependent upon primary commodities to one
with an expanding industrial base. By 1993, exports of rubber and tin merely accounted for
about 2.2% of total export earnings against 70% in the 1950s. Moreover by the same year, the
manufacturing sector contributed about 30% of the GDP as opposed to 20% in 1980 and 14%
in 1970. Apart from the manufacturing sector, the services sector has also been actively
promoted by the government in recent years as a potential source of foreign exchange
earnings. Specifically, the areas targetted are tourism and shipping services. The relative
significance of the services sector to the Malaysian economy has been fairly stable over the
past three decades, contributing about 40% of the GDP.
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Chapter 2
THE MALAYSIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A REVIEW
2.1 Structure Of The Malaysian Financial System
When compared to other countries at a similar stage of economic development, the Malaysian
financial system is fairly well-developed. Progress in financial deepening and innovation has
been rapid especially since the second half of 1970s. Not unlike other developing countries,
Malaysia has been striving to develop its financial system so as to mobilise savings, allocate
credits and supply financial services efficiently to the country. Generally the system has aided
in the stimulation of savings and investment and in the improvement of financial resource
allocation.
Broadly the Malaysian financial system can be divided into two sectors - banking and non-
banking. In the banking sector, the major components are the Central Bank (at the apex of the
system), commercial banks, finance companies and merchant banks. Altogether they command
about 70% of the total assets of the financial system. As at the end of 1992, there were already
37 commercial banks, 1 Islamic Bank, 41 finance companies, 12 merchant banks, 7 discount
houses and 8 money and foreign exchange brokers operating in the country. Of all these
institutions, commercial banks collectively form the 'biggest' institution. As at the end of 1992,
they commanded about 38.9% of the total assets of the financial system, 52.5% of the total
deposits with the system, and 55.9% of the total loans outstanding in the financial system.
Most foreign banks are small. They number only 16 with total assets worth of M$41.3 bn and
a network of 146 branches, confined mostly to the older established foreign banks. The rest
merely maintain 1 banking office each.
On the other hand, the non-banking financial sector is constituted by provident and insurance
funds, development finance and savings institutions, and other financial intermediaries such as
unit trusts, building societies, credit and charge card companies, factoring and leasing
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companies and several quasi-government investment and financial institutions such as the
Pilgrims Management and Fund Board, the National Mortgage Corporation (Cagamas Ltd.),
the Credit Guarantee Corporation and the Malaysian Export Credit Insurance Ltd (MEOB).
Amongst these institutions, the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) is the largest and it yields an
annual investible surplus of about M$6 bn (equivalent to over 5% of the country's GNP).
Compelled by law to invest at least 70% of its assets in Government securities, it is a major
financier of the Government's development expenditure. In practice, over 80% of its assets are
held in the form of government securities, mostly of long-term maturities of approximately 20
years. Perhaps this is why the Malaysian government does not have to resort to inflationary
financing, a practice common amongst developing countries.
As at the end of 1992, there were already 59 insurance companies in operation in Malaysia. In
addition, export credit insurance is offered by the Malaysian Export Credit Insurance Ltd
(MECIB), a wholly government-owned firm. It provides export insurance cover to a
maximum limit of 85% to local exporters against the risk of payment defaults by their foreign
buyers. Amongst the savings institutions, the National Savings Bank (NSB) is the largest in
terms of scale of operation with assets worth M$4.2 bn and 452 branches (801 post offices
with savings account facilities). The other savings institutions are urban cooperatives and rural
cooperatives. Via their extensive branch network, the savings institutions have been successful
in mobilising funds from a significant number of small savers, especially those from the lower
fixed income groups.
2.2 Growth and Development of the NIalaysian Financial System
Broadly, the objective of liberalising the financial sector is to enhance its efficiency by
stimulating competition and strengthening the role of market forces. In Malaysia, financial
reforms have only been undertaken gradually over the years (Awang Adek, et.al  1992).
Though some moves toward liberalisation were already envisaged in the early 1970s, they did
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not constitute a continuous and steady policy to liberalise the system as the liberalisation path
had been frequently interrupted by adverse economic conditions that prevailed occasionally
such as the high inflation of 1973-74, the 1975 recession, the 1979 oil price shock and the
protracted global economic recession in the early 1980s. For the sake of presentational
elegance, we shall categorise the changes that have transpired in the Malaysian system into
institutional, foreign exchange-based and legislative changes.
2.2.I Institutional Changes
Favorable macroeconomic developments witnessed at times in the 1970s and 1980s have
helped in promoting significant innovations and changes to the structure of the Malaysian
financial sector. Increasing financial intermediation and competition in the market for financial
services have been envisaged. It was especially in the 1980s that the Central Bank began to
intensify its reforms of the financial system via a program both to strengthen the financial
infrastructure and to relax and simplify rules and procedures.
The 1978 interest rate deregulation constitutes the most distinctive institutional change made
to the Malaysian financial system. Interest rates are commonly regarded as a significant
determinant of economic activity and institutional savings.' Prior to October 1978, both the
structure and level of interest rates were determined by the Central Bank in consultation with
the Council of the Association of Banks in Malaysia. Both the maximum deposit rates and the
minimum lending rates (the 'prime' and 'preferential' rates) were decided upon. The
administered interest rate regime was motivated by the desire to promote the development of
indigenous banks by limiting competition between domestic and foreign banks on the interest
rate front as foreign banks are much more established in the trade. It is particularly noteworthy
here that the Malaysian policy with respect to the lending rate was distinct from the
1 Section 37(1) (b) of the Central Bank of Malaysia Ordinance. 1958 empowers the Central Bank to determine
interest rates payable or chargeable by banks and other bank charges.
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conventional wisdom about lending policies in LDCs. Instead of a ceiling as is usually cited in
the literature, the Malaysian policy was one of floor-setting.
The system of interest rate determination was subsequently amended on October 23, 1978 and
under the new regime, commercial banks can freely determine the interest rates for deposits
and loans. However, some loans to the government and statutory authorities remain to be
granted at preferential rates while the maximum rates chargeable for loans to the priority
sectors remain the subject of regulation by the Central Bank. In fact this was only 1 of the 4
measures instituted over the 1978-79 period for the modernisation and deepening of the
financial market. The others were the extension of the Central Bank's supervisory framework
to include merchant banks, the amendment of liquidity requirements of financial institutions
and the inauguration of two new money market instruments namely banker's acceptances
(BAs) and negotiable certificates of deposits (NCDs).
A base lending rate (BLR) system was subsequently introduced on November 1, 1983. Under
this system, the lending rate levied by a bank or finance company (except for loans to the
priority sectors) was anchored to its declared BLR. The BLR was to be computed on the basis
of cost of funds to the institution concerned after making provisions for the cost of statutory
reserves, liquid asset requirements and overheads. Hence the actual cost of credit to borrowers
was then determined by the BLR and an interest margin over the rate which would depend on
the borrower's credit standing.
There was however a temporary suspension of market influence on interest rates during the
tight liquidity period from October 1985 to January 1987. This was to curb competitive
bidding up of interest rates amongst banks as it was felt that the then ongoing recovery
process of the economy from its worst ever recession in the mid 1980s would be thwarted by
excessive interest rates. However it did not involve any reimposition of direct controls on the
rates. It was merely ruled that commercial banks and finance companies should peg their
interest rates for deposits up to 12 months in maturity to the deposit rate of two leading
commercial banks on October 21, 1985. For commercial banks, the maximum allowable
10
differential vis-a-vis the lead banks was 0.5 percentage point while for finance companies a
maximum of 1.5 percentage points. The ruling was finally abolished in February 1987.
In September 1987, control on the lending rate was reimposed as it was felt that banks
including finance companies were maintaining excessive margins. Under this policy,
commercial banks were disallowed to maintain a base lending rate that exceeds the BLR of the
two lead banks by more than 0.5 percentage point. A four-percentage point limit was also set
to the margin above the BLR. These guidelines were also applicable to finance companies.
However this ruling was subsequently lifted on February 1, 1991 when the BLR was freed
from the administrative grip of the Central Bank. Since then each commercial bank and finance
company is allowed the liberty to set its own BLR according to its own cost of funds. With the
exception of interest rates levied on loans granted to the priority sectors, all interest rates are
now freely determined by market forces.
The financial system has been transformed into a relatively modern one offering financial
services comparable to most other developed and developing countries. The computerisation
of banking operations started in full force in the 1980s. Automated Teller Machines (ATMs)
were first introduced in 1981, and their numbers proliferated to 1556 by the end of 1993.
Currently, telebanking is at its nascent stage of development. It permits customers to conduct
most of their banking transactions by phone at any time of the day and throughout a week. A
link-up to the Society for Worldwide Inter-bank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT)
network was established in 1989 to facilitate overseas transactions when 23 commercial banks
and the Central Bank joined the SWIFT society. Interest rate swaps, foreign exchange
hedgings, sale of Government securities under repurchase agreements (repos), loan
syndications and other specialised financial packages have been put in place. Same-day
settlement for the clearing of cheques and automatic overnight lending at the clearing house
were also amongst the measures instituted by the Central Bank. The environment for a more
active secondary market has also been created via a regular and greater supply of Treasury
Bills, an introduction of Government bonds of shorter maturities and an increase in the
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frequency of new sales and an installation of facilities for auctioning mortgage papers and
Government bonds. There is also a freer competition for loans, deposits and other financial
services. Forces are at work to develop Kuala Lumpur as an international financial centre.
More generally there is already on average about one banking office for every 10000 people.
This is somewhat consistent with the standard of major industrial countries. Moreover finance
companies are posing an effective competition against banks in some areas of financial
services. New financial institutions have emerged such as Cagamas (a housing mortgage
corporation) that issues medium term bonds, the Industrial Bank, the Unit and Property Trusts
and the Malaysian Export Credit Insurance Berhad (MECIB). The emergence of new
institutions was an added catalyst to the creation of new financial products and to the
liberalisation of the financial market. An international offshore financial centre (I0FC) was
also established in October 1990 in Labuan, East Malaysia. It is aimed at enhancing the
investment climate of Malaysia and also to complement and supplement the onshore financial
system centered in Kuala Lumpur.
There is also a growing disfavor for lending to the priority sectors, thus reducing the
inherently distortionary impact of government interventions. In early 1989, the guidelines on
credits to agricultural food production were frilly eliminated. By March 1990, the remaining
guidelines are related only to lending to the Bumiputra community and to small scale
enterprises. Moreover as from 1989, banks are no longer required to comply with the
statutory reserve and minimum liquidity requirements on a daily basis. The new rule only
requires that each bank maintain an average of the daily ratios over a fortnightly period. The
statutory reserve ratio on any single day can fall by up to 0.5 percentage point below the
fortnightly average. In order to broaden the investment portfolios of commercial banks and
merchant banks, they have been allowed effective from September 1, 1989 to participate in the
equity of Malaysian Airline System Ltd (MAS), Malaysian International Shipping Corporation
Ltd (MISC), manufacturing companies and blue chip companies and in units of property trusts
though only within prudent limits. A bank's total investment in these organisations is restricted
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to not more than 50% of its capital base (net of investments in subsidiaries and other financial
institutions)
The rapid development of the Malaysian banking system has also gone parallel with the
Malaysian capital market. The Malaysian capital market was practically non existent until the
early 1960s. It now comprises markets for longer term financial assets (such as public and
private debt instruments with maturities exceeding one year and corporate stocks and shares
with unfixed maturity) and commodity futures. There is also a gradually growing tendency for
companies to substitute equity capital for bank borrowin gs in recent years. Hence the
traditional reliance on commercial banks as a source of borrowing is on the wane though still
important. In terms of market capitalisation, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (ICLSE) is
fairly well established with an estimated market capitalisation of US$37 bn or 116% of GNP.
Unlike the stock exchanges of Taipei, Seoul, Bangkok and Manila, the KLSE is more open to
foreign participation with only a few restrictions e.g. a pre-determined limit to foreign
ownership of commercial bank stocks.
Efforts have been made to promote the market for private debt securities. Guidelines for the
issue of private debt securities have been issued on January 1, 1989 and an independently run
credit-rating agency named, Rating Agency Malaysia Ltd was established in 1990. The 1990
Budget addressed the problems of developing the private corporate bond market by
undertaking measures aimed at reducing the cost of issuing and trading in corporate bonds.
Plans are also now underway for the establishment of financial futures and options markets.
Apart from the attempts to boost the private debt securities market, attention has also been
focussed on the development of the government securities market. Measures have been taken
to render Malaysian Government Securities (MGS) more attractive and to diversify their
ownership so as to shed their captive market image. Especially in the late 1980s, secondary
trading in MGS has been actively promoted. On January 1, 1989 in order to promote an active
market for the trading of Malaysian Treasury Bills, 7 discount houses were appointed as
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principal dealers. The discount houses have also been allowed to hold and trade in money
market instruments such as the MGS, treasury bills, CAGAMAS bonds, BAs and NCDs of up
to 5 years of prematurity period, compared to an earlier limit of 3 years.
2.2.11 Foreign Exchange-based Changes
The switch to a more flexible exchange rate regime in the early 1970s and then a more flexible
interest rate regime in 1978 in fact represented the first steps toward deregulating the
Malaysian financial market. Prior to assuming the role of the sole currency issuing authority
by the Central Bank in June 1967 2 , the exchange rate of the Malaysian dollar (then known as
the Malayan dollar) was fixed at 2s.4d sterling. Generally daily fluctuations in the exchange
rate were quite insignificant and sterling was not only the premier currency for foreign
exchange settlements for Malaysia but also for reserve holdings.Subsequently on June 12,
1967 when the Central Bank commenced issuing the Malaysian currency, the Malayan dollar
was exchangeable for the new Malaysian dollar at par. However with the devaluation of
sterling by 14.3% in November 1967, the sterling-pegged Malayan dollar was automatically
devalued by the same magnitude. Instead of the previous 2s.4d, the exchange rate for one
Malaysian dollar became 2s.8.67d. Hence the Malayan dollar was then worth 85.71 cents of
the new Malaysian dollar.
Following the balance of payments crisis faced by U.K. in 1972 which undermined sterling's
position and which led to its floating and then the unilateral dismantlement of the Sterling Area
by the U.K. Government, sterling was replaced by the U.S. dollar as the intervention currency
on June 24, 1972. The parity of the Malaysian dollar was then maintained at M$2.81955 per
U.S dollar and this was revised to M$2.5376 following a devaluation of the U.S. dollar on
February 12, 1973.
With the worsening in the situation of international foreign exchange markets and taking the
lead of other national governments, the Malaysian government allowed its currency to float on
June 21, 1973. This marked the termination of the fixed exchange rate era in Malaysia, an era
generally characterised by a narrow non-intervention margin set on either side of a parity. The
2The role was played until then by the Board of Commisioners of Currency. Malaya and British Borneo.
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main reason for the floating as advanced by the Central Bank was that it had become evident
that the fixed exchange rate regime was no longer conducive to the attainment of external
equilibrium without any involvement of a trade-off quite detrimental to domestic balance. It
was hoped that floating would broaden the scope for pursuing domestic stabilisation as a
principal economic objective since floating would grant the authorities some control over
money supply. Moreover it would to some extent insulate the domestic price level from
foreign inflation.
Nevertheless, it has never been the intention of the authorities to observe a 'clean' float. The
Central Bank would continue to defend the Malaysian $ at its upper intervention limit of
M$2.59471U.S.$. This was intended to moderate excessive fluctuations in exchange rate,
allegedly due to speculative activities. Finally another change was made to the exchange rate
regime on September 27, 1975 when basket-pegging was instituted. Under this new
arrangement, the exchange rate is determined in terms of a basket of currencies of Malaysia's
most significant trading partners as 'it was no longer desirable for the Central Bank to
determine the exchange rate of the Malaysian dollar in terms of the U.S. dollar alone and to
buy and sell the U.S. dollar in order to maintain an exchange rate so determined.' (Bank
Negara Malaysia, 1984). However, it remains the policy of the Central Bank to intervene in
the foreign exchange market only at appropriate times to moderate day-to-day fluctuations in
the value of the Malaysian dollar vis-a-vis the 'basket' of currencies. Lin (1989) has pointed
out that in practice the ringgit has never been pegged strictly to the basket. Instead
fluctuations in the ringgit relative to the basket as dictated by foreign exchange market
conditions have been envisaged. The Central Bank's policy has been to intervene only if there
are excessive fluctuations in the exchange rate that destabilise the exchange market.
This switch to a more flexible exchange rate system has been accompanied by the dismantling
of exchange controls. The discriminatory system of exchange control rules based on the
Sterling Area was first moderated in May 1973 and further relaxations were witnessed in 1978
and 1984 and more recently in 1987. The exchange control is exercised by the Central Bank in
accordance with the provisions of the Exchange Control Act 1953 and its subsequent
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revisions. The Act provides for the recording and monitoring of movements of funds and for
the safeguarding of the nation's foreign exchange position should the need arise. In practice, all
commercial banks and the Islamic Bank have been delegated the authority to approve
applications for both current and capital payments. The latest measures to liberalise further the
exchange control rules were instituted on January 1, 1987 and they include:
1) the freedom to make payments to foreign countries in any foreign currency except South
African and Israeli currencies though payments in Malaysia must necessarily be effected in
Malaysian ringgit (M$);
2) the freedom to make payments to non residents for any purpose including repatration of
profits by foreign investors;
3) the granting of more authority to 'authorised banks' by allowing them to approve all
payments irrespective of the amount involved. These banks only need to refer to the Controller
of Foreign Exchange for approval if payments are to be made for the purpose of investing in
securities and immovable properties abroad or for the purpose of extending credit to or
placement of deposits with non residents;
4) the freedom for non residents to undertake direct or portfolio invesments in Malaysia
without any prior permission;
5) the freedom to delay the repatration of export proceeds to Malaysia up to a period not
exceeding 6 months;
6) the freedom to maintain inter-company accounts. Permission is not needed from the
Controller for a company in Malaysia to maintain inter-company accounts with their
associated companies, branches or other companies offshore. Such companies only need to
furnish the Controller with monthly returns. However this does not apply to proceeds from
exports of Malaysian goods and proceeds from loans to Malaysian companies;
7) the liberty of non resident controlled companies (NRCCs) to borrow locally. No permission
is needed from the Controller for a sum to be borrowed that does not exceed M$10 million
from all sources in Malaysia so long as at least 60% of the sum is from locally-incorporated
financial institutions. Prior permission is only required for a sum exceeding M$10 million.
However under normal circumstances, approval is readily granted;
16
8) the freedom for residents to borrow in foreign currency from banks in Malaysia so long as
the borrowing is for productive purposes;
9) the freedom to borrow without any prior approval from non residents provided the amount
of foreign borrowing does not exceed a sum equivalent to M$1 million. Approval is however
readily granted if the amount exceeds the stipulated level; and
10)the freedom for the public to deal in gold in any terms or weight without any prior sanction
from the Controller.
All this constitutes a removal of major barriers to international capital movements in the
country, hence exposing the local financial market to the rest of the world. Similar programs
have in fact been pursued by neighbouring countries such as Thailand and Indonesia.
2.2.111 Legislative Changes
This chapter has so far outlined the institutional and foreign exchange-based changes that were
envisaged in the Malaysian financial system. However it is stressworthy that the system did not
actually experience a smooth transition to its present state. Its development trend was upset
during the early 1980s by the global economic recession. The adverse economic environment
sent a number of financial institutions into financial distress in the mid 1980s, especially those
heavily exposed to the property market. Following a decline in profitability, the capital base of
some banks was eroded and this necessitated an increase in their paid-up capital so as to
maintain the prescribed capital-adequacy ratio.
All this prompted legislative changes aimed at enhancing the supervisory and regulatory
powers of the Central Bank over the financial system. The passage of the Banking and
Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA), 1989 is the main response. The Act which came into force
on October 1, 1989 is a substitute for the Banking Act, 1972 and the Finance Companies Act,
1969. By virtue of the Act, the Central Bank's traditional jurisdictions have been extended
beyond the banking system to encompass most of other institutions in the financial system.
The Act provides for an integrated supervision of the system and constitutes a modernisation
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and streamlining of laws pertaining to banking and other financial institutions. Specifically, the
Act provides for:
1) stricter licensing requirements;
2) a tighter control on deposit-taking activities and on the establishment of subsidiaries and
offices by licensed institutions;
3) restrictions on businesses that can be carried out to those for the purpose of which the
licenses have been issued;
4) an enhancement of capital adequacy requirements including the need to maintain a reserve
fund',
5) minimum standards of financial accountability to be observed;
6) a control of ownership and management and
7) a control on the direction of credit in particular loans granted to individuals or firms which a
bank or its officials may have vested , interests.
Also by virtue of the Act, the 16 branches of foreign banks operating in Malaysia have been
compelled to incorporate locally within a time frame of 5 years from the effective date of the
Act or such longer period at the discretion of the Minister of Finance. A 100% foreign
ownership of these branches is permitted. However in this case they would remain be treated
as foreign banks and would be subject to the existing policies toward foreign banks. Otherwise
they would be accorded the same status and privileges as domestic banks.
2.3 Monetary Policy as a Demand Management Policy: The Malaysian Experience
Monetary policy issues fall under the purview of the Central Bank of Malaysia. The principal
functions of the Bank which was officially inaugurated on January 24, 1959 are:
1) to issue currency and to maintain reserves in safeguarding the value of that currency;
2) to act as a banker and financial advisor to the Government;
3The minimum capital funds or net working finds that commercial banks, finance companies and merchant
banks ought to maintain are increased to M$20 mn. M$5mn and M$10 mn respectively. With respect to banks,
they were given a transitional period of one year to comply with the requirements. Whilst for finance
companies, a gradual increase in their capital funds to M$3 mn by September 30 ,1992 and to M$5 mn by
September 1995 is allowed.
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3) to promote monetary stability and a sound financial structure; and
4) to influence the credit situation in the economy to the national advantage.
To enable the Bank to discharge these duties, it is vested with comprehensive legal powers to
regulate and supervise the financial system under the Central Bank of Malaysia Ordinance,
1958, the Banking Act, 1973 and the Finance Companies Act, 1969 with subsequent
amendments as embodied in the Banking and Financial Institutions Act, 1989 to suit the
changing times. Over the years, stable economic growth, a high level of employment, stability
of the purchasing power of the Malaysian currency, poverty eradication and socioeconomic
restructuring, a high living standard and a reasonable balance in the country's international
payments position have been recognised as national economic objectives which the Bank is
expected to tend to. 	 .
Though the Bank was established in 1959, it was not until the 1970s that monetary policy
became a tool for macroeconomic stabilisation. In the 1960s, monetary policies were merely
designed for the purpose of strengthening and developing the domestic financial system as it
was the Bank's first priority then. The task of macroeconomic stabilisation was then largely
assigned to the fiscal arm of the government only to be complemented to some extent by
monetary policy. This was rendered feasible by the prevalence of the then low tax incidence
and thus there was still some scope for taxation to be used as a built-in stabiliser. Moreover
there was then a lack of indigenous banks and the predominance of foreign banks stifled the
effects of monetary policy as they had all the ways and means of circumventing the regulatory
mechanism of the Bank. However with the growing incidence of taxation over the years,
further tax policy manoeuvres became less expedient and hence arose the need for a greater
reliance on monetary measures to achieve macroeconomic stability. Furthermore fiscal policy
operations have become constrained by the socioeconomic redistribution objectives of the
government. The full assumption of the sole currency-issuing power by the Bank in 1969 and
the floating of the Malaysian currency in 1973 helped set the stage for monetary policy to play
a greater role in macroeconomic stabilisation.A number of monetary policy instruments, both
of the general impact variety and of the selective impact variety are at the Central Bank's
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disposal. They include statutory reserve requirements, minimum liquidity requirements,
discount operations, open market operations, interest rate regulation, credit control and
guidelines on lending and moral suasion. They all operate with varying degrees of efficiency.
Regulating the nations's supply of money and credit to ensure that their long run rates of
growth are consistent with the increasing and changing needs of a rapidly expanding economy
is the primary objective of the Bank. Over the short and medium run, its task is to ensure that
the growth in money and credit is adequately elastic to dampen any inflationary or deflationary
pressure in the economy and to induce a sustained growth in output and employment amid
relative price stability and external equilibrium.
Generally the choice of an appropriate monetary aggregate as an 'intermediate target' is crucial
to the success of monetary policy in macroeconomic stabilisation. The use of different
monetary aggregates namely, Ml, M2 and M3 to represent money supply may sometimes lead
to divergent policy implications. Officially MI is money narrowly-defined to comprise
currency in circulation and demand deposits of the nonbank private sector while M2 is MI
plus fixed and savings deposits of the nonbank private sector placed with the Central Bank and
the commercial banks, negotiable certificates of deposits (NCDs) and central bank certificates.
M3 is then M2 plus all private sector deposits with the finance companies, merchant banks and
discount houses and the Islamic Bank, excluding placements amongst these institutions.
The criteria for selecting an appropriate measure of money adopted by the Bank over the
period 1960-75 are the following:
1) the strength of the relationship between movements in a monetary aggregate and
movements in aggregate output or income;
2) the stability of the relationship over time; and
3) the predictive power of this relationship.
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However in practice all the three monetary aggregates have been monitored by the Bank.
Based upon the balance sheet approach, money supply in Malaysia is mainly influenced by the
following:
1) the financial management of the entire public sector;
2) the lending operations of the banking system (Central Bank and the commercial banks) to
the nonbank private sector. The bulk of the credit extended by commercial banks has been for
the financing of working capital and capital formation;
3) the external payments position of the country.
In macroeconomic management, monetary policy commonly involves the Bank's control over
liquidity. Some of the important monetary policy instruments might have suffered a loss of
efficacy and or relevance arising from financial innovation and liberalisation and policy shifts.
On the external front, freer capital movements arising from a greater integration with other
international financial centres might have also posed an added challenge to the Bank's ability to
exercise monetary control.
In common with most other monetary authorities, the Central Bank has two sets of monetary
policy instruments that affect the availability and cost of money and credit. However the more
traditional set of instruments that encompasses statutory reserve and liquidity requirements,
open market operations and discount window which operate through bank reserves has a more
global impact on the economy compared to the other set which has a more selective and direct
impact. The latter comprises interest rate regulation, credit control and lending guidelines and
moral suasion. The exigencies and efficacies of these instruments depend on the state of
development of the financial system and the Central Bank's philosophy in financial
management and legal powers. We shall outline these instruments in turn as follows:
a) Statutory reserve requirements. It is regarded as the most effective instrument of monetary
control of the Central Bank . The requirements apply not only to commercial banks but finance
companies and merchant banks as well and are defined in terms of eligible liabilities of these
institutions. Interest is not paid on these reserves. The reserve ratio has been revised from time
to time in tandem with the desired liqudity situation in the economy. The ratio applicable to
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commercial banks since January 3, 1994 is 9.5%. Since January 1, 1989, financial institutions
concerned need no longer observe the ratio applicable to them on a daily basis. They only need
to average out their required reserve holdings over a fortnightly period to meet the appropriate
ratio. This instrument was first experimented with by the Central Bank in July 1969 to curb the
then burgeoning bank liquidity by raising the reserve ratio to 5%.
b) Minimum liquidity requirements. It is imposed on commercial banks, finance companies and
merchant banks and is aimed not only at protecting depositors by ensuring the liquidity of
banks but also at influencing the credit situation. Perhaps even more so to secure bank
financing for the Government in its developments efforts by designating long term
Government securities as- one of the liquid assets that banks could hold for fulfiling the
requirements. Since the inception of the Central Bank in 1959, the minimum liquidity ratio has
only been infrequently revised. Only the portfolio composition of assets deemed liquid has
been changed by type and magnitude to cater to the changing needs of circumstances. Prior to
June 1, 1990 banks were required to maintain a primary liquid asset ratio of 5% of eligible
liabilities within the minimum overall liquidity requirements of 17%. Primary liquid assets were
defined as cash, balances with the Central Bank, net money at call with the discount houses,
Treasury Bills and Malaysian Government Securities (MGS) and Cagamas bonds with less
than one-year maturity period. As in the case of statutory reserve requirements since 1989, the
institutions concerned are permitted to observe their respective minimum liquidity ratios based
on the average holdings of eligible liquid assets over the entire stretch of each liquidity period
(i.e. from 1st to 15th and from 16th to the end of each month) instead of a daily compliance.
c) Discount operations. The Central Bank may vary the terms and condition under which the
commercial banks and other eligible institutions such as the finance companies, merchant
banks and discount houses may have access to its credit facilities via rediscounting of eligble
short-term assets or via secured advances. The rate of interest charged is referred to as the
discount rate. The Central Bank's discount policy will have a direct impact on the growth of
money and credit as an increase in discounting would add to the reserves of banks and vice-
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versa. Such facilities are traditionally associated with the Central Bank's role as a last resort
lender. They are only available to these financial institutions only as a 'privilege' aimed at
providing them with a temporary source of funds to meet large unexpected withdrawals or
portfolio adjustments and as a 'safety-valve' during a liquidity stress. Such discount window
funds are normally of short maturities up to 2 weeks and rarely exceed one month. It is
noteworthy that no formal announcement of the discount rate is made by the Central Bank as
such practice is deemed unnecessary. Nevertheless, direct borrowing from the Central Bank
collateralised by Government securities has been gaining popularity amongst financial
institutions.
d) Open market operations (0M0s). It is perhaps an even more powerful monetary policy
instrument. Irrespective of whether it is an institution or a private individual that trades
Government securities with the Central Bank, such operations inevitably yield a direct impact
on the volume of bank reserves. However due to the absence of a well-developed capital
market especially a secondary market for Government securities, OMOs have limited
practicality in Malaysia. There is only a captive market for longer-term Government securities
and usually are they held until maturity. As an alternative to the traditional 0M0s, the Central
Bank has been engaging in swap transactions with commercial banks as a means of easing any
tight inter-bank money market condition. Such transactions usually involve the trading of
Malaysian currency, i.e. the ringgit against another currency with a precommitment to reverse
the transactions at a predetermined future date and exchange rate. These are usually short term
transactions varying from 1 month to 3 months. Nonetheless, OMOs are set to become an
important instrument in the not too distant future with the ongoing efforts by the Central Bank
to promote a secondary market for Government securities.
e) Interest rate regulation. Regulation of interest rates (deposits and loans) is another conduit
of the Central Bank influence on bank liquidity and the availability and cost of bank credit.
Prior to interest rate deregulation on October 23, 1978, the minimum lending rates for 'prime'
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and 'preferential' customers of banks and the ceiling on deposit rates were fixed by the Central
Bank. The underlying rationale for such an interest rate regime were:
1) to influence the level and maturity structure of savings;
2) to boost the growth of indigenous banks by shielding them from competition from foreign
banks on the interest rate front; and
3) to influence economic activity on the belief that private borrowings and savings are
sensitive to interest rate variations.
However since the early 1970s the Central Bank has been paving the way for a more market-
oriented system of interest rate determination. A new interest rate regime was installed for the
commercial banks in October 1978 whereby they could determine the deposit and lending
rates at their own free will. However, the practice of pegging lending rates to the prime
lending rate has in more recent years been replaced by pegging to a base lending rate (BLR).
The BLR is a rate quoted by a bank based upon its cost of funds computed on the basis of cost
of holding cash, statutory reserves and liquid assets and overhead costs. The actual lending
rate charged by a bank is some positive margin from the BLR depending upon the customer's
credit standing, nature of the project to be financed, repayment schedule and the collateral
placed. However problems of asymmetric information could contain the margin.
The other instruments which have a selective impact are:
0 Credit control and guidelines on lending. Quantitative control on credit extended by
commercial banks and finance companies was first exercised in early 1974 by the Central Bank
as an anti-inflationary move. A maximum overall growth ceiling of 20% and 25% was imposed
on credit extended by commercial banks and finance companies respectively. This followed a
hefty rise in bank credit by 53%, money supply by 37.6% and consumer prices by 10.5% in
1973. The move was complemented by a set of guidelines laid down by the Central Bank on
the direction of credit designed to restrict lending for consumption and speculative purposes in
favor of productive ventures. As inflationary pressures moderated, this restriction was
subsequently lifted in February 1975.
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The other lending guidelines are also selective in their impact. In order to promote their
development, a number of sectors have been designated as 'priority' sectors. Banks are
compelled to extend them loans on preferential terms. The sectors involved so far are the
Bumiputra community, agricultural sector, manufacturing industry, building and construction,
and real estate development. Specific lending guidelines were first introduced in 1976 and they
have been subject to a regular annual review. It must be borne in mind however that these
guidelines are specified primarily in terms of shares in a bank's loan portfolio. Rarely has it
involved attempts to channel credits in quantitative terms. Furthermore the interest rates
charged on these priority loans have been positive in real terms.However the practice of
priority lendings has been downplayed by government policy of late. For instance in a March
28, 1989 announcement, guidelines on credits to agricultural food production were abolished
altogether and a greater degree of flexibility was introduced to interest rate charges so as to be
more consistent with market forces. Such selective credit policies may not affect our
subsequent analysis on credit materially as guidelines are not based upon absolute amounts of
credit to be devoted to these sectors and furthermore lending to the priority sectors constitute
only a small proportion of the total credit granted by banks. It has been estimated that loans
made under these policy guidelines constituted a mere 31% of total loans outstanding as at the
end of 1989. In general it must be noted that the selective guidelines rarely involve attempts to
channel credits in quantitative terms.
g) Moral suasion. It has also occasionally been deployed by the Central Bank to achieve a
desired situation in a more 'voluntary' spirit. For instance in the 1960s, banks were urged to
reorientate their operations by holding more domestic against foreign assets. In the 1970s and
early 1980s, they were discouraged from lending for speculative purposes and urged to be
more development-oriented . It was perceived that banks could assist in national development
by providing longer term financing on the basis of project viability rather than purely on the
ability to furnish the right collateral . The numerous calls on commercial banks to step up
lending to the priority sectors are another example of the use of moral suasion.
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However the administration of monetary policy by the Central Bank has its pitfalls too. In
general, its monetary policy stance at any point in time is a manifestation of its reaction to the
prevailing macroeconomic condition. For instance in 1975 and 1985-86, an expansionary
monetary policy was maintained to help stimulate economic recovery or to avert an economic
downturn. Instead, a contractionary monetary policy was observed e.g. in 1981 to supress
inflation by denying fuel to the ember of inflation. There are also times when monetary policy
can be regarded as neither expansionary nor restrictive. Past experiences reveal that monetary
measures have a more immediate impact on the production of goods and services than on
wages and prices. This supports the notion of wage and price stickiness in macroeconomics,
pointing to monetary policy effectiveness against policy ineffectiveness propositions.
Notwithstanding this, there are periods in the Malaysian economic history when monetary
policy revealed its inexpediency due to severity of an economic condition or the classic
dilemma of meeting conflicting objectives. An instance when monetary policy instead
succumbed to the pressure of the economy was in 1973 when the threat of imported inflation
was too intense. Even a revaluation of the Malaysian currency failed to cushion the economy
from the impact of surging prices of imports especially foodstuffs. The Government had then
to respond by undertaking measures to stabilise food prices by more direct means. The
measures included a provision of subsidies for essential food items, a discriminate removal of
import restrictions and other indirect taxes on relevant products, an imposition of export
control on deficient items and a campaign against hoarders and speculators. Moreover
monetary policy was not reinforced by fiscal policy as efforts to mop up excess liquidity were
not accompanied by any fiscal action to enhance taxes but instead were more or less offset by
the Government's obsession with spending on socioeconomic restructuring.
The case of classic dilemma has perhaps been best illustrated by events in the early part of the
1980s. In the early 1980s, monetary management was challenged with both the need to negate
the dampening effects of world recession and the need to maintain monetary stability so as not
to provide added fuel to inflation and worsen the balance-of-payments. This called for a
selectively accommodative monetary policy that would boost private investment outlays and
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output in areas experiencing demand pressures while at the same time that would check
undesirable consumption, speculation and hoarding. A policy that would induce inflows of
long term capital was also favored. The Central Bank was again confronted with a challenge
of similar sort in 1986 when the need to maintain exchange rate stability and the need to
reduce interest rates arose simultaneously. Monetary situation was then left 'tighter' then
desired most of the time in that year. The predicament emerged from uncertainty about the
Malaysian economic prospect following a drastic fall in commodity prices and upheavals in the
corporate and financial sectors. Hence despite some effort of the Central Bank to inject
liquidity into the economy, it was defeated by two bouts of speculative attack against the
Malaysian currency during April-May and August-September of the same year. Bolder
attempts were only warranted durin g. the 4th quarter when pressures on the Malaysian
currency began to show signs of relief The Central Bank then capitalised on the event on
October 15, 1986 to boost liquidity in the economy by reducing the statutory reserve
requirements for commercial banks by 0.5 percentage point to 4% of eligible liabilities while
the minimum liquidity requirements was slashed by 1.5 percentage points to 17%.
2.4 Development of the Financial System: Some Quantitative Assessment
To recapitulate, financial liberalisation encompasses measures aimed at freeing interest rates
from any regulatory and institutional constraints, promoting the development of financial
institutions and secondary markets for financial instruments, enhancing credit and deposit
facilities, formalising the unorganised financial sector and boosting competition amongst
financial institutions (Awang Adek, et.al 1992). One of the major thrusts of a financial
liberalisation program may be to permit market determination of interest rates. Increased
savings particularly financial savings could be spurred by the movement from a below
equilibrium interest rate in a financially-repressed setting to the equilibrium rate under a
competitive regime. With a larger pool of funds available, more lumpy investments could be
undertaken. Moreover low yielding and inefficient investment projects could be rationed out of
the financial market via the interest rate mechanism. This could result in an overall
enhancement of investment efficiency and national income. However there is some evidence in
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the case of Malaysia that the development of its financial system so far has actually not been
due to the maintenance of positive real yields on bank deposits. Figure 2A furnishes real
interest rate series of savings and 3-month fixed deposits with commercial banks. It seems that
negative real rates of return could even prevail in recent years despite the October 1978
interest rate liberalisation measures. This could also be due to the prevalence of equilibrium
credit rationing in the bank credit market.
Nevertheless parallel with rapid growth, relative price stability and structural changes
experienced by the Malaysian economy, the Malaysian financial system has undergone radical
transformations and financial deepening. Table 2.1 provides a comparison between
monetisation in Malaysia and in a selected group of developed countries namely Germany,
U.S., Korea and Japan over the period 1975-92 based upon the ratio of broad money supply
(M2) to GNP in nominal terms. While Malaysia maintained the second lowest ratio after
Korea in 1975, it maintained the second highest after Japan in 1992. As a digression, in fact
then there is an absence of any distinct inverse or direct relationship between this yardstick of
monetisation and national economic development. Similar comparisons can be effected vis-a-
vis other Association of South East Asian (ASEAN) countries (Table 2.11).
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Table 2.1
Ratio of Broad Money Supply (M2) to Gross National Product at Current Prices (GNP):
Selected Countries
Malaysia Germany U.S. Korea Japan
1975 0.46 0.54 0.64 0.31 0.85
1985 0.69 0.59 0.61 0.37 0.95
1989 0.77 0.60 0.59 0.41 1.15
1992 0.82 0.66 0.57 0.42 1.08
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (1994)
Malaysia has appeared to fare better than the other ASEAN countries except Singapore. The
higher degree of monetisation in the Malaysian economy is also manifest in two other
alternative measures namely the demand for nominal M2 and for bank deposits in per capita
nominal terms. There was a considerable expansion in the per capita demand for M2 and for
bank deposits from US$324 to US$2356 and from US$263 to US$2317 respectively from
1975 through 1992. Though these figures pale in comparison with Singapore's, they are still
significantly higher than those of Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia.
The notion that Malaysia is ahead in financial intermediation relative to Philippines, Thailand
and Indonesia is perhaps reflected by the ratio of total assets of the financial system to GNP in
nominal terms. The ratio rose steadily from 1.23 in 1975 to 2.81 in 1989 and further to 3.17 in
1992. Broadly similar inferences may be drawn based upon the income elasticity of assets of
financial institutions though it would suggest that Malaysia is even ahead of Singapore. The
elasticity is computed based upon the ratio of the average annual growth rate of total assets of
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Table 2.11 
ASEAN: Selected Measures of Monetisation and Financial Deepening, 1975 - 1002
Indonesia N1a1a)sia Philippines Singapore Thailand
1975 1985 1989 1992 1975 1985 1989 1992 1975 1985 1989 1992 1975 1985 1989 1992 1975 1985 1989 1992
N42/GNP 0 17 0.25 0.37 0.48 0.46 0.69 0 77 0.82 0.24 0.29 0.33 0.36 0.61 0.70 0.90 099 0.34 060 0 69 09(1
M2 per capita
(nominal US$
terms)
35 125 182 308 324 1325 1586 2356 85 154 222 303 1451 5223 10153 16326 121 432 851 1437
Per capita bank
deposits (US$)
21 82 132 218 263 1394 1596 2317 52 130 180 252 1160 4344 8851 14541 94 185 706 1	 i 12
Total financial
s3stein assets/GNP
041 0.68 074 1.10 123 2.14 281 3.17 082 1.36 1.12 1.05 4.50 764 10 34 861 0b4 1 20 III) 1 74
1975 - 1992 1975 - 1992 1975 - 1992 1975 - 1992 1975 - 1992
Income elasticity
of financial system
1.34 1.64 1.11 14$ 1 54
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (1994)
the financial system to the average annual growth rate of GNP in nominal terms. An elasticity
exceeding unity would imply a process of financial deepening. The elasticity calculated over
the 1975-92 period for Malaysia is 1.64 and is the highest of all the' ASEAN countries under
review.
Nonetheless, the development of the financial system has not distinctly produced any upward
trend in the income velocities of circulation of MO (currency-in-circulation) and MI be they
nominal or real (Figures 2B & 2C). In the case of M2 however, a downward trend is apparent
instead and this probably reflects the continued progress in financial intermediation made by
the Malaysian economy.
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Chapter 3
MONEY DEMAND
3.0 OVERVIEW
This chapter of the thesis deals with the estimation of Malaysian money demand functions
against the backdrop of financial liberalisation/innovation process that the Malaysian financial
system has undergone. Financial sector reforms have important ramifications on the design and
conduct of monetary policy as they affect the stability of money demand functions. This is
because a stable money demand function is a prerequisite for a monetary policy to achieve its
desired objectives. Reforms of the financial sector have been a global phenomenon with their
acceleration in the late 1970s in many industrial countries and in the early 1980s in several
developing countries in the Pacific Basin and Latin America. In many African countries and
Eastern Europe, major financial reforms have been underway.
It is envisaged that very useful policy implications can be drawn from this exercise as money
demand represents one of the channels of monetary transmission mechanism. Moreover it is
contended by a number of researchers that changes to broad monetary aggregates emanate
primarily from money demand shocks rather than money supply or monetary policy shocks
(Christiano & Eichenbaum, 1992).
In addition, this chapter addresses the issue of effectiveness from the viewpoint of exchange
rate sensitivity of money demand. This relates to Mundell's (1963) notion that the elasticity of
money demand with respect to the exchange rate has a bearing on the relative effectiveness of
monetary and fiscal policies. In a flexible exchange rate regime, if the demand for money
indeed depends upon the exchange rate apart from the levels of interest rates and income, the
monetary policy effects on income and employment may be compromised while the
effectiveness of fiscal policy may be enhanced both to some extent. Monetary policy would
lose its effectiveness if the impact of a depreciation is negative on money demand (Bahmani-
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Oskooee & Pourheydarian, 1990). For instance when the domestic currency is weak vis-a-vis
foreign currencies, any expansionary monetary policy pursued by the monetary authority may
be defeated in its objective as agents may favor foreign against the domestic currency. This is
however an irrelevant issue in the case of a fixed exchange rate regime since there would be no
movements in the exchange rate that would create an incentive for agents to transform their
financial assets from one currency denomination to another.
The rest of this chapter is configured as follows. Section 3.1 provides a review of the general
literature on money demand including a brief reference to past studies on Malaysian money
demand as they have not been properly conducted. Section 3.2 discusses the demand functions
to be estimated and Section 3.3 describes the data mobilised in our modelling exercise. The
time series characteristics of the data are explored in Section 3.4. Estimates of the long run
money demand functions via the use of Johansen's cointegration technique are presented in
Section 3.5 while Section 3.6 deals with the modelling of short run dynamics. Finally the
chapter concludes with remarks in Section 3.7.
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3.1 Literature Review on Money Demand
3.1.1 General Literature
The demand for money is an issue that has been studied extensively at both the micro and the
macro level (Adam, 1992). The microeconomic foundations of money demand are principally
laid down by Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) who lay stress on the transactionary motive
and Tobin (1958) who lays stress on liquidity and portfolio selection. Noteworthy extensions
of the transactions model to include uncertainty and precautionary motives are made by Miller
& Orr (1966), Akerlof & Milbourne (1980) and Sprenkle & Miller (1980). Money's role as a
medium of exchange in markets for goods and services is underscored by Mc Callum (1989,
ch.3) and Dowd (1990) in analysing the demand for money. They introduced the concept of
'shopping time' based upon the notion that trade with money as opposed to barter trade
generates larger savings in shopping time which has value and so is welfare enhancing. This is
because the time saved can be expended on utility-maximising leisure or on paid employment.
In an empirical implementation, Dowd (1990) explores the notion that the wage rate which
can be used as a proxy for the value of transactions time has a bearing on money demand. This
is in view of the fact that money helps in the economisation of transaction costs and such costs
include an element of time.
Money as a store of value is underscored in the overlapping generations (OLG) framework by
Sargent & Wallace (1982) and Wallace (1988). What matters in the OLG model is the
durability of money that enables it to act as a store of value and not money's role in the
economisation of shopping time.
At the macroeconomic level, the demand for money analysis was popularised by Friedman
(1956) based upon Fisher's quantity theory of money. However following the 1973 oil shock,
many estimated money demand functions persistently overpredicted real money holdings (see
Goldfeld, 1976). This implies a dramatic surge in the velocity of circulation of money in the
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mid 1970s, a period commonly dubbed as the 'missing money' episode. This triggered two
major responses in research (Adam, 1992):
1. A search for a more comprehensive specification of the money demand function by
entertaining the possibility of omitted variable biases arising from structural changes and
financial innovations. Attention was then devoted specifically to domestic interest rates and
currency substitution effects. Nevertheless such respecification efforts were found only to be a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the restoration of the stability of the aggregate
demand for money function;
2. As a corollary of the above, the cointe2ration and error correction technique in modelling
the demand for money (see Granger (1986), Engle & Granger (1987), Hendry (1986) and
Johansen & Juselius (1990)) was developed. The use of the technique helps in averting
spurious regression problems as prior to the application of the technique, the time series
properties of the variables will have to be examined to ensure their consistency with one
another. Hence it provides a more robust means of estimating long run relationships amongst a
set of macroeconomic variables of interest and their short run dynamics.
The issue of dynamic specification as discussed in (1) above is also featured strongly in the
development of buffer stock or disequilibrium theories of money demand (Adam, 1992). Artis
& Lewis (1976), Laidler (1985) and Carr & Darby (1981) are amongst those closely
associated with these models. The buffer stock theory of money demand generally assumes
that unanticipated changes in the money supply are initially absorbed in holdings of money
balances which would gradually be disbursed for the purchase of a broad spectrum of assets
and goods via the operation of the real balance effect. A popular empirical implementation of
the buffer stock approach is the shock absorber model developed by Carr & Darby (1981)
which includes the unanticipated component of the money supply as an additional argument in
the partial adjustment money demand model. The rationale for the introduction of this money
shock variable is to overcome the limitations of the partial adjustment model such as its
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frequent inaccurate predictions of real money balances and a mal-implication yielded by the
model that the interest rate would overshoot in the short run following variations in money
supply (Boughton & Tavlas, 1990). This mal-implication arises from the fact that the partial
adjustment model includes a lagged dependent variable as one of the regressors which
necessarily implies that the interest elasticity of money demand is smaller in magnitude in the
short run than in the long run. Hence for changes in the money supply to be willingly held, the
interest rate has to overshoot its long run equilibrium level in the short run. However interest
rate overshooting is not a phenomenon in financial markets as contended by monetarists
(Goodhart, 1984). Instead of incorporating money supply shocks, other studies have also
incorporated variables such as bank advances and the budget deficit as a proxy for 'shocks'
(Cuthbertson & Taylor, 1990). The buffer stock element is modelled by Cuthbertson (1988)
and Cuthbertson & Taylor (1989) by assuming the influence of short run demand for money
by 'surprises' in income, prices and interest rates.
It is generally believed and also entirely plausible that economic and financial sector
development experienced by a country has a bearing on the stability of its money demand
function. Institutional developments have been broadly perceived as being responsible for the
observed long run cycles in the money demand function (see e.g. Bordo & Jonung, 1987 &
1990). At an early stage of economic and financial system development, it is typical for an
economy to encounter a downward trend in its money velocity in tandem with the growing
degree of monetisation in the economy (Tseng & Corker, 1991). However as the economy
grows in sophistication, a reversal could generally be anticipated as financial market
innovations would warrant an economisation of money holdin gs amongst economic agents.
The variation of the velocity with the stage of economic and financial development would then
affect the stability of the money demand function. The notion that financial innovations would
generate an instability of the function is actually not novel and it is traceable back to Gurley &
Shaw (1955 & 1960). They contended that the interest elasticity of money demand would be
significantly boosted by a proliferation of money substitutes in the financial market and the
structural changes that it undergoes. The interest elasticity would be significantly enhanced by
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the increasing presence of interest bearing money substitutes. Lieberman (1977) argues that an
increasing resort to credit and money substitutes, a better synchronisation between receipt and
expenditure flows, and a greater efficiency of the payments meChanism may precipitate a
permanent decline over time in the transactions demand for money. In focussing on currency
demands, Ochs & Rush (1983) maintain that once currency economising innovations have
been initiated, the demand for money can be expected to be permanently affected as these
innovations may involve massive initial capital outlays though their operating costs may be
low. Hence some element of irreversibility is involved.
The period of 'great velocity decline' in the 1980s as opposed to the period of 'missing money'
in the 1970s in the industrial countries most notably U.K. and U.S. does not constitute a
refutal of the negative influence of financial innovations on money demand as the former was
characterised by an acceptance of more financial instruments as money. However, Hendry &
Ericsson (1990) have shown that the 'missing money' and the 'great velocity decline' episodes
in the U.S. and U.K. were due to misspecified dynamics and omitted interest rate volatility and
not due to financial innovation. Nevertheless, Laidler (1993) contends that the notion of a
stable long run demand for money function remains to have empirical content and of policy
relevance despite institutional changes.
3.1.11 Previous Estimates of Money Demand in Malaysia
It is doubtless that there exists previously estimated money demand functions of Malaysia.
However these studies (Semudram, 1981; Ghaffar & Muzaffar, 1987a &1987b; and Rahim,
1986) are subject to methodological and data limitations. None of these studies explored the
time series properties of the data mobilised by them let alone the use of cointegration
technique. Thus they may suffer from spurious regression problems. All the studies above
possibly with the exception of the one by Rahim suffer severely from the problem of limited
degrees of freedom. The study by Semudram (1981) merely makes use of annual data
spanning from 1959 through 1977 while those of Ghaffar & Muzaffar from 1960 through
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1984. Though Rahim's study makes use of quarterly data spanning from 1965.1 through
1984.IV, like the other Malaysian studies cited, the validity of the estimation period is
questionable since the Central Bank of Malaysia only began assuming its currency-issuance
power in 1967 and that there was a significant revision of the MI data series in 1971. No
attempt was made by them to assess the possible influence of exchange rate movements on
domestic money demand bearing in mind that Malaysia is a very open economy. These
researchers did not even subject their estimates to proper diagnostic tests for problems of
autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and normality of residuals. All of them merely focussed
upon first order serial correlation problems when higher order autocorrelation problems may
be present. Furthermore, no attempt was even made by them to check the ability of their
estimated fiinctions to track the historical data.
Though these previous works are subject to technical and data limitations as discussed above,
perhaps it may be of interest to highlight their results. Semudram (1981) found the long run
income elasticities of demand for real M1 and real M2 to be 0.9685 and 1.4956 respectively.
Interest rate as proxied by the one-year Treasury Bill rate is also found by him to have a
negative bearing on these demands with long run elasticities of -0.4434 and -0.3954
respectively. Following the partial adjustment approach, the short run income elasticities are
estimated at 0.5121 and 0.8845 for real M1 and M2 respectively. With regard to short run
interest rate elasticities, they are estimated at -0.3681 and -0.2816 respectively.
Turning to the results of Ghaffar Muzaffar (1987a), income elasticities of demand for real
MI, M2 and M3 are estimated at 1.156, 1.702 and 1.861 respectively while their respective
short run income elasticities are 0.615, 0.664 and 0.48. Proxied by a 3-month Treasury Bill
rate, the alternative rate of return is also found to have a negative influence on real MI, M2
and M3 demands with the long run elasticity for each of these a ggregates estimated at -0.36, -
0.293 and -0.320 respectively. Their respective short run interest rate elasticities are -0.192, -
0.114 and -0.083. However their estimated inflation elasticities of real M2 and M3 demands
are rather large at -1.777 and -3.505 respectively. In a subsequent study, Ghaffar & Muzaffar
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(1987b) estimated the short run income, inflation and interest rate elasticities of real currency
demand at 0.513, -1.022 and -0.312 respectively. Their respective long run elasticities are
1.646, -3.277 and -1.001. With regard to the demand for real demand deposits, they estimated
0.902, -0.719 and -0.279 as short run income, inflation and interest rate elasticities
respectively. Their corresponding long run elasticities are 1.447, -1.154 and -0.447
respectively. The study by Rahim (1986) reveals a long run income elasticity of real M1
demand of 1.14 while the long run interest elasticity is estimated at 0.19. Their respective
short run elasticities are estimated at 0.311 and -0.053.
More recent works on money demand for a group of developing countries in which Malaysia
is included include those of Tseng & Corker (1991) and Arrau & Gregorio (1991). In respect
of Malaysia, the work by Arrau, et.al involved quarterly data spanning from the first quarter of
1980 through the second quarter of 1988. Their focus was merely on M1 and perhaps a major
limitation of their analysis was that theirs was couched in per capita terms. Moreover no
consideration was given to the possible influence of expected exchange rate depreciation on
money demand. All in all, Arrau, et.al  achieved disappointing results in the case of Malaysia as
they failed to establish any cointegrating relationship at all. This could be due to the fact that
their analysis was inappropriately couched in per capita terms.
Tseng & Corker (1991) investigate the effect of financial liberalisation on money demand in
the SEACEN countries with a focus on the stability and predictability of broad and narrow
monetary aggregates during the 1980s. Though they did explore the possibility of the influence
of foreign interest rates on local money demand via an incorporation of the London Interbank
Offer Rate (LIBOR), they merely made use of the Engle & Granger (1987) approach that does
not provide for the possibility of multiple cointegrating vectors. While they could distinctly
establish a cointegration between real M1 demand and income with an elasticity of 1.11, they
could not ascertain clearly whether there exists some cointegrating relationship in respect of
real M2 demand.
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3.2 The Long-Run Money Demand Estimation Framework
The following is a general representation of the long run money demand functions that we
attempt to estimate:
( Al P ) id =
M = money demand (MO, M1 & M2)
P = domestic consumer price index (1985=1 00)
Y = gross domestic product at 1985 constant prices
r°= money's own rate of return
r a = rate of return on alternative assets
st =expected exchange rate proxied by a one-period lead in an index computed on the basis of
exchange rates between M$ and UK pound, US$ and S$ with an equal weight being assigned
to each of the foreign currencies.
Except for interest rates, all variables have been transformed into natural logarithm terms.
In estimating the money demand functions, three alternative monetary aggregates have been
explored namely, MO, M1 and M2. Since the demand for money is essentially a demand for
real balances (Laidler, 1993), our estimates of money demand functions are couched in real
terms. Theoretically the demand for money however defined varies directly with income as a
scale variable. If the income elasticity of demand for money is less than unity, economies of
scale in cash management or holdings is implied (Baumol, 1952; Tobin, 1956). An alternative
to income as a scale variable is wealth. It is contended by Friedman that a more inclusive
concept of wealth that embodies both human as well as nonhuman wealth be adopted when
gauging the constraint on money demand. However no attempt is made to incorporate wealth
in our analysis as its measurement is problematic especially in the case of a developing
economy such as Malaysia.
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With regard to the coefficients of the other variables, their directions and significance would
hinge upon the monetary aggregate being examined. Since MO and MI are non interest
bearing, f, is expected to be null in their regressions. For M2, money's own rate of interest
can be proxied by some deposit rate of interest and is expected to yield a positive influence on
the demand for M2. Specifically the rate of interest on M2 may be proxied by some deposit
rate of interest offered by commercial banks. However it may be contended that money's own
rate of interest may be more appropriately represented by the negative of the rate of inflation
in the context of developing countries. In the case of developing countries, interest rates are
rarely regarded as a significant determinant of the demand for money for two major reasons.
In one respect, agents are restricted to the holding of monetary claims mainly currency and
bank deposits owing to a lack of alternative financial instruments. In another, interest rates are
typically regulated and set below their equilibrium level. These may lead to an immateriality of
interest rates in decisions pertaining to the amount of money to be held.
An acceleration in the rate of inflation may depress money demand especially if it leads to the
formation of inflationary expectations. Under such circumstances, agents may prefer to hold
their wealth in physical forms which may be referred to generally as inflation hedges. In fact
the traditional view of money as a transaction asset regards money as a constant, generally
zero rate of return riskless asset. However amid uncertainty in price movements, this
assumption may lose its tenability. Mizrach & Santomero (1990) contend that money demand
is depressed by inflation risk, and hence the justification for the inclusion of the rate of
inflation in the money demand function. However the rate of inflation may also yield a positive
influence on money demand. Klein (1977) argued that the quality of cash balances would
deteriorate when there is unexpected inflation which would induce consumers to hold a larger
quantity of money. In his empirical endeavors, he discovered a positive relationship between
price variability and money demand. This may be true if there is a lot of uncertainty in the
developments of the price level and especially when money is being held mainly for
transactionary purposes. However the relationship is discovered to be negative by Smirlock
(1982) based upon the use of several measures of inflation uncertainty in Goldfeld's money
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demand specification. Specifically in the context of developing countries, the anticipated rate
of inflation has in fact been widely used as a proxy for the opportunity cost of holding money
and found to yield a significant explanatory power in the money d,emand function (Wong,
1977).1
With regard to the rate of return on alternative assets which is an opportunity cost variable,
the interest rate offered by commercial banks may be the appropriate proxy in respect of MO
and M1 though undeniably there is a multiplicity of interest rates existing in the market at any
one time. Nevertheless so long as all the rates are moving together, any one of them may
probably be as appropriate as the other to be deployed in the money demand function. This
seems to be the general tendency in Malaysia. Anyhow in general, results pertaining to the
opportunity cost influence on holding money are not very sensitive to the precise choice of the
variable. It seems rather more important to include an interest rate variable in a money demand
function than to be concerned with the appropriate measure of the opportunity cost variable
(Laidler, 1993). In the case of M2, the appropriate opportunity cost variable may then be the
interest rate offered by finance companies. However since interest rates offered by these
companies are not reported prior to 1978, we have decided to use the 3-month Treasury Bill
rate as a proxy.
Since Malaysia is an open economy and has been maintaining a liberal exchange control
regime since 1973, foreign interest rate developments may have a bearing upon domestic
money demand. Hamburger (1977) maintains that the rate of return earnable from holding
foreign securities may constitute another opportunity cost variable when modelling money
demand in an open economy context. Nevertheless if world's capital markets are closely
integrated, cross-border interest rate differentials may tend towards zero. Under such
circumstances, it is adequate to have just a domestic interest rate variable incorporated in the
/ In our empirical endeavors later, the rate of inflation is not incorporated into the long run money demand
function since it is found to be an 1(0) variable. However when modelling the short run dynamics of money
demand, the rate of inflation is postulated to have an influence on money demand and duly incorporated into
our analysis.
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money demand function. However if foreign interest rate considerations are relevant, future
movements in the exchange rate would also become pertinent. The impact of exchange rate
depreciation on money demand could be negative if a domestic currency depreciation leads the
public to anticipate a further reduction, prompting them to demand more foreign currency
against domestic currency. On the other hand, a positive impact could also be envisaged if a
depreciation arouses expectations that the domestic currency would rebound thus inducing
people to hold more domestic money. In our empirical implementation later, it is implicitly
assumed that exchange rate movements do reflect domestic-overseas interest rate differentials.
Hence we do not include interest rates abroad.
3.3 Data Considerations -
Our period of review generally spans from 1971 through 1991 subject to the availability of
individual data series. Though this is a quarterly-based study, monthly data have been gathered
to derive quarterly series as published quarterly data are mainly end-of-period rather than
periodic average observations. Data are drawn from the numerous issues of the Quarterly and
Monthly Economic Bulletins of the Central Bank of Malaysia and the International Financial
Statistics published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Annual income series namely
real gross domestic product has been interpolated over the missing quarterly observations
based upon the industrial production index. This is effected by apportioning annual real gross
domestic product figures to each quarter of a year based upon the industrial production index
reported for the corresponding quarter. Prior to this, an attempt was also made to interpolate
based upon the method developed by Goldstein & Khan (1976) method. However the results
turned out to be disappointing when the conventional unit root test was applied to the
generated series as severe serial correlation problems were encountered.
As our research is concerned with private sector demand for money, official series of MI and
M2 have not been relied upon as these series include balances held by Federal and State public
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authorities. These authorities have been officially defined as part of the private sector. Our
definitions are as follows:
MO - Currency-in-circulation;
Ml - MO plus demand deposits of the private sector placed with commercial banks. (The
official definition of demand deposits of the private sector includes demand deposits placed
with the Central Bank of Malaysia by the Federal and State public authorities though the
amount involved is negligible); and
M2 - Ml plus quasi money placed with commercial banks.
The consumer price index forms the basis of our computation of the rate of inflation and also
acts as a price deflator for the nominal money series. This is mooted by the fact that it has a
greater influence on the majority of people.
Two interest rate series are being mobilised in our analysis namely the 3-month fixed deposit
rate offered by commercial banks and the 3-month Treasury Bill rate. In our estimation
process, these two series are being tried upon to capture the opportunity cost influence on real
MO and MI demands. However in the process of estimating the real M2 demand function, the
3-month fixed deposit rate and the 3-month Treasury Bill rate are designed to capture the own
rate of return and opportunity cost influences respectively. This is because unlike MO and MI
which are non interest bearing, M2 has an interest bearing component.
Owing to Malaysia's traditional trading and financial ties with U.K., the reserve currency
position of the U.S.$ and the geographical proximity of Malaysia to Singapore, there lies the
possibility that exchange rate movements of the Malaysian currency vis-a-vis those of these
countries will have an impact on real money balances in Malaysia. As mentioned earlier, an
exchange rate index is computed based upon the exchange rates between the M$ on one hand
and U.K. pound, U.S.$ and S$ on the other with weights equally assigned to these foreign
currencies. This is because financial resource movements rarely respect fundamentals in an
economy. Since the exchange rates published in the IFS are bilateral rates between a currency
vis-a-vis the U.S.$, the bilateral rates between the Malaysian ringgit vis-a-vis the U.K. pound
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and S$ are derived as cross rates. The expected exchange rate is then proxied by a one-period
lead of this index assuming perfect foresight.
,
3.4 Conventional and Seasonal Unit Root Tests
This section discusses the unit root tests applied to the data mobilised by us namely the
conventional (Dickey-Fuller-based) tests for unit roots and the seasonal unit root test. The
latter is also attempted as the presence of seasonal unit roots may call for the use of seasonal
cointegration technique instead. In the subsequent paragraphs, the techniques employed are
first discussed followed by a discussion of their results.
Prior to assessing relationships amongst variables based upon the notion of cointegration, their
univariate time series properties have to be examined, i.e. their order of integration. Granger
(1983) put forth the concept of cointegration which acknowledges the possibility that though
an unit root may be present in individual time series, a linear combination may not display an
unit root behavior. An univariate test for unit roots was first advocated by Fuller (1976) and
Dickey & Fuller (1981). Economic time series are typically integrated of order one, I(1). This
implies that non stationarity in this variable is typically stochastic rather than deterministic and
it can be rendered stationary by first differencing.
Apart from conducting the usual unit root tests, seasonal unit root tests are also attempted to
ascertain whether the series in question possess an unit root at some frequency other than the
usual zero frequency, namely biannual and or annual frequencies which may be the case with
quarterly data. For instance there are a few U.K. macroeconomic variables which exhibit
nonstationary stochastic seasonality (see inter alia Osborn, 1990). If unit root at these other
frequencies is found for a set of variables, an application of the seasonal cointegration
technique may be called for. The standard procedure of testing for cointegration may become
inappropriate. However for two series to be seasonally cointegrated, they must have an unit
root at the same frequency.
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Here the Dickey-Fuller based approaches are relied upon to test for conventional unit roots. In
principle, it involves running the following univariate regression:
AY1 = ao +alYi-i + E	 /it	 (3.4.1)
,./
where y, is the natural logarithm of the variable of interest and ii is a white noise stationary
error term. Equation (3.4.1) may also be augmented by a deterministic trend term. 
' y  is non
stationary, a, will assume a zero value and y, is deemed to have an unit root. The null
hypothesis that a, = 0 can be tested by reference to its usual t-statistics computed as the ratio
of a, to its estimated standard error. This statistic is referred to as the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) statistic. However the distribution of ADF does not follow the usual student's t.
Approximate critical values of this statistic can be found originally in Fuller 0'974 The
number of lags (n) in (3.4.1) has to be selected such that the regression yields non-serially
correlated errors. If n=0, the t-value is referred to just as the Dickey-Fuller (DF) statistic
though its critical values are similar to cases requiring augmentation.
Equation (3.4.1) is just designed for testing whether a series is I(1) or I(0) though an I(1)
outcome need not suggest that the series is inherently I(1). However in the implementation of
the test, the possibility that the series is integrated of higher order is also explored along the
lines of Dickey & Pantula (1988). We proceed on the assumption that the order of integration
of each series is at most 2. Dickey and Pantula propose the procedure of moving from the
highest level of differencing that one would contemplate to the lowest level and not vice-versa,
guided by a sequence of one-sided t-tests.
Before discussing the results of these tests, we discuss briefly the seasonal unit root test
procedure employed by us as developed by Hylleberg, Engle, Granger and Yoo (1990)
referred to as the FIEGY procedure. As pointed out earlier, the standard cointegration
technique may not be applicable if the relevant data series are plagued with seasonal unit root
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problems. In the literature, a few attempts to develop such tests exist for instance the one
proposed by Dickey, Hasza and Fuller (1984). The HEGY test may be administered to a series
y, by estimating the following equation:
9 i ( B )Y 41 — ITY11-1 + 172y 21-1 + 173Y3 i _2+ 114.Y3t-i + lit ± (3.4.2)
where y,, = (I+ L + L2 + L3 ).x,
y2, = —(1— L+ L2 —1.3)X,
Y3t = -( 1- L2)X1
y4, = (I — L4)x,
and ut may consist of deterministic terms such as seasonal dummies, time trend and constant.
Additional lags of y4 may be introduced in the estimation process to whiten the errors. Based
upon estimates of the above, the following null hypotheses may be evaluated:
I	 .110 :171 =
II	 H0 :17, =
III H0 :173 =
0
0
174 = 0
H.4:171
H .,:17,
H4:173
-‹
-‹ 0
 0
 0
The first null hypothesis corresponds to a test that the series in question has an unit root at
zero frequency while the second relates to one that it possesses an unit root at biannual
frequency. The third deals with the test for the presence of unit root at annual frequency. An
alternative course to III is to pursue a two-sided test of H4 =0 and conditional upon its
acceptance, proceed to a one-sided test of 113 =0 vis-a-vis the alternative 17, -<0. Seasonal unit
roots are said to be absent if 17, and either 173 or 174 are different from zero. This calls for a
rejection of both a test for 17, and a joint test for 173 and IT, .
Table 3.1 furnishes the results of the Dickey-Fuller-based unit root tests at three different
orders, namely second difference, first difference and levels despite the general conviction that
most economic time series are 1(1). The results are arrived at after subjecting each regression
to a spate of Lagrangean Multiplier (LM) tests for serial correlation at the 5 per cent
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significance level ranging from the first to the fourth order. This is to ensure that no serial
correlation is present that could render a bias to our inferences. Deterministic seasonal
dummies have been included for those series namely MO, MI and M2' and real GDP as their
inclusion drastically reduced the number of lags required to generate non-autocorrelated
errors.
Table 3.1
Dickey-Fuller Tests (Without Time Trend)
Levels First Difference Second Difference
LRMO -2.2423 -7.7588 -10.6738
LRM1 -1.3612 -5.7908 -10.2027
LRM2 -2.2051 -7.2258 -9.4562
LCP -1.1399 -3.4663 -8.5071
R3FD -2.4849 -5.3242 -7.6451
LRGDP -0.7727 -4.4561 -7.5635
LS -2.3690 -6.4656 -7.2290
R3TB -1.6756 -6.2678 -5.7915
Notes: I) All variables are in natural logarithm except for interest rates
II) LRMO - real MO
LRM1 - real M1
LRM2 - real M2
LCP	 - consumer price index
R3FD - 3-month fixed deposit rate offered by commercial banks
LRGDP - real gross domestic product
LS	 - exchange rate index
R3TB - 3-month Treasury Bill rate
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III)Critical values at the 5 per cent significance level for 50 and 100 observations are -
-2.93 and -2.89 respectively
,
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It can be discerned from the table that all the variables are 41). Since the consumer price index
(LCP) is 41), we may deduce that the rate of inflation is I(0). The results based upon the
inclusion of the deterministic time trend in respect of non interest rate-variables are presented
in Table 3.11. It is suggested by the table that all the variables are indeed 41).
Table 3.11
Dickey-Fuller Tests (With Time Trend)
Levels
LMO -1.8524
LRMO -1.5569
LM1 -2.8895
LRM1 -2.0289
LM2 -1.6396
LRM2 -1.0779
LCP -1.7673
LRGDP -1.8955
LS -2.0442
Notes: I) LMO - nominal MO
LM1 - nominal M1
LM2 - nominal M2
II) Critical values at the 5 per cent significance level for 50 and 100 observations are
-3.50 and -3.45 respectively.
I
Table 3.111 presents the results of seasonal unit root tests, allowing for five different
configurations for each series namely, when all deterministic terms are absent, when only an
intercept (I) is included, when an intercept (I) and seasonal dummies (SD) are included,
when an intercept (I) and a trend term (Tr) are included and when all the deterministic terms
are present. All the series unambiguously have an unit root at zero frequency as indicated by
the t-statistics of HI . The inclusion of deterministic seasonal dummies appears to render most
series clear from seasonal unit root problems though certain series namely real and nominal
M2 and the exchange rate index are inherently free from seasonals as even no seasonal
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dummies are required for such variables Perhaps it can be deduced that generally seasonal
influence on these series can be adequately captured by an incorporation of deterministic
seasonal dummies.
Table 3.111
Seasonal Unit Root Tests
(The HEGY Procedure)
`t':7c 1 `e:7t2 `e:7c3 `V:7t4 'F':7c3nn4
LMO- 1.707 -0.204 0.410 -0.172 0.098
I
-0.411 -0.026 0.799 -0.425 0.406
I,SD -2.618 -4.093* -1.856 -1.957 3.630
I,Tr -1.759 -0.054 0.867 -0.452 0.473
I,SD,Tr -3.633 -3.468* -3.171 -2.773* 8.799*
LRMO- 0.932 0.409 0.692 0.079 0.242
I -1.011 0.404 0.731 0.043 0.268
I,SD -2.118 -3.118* -9.855 -2.822* 9.120*
I,Tr -2.449 0.465 0.745 0.147 0.287
I,SD,Tr -2.887 -3.069** -3.521 -2.339* 8.849*
LM1- 2.890 -0.263 -0.974 -1.322 1.372
I -1.473 -0.238 -0.978 -1.290 1.333
I,SD -2.128 -9.936** -3.245 -3.139* 11.908*
I,Tr -1.745 -0.266 -1.010 -1.231 1.291
I,SD,Tr -3.633 -4.612* -2.807 -4.359* 13.447*
LRM1- 3.345 -0.299 -1.386 -1.455 2.105
I -0.396 -0.311 -1.361 -1.448 2.058
I,SD -0.306 -3.153* -3.227 -2.610* 10.072*
I,Tr -1.784 0.186 -0.893 -0.555 0.561
I,SD,Tr -2.750 -6.616* -4.068* -5.182* 30•337*
LM2- 2.000 -9.135* -1.965* -2.079** 4.326*
I -1.856 -2.072* -2.142* -2.029** 4.615*
I,SD -1.732 -4.150* -9.299 -4.475* 12.674*
I.Tr -1.972 -2.107* -2.047* -1.985** 4.296*
I,SD,Tr -2.316 -3.972* -9.321 -4.146* 11.282*
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l':71- 1 `t':x 2 `t': K 3 ‘C:g4 'F':n- 3 nx - 4
LRM2 -	 3.022 -2.465* -2.639* -2.280* 6.785*
I	 -1.501 -2.410* -2.772* -2.245* 7.102*
LSD
	 -1.811 -5.226* -4.187* -5.760* 37.072*
I,Tr	 -1.375 -2.417* -2.706* -2.167* 6.674*
L SD, Tr -1.364 -5.262* -4.291* -5.643* 37.231*
LCP -	 -2.147* -1.406 -0.312 4.233* 8.992*
I	 -1.114 -2.602* -2.239* 4.427* 13.690*
I,SD
	 -1.015 -3.736* -2.314 -5.137* 18.283*
I,Tr	 -1.723 -1.399 -0.476 4.133* 8.632*
I, SD,Tr -1.825 -5.676*
-3.296 • -7.632* 46.722*
LRGDP - 2.758
-0.924 -0.255 -1.118 0.652
I -0.511 -0.934 -0.246
-1.128 0.661
I,SD -0.884 4.464* 4•393* -2.902* 16.8462*
I,Tr -2.084 -0.921
-0.297 -1.068 0.609
I,SD,Tr -1.896 4.506* 4.540* -2.809* 17.308*
LS -1.186 -4.675* -2.786* 4.917* 15.767*
I -2.348 4.586* -2.916* 4.682* 15.059*
I,SD -2.332 4.543* -2.912 4.593* 14.601*
I,Tr -2.168 4.532* -2.862* -4.584* 14.343*
I,SD,Tr -2.131 4.490* -2.856 4.499* 13.901*
* Significant at the 5 per cent level
** Significant at the 10 per cent level
In brief; the exercise in this section has shown that all the variables are 41). This implies that
,
the series could be rendered stationary by just first differencing. Moreover no seasonal unit
root problem is found.
3.5 Estimates of Long Run Money Demand Functions
An attempt is made here to estimate the long run Malaysian money demand functions using the
cointegration technique developed by Johansen. A major advantage of the Johansen's
maximum likelihood approach to cointegration over the Ordinary Least Squares approach is
that it allows for the possible existence of multiple cointegrating vectors and their
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identification especially in regressions involvinu. more than two variables (Cuthbertson et.al ,
1992). The procedure begins from the following standard vector autoregression:
Xt = ITX(-1+ 	 +174Xt_k ef	 (3.5.1)
where X is an Nxl vector of the I(1) variables and 17, is an NxN matrix of parameters.
Reparameterisation of the system of equations (3.5.1) in an ECM form yields the following:
= FI AXt--1 ± 	 +rk-1LIA7 k-l +f; Xt-k +et	 (3.5.2)
where /7 = —(I	 i=1, 	
The long run (levels) relationship amongst the variables in the VAR is embodied in r„. By
virtue that X, is a vector of I(1) variables, the left-hand side and the first (k-1) terms of (3.5.2)
must be I(0) while the last represents a linear combination of I(1) variables. All the possible
distinct combinations of the levels of X that yield high correlations with the I(0) elements in
(3.5.2) are then estimated. These combinations are referred to as the cointegrating vectors.
The rank of the vector /7„ is determined by the number of cointegrating vectors, r, amongst
the elements of X. There are three possible scenarios subject to the rank of If 1 7, is of full
rank N, the matrix is then stationary and by implication, the elements in vector X are not 41).
On the other hand, if its rank is zero, then all the individual variables in X are I(1) but not
cointegrated. However if its rank, r is greater than zero but less than N, then there exists r
cointegrated vectors which are identifiable and incorporatable into an error correction model.
Except for the final term, all terms on the right hand side of (3.5.2) are clearly I(0). Hence the
final term must also be 1(0), i.e. TA.X„. x I(0). For it to be I(0), either /7, must harbor a
number of cointegrating vectors or / 7„ must be a null matrix.
Now let 11 be an Nxr matrix such that /J A', k X 1(0). If all the elements of X, are 41), then
the columns of p must form cointecuating parameter vectors for X, , and by implication X, .
Since the maximum number of cointegrating vectors can only be (N-1), p must have r smaller
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than N. However ig must be a matrix of zeroes if X is 1(1) and yet no cointegration exists
amongst the elements.
Next consider another (Nxr) matrix a such that
—rk = ag	 (3.5.3)
The Johansen technique is premised upon estimating the factorisation (3.5.3). This implies
estimating the matrix (41) that contains all the possible cointegrating vectors and the a
matrix containing the corresponding set of error correction coefficients. If elements in AC
indeed do cointegrate, at least one of the 73, vectors will be statistically significant. Then by
virtue of the Granger representation theorem, a, must contain at least one non zero element.
An isomorphism is established between ECMs and cointegrated processes by Engle & Granger
(1987). The Granger representation theorem (Granger, 1983 & Engle & Granger, 1987) states
that if a set of variables are cointegrated of order 1,1 (CI (1,1)), then a valid error correction
representation of the data exists.
In general, (3.5.2) may be rewritten as
AX, =	 , + 	  f: jiX, ( a/3 ) Xr _, + e1 	(3.5.4)
The rank of the matrix 1-4. can be determined by reference to the eigenvalues 2, derived from
the maximisation of the concentrated likelihood function of (3.5.4). The likelihood ratio
statistic for the null hypothesis of at most r cointegrating vectors is given by
—T	 In(1— 2,)	 (3.5.5)
This statistic is known as the trace statistic. An alternative test statistic to the above is the
maximal eigenvalue statistic computed as:
= Tln (/ —2, 44 )	 where r	 n-2,n-1	 (3.5.6)
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The critical values for the above tests have been tabulated by Johansen (1988) and
Osterwald-Lenum (1992) for a range of values n and are also available in Banerjee,
et. al (1993). Tables 3.IVA through 3.IVC provide the results of the application of the
,
Johansen procedure to the identification of long run demand relationships of real MO,
M1 and M2 respectively with all the possible cointegrating vectors normalised with
respect to the monetary aggregate in question. They have all been estimated upon the
assumption that there is trend in the series but no trend in the data generation process
(DGP). Table 3.IVA suggests that one cointegrating vector exists in the case of real
MO based upon the trace statistic at the 5 per cent significance level (Panel I). The
cointegrating vector has been estimated with a provision for 8 lags with a dummy
variable (D7841) and the rate of inflation (ALCP) included alongside the centered
seasonal dummies. The inclusion of this number of lags is found appropriate as no
serial correlation and serious normality problems arise (Panel V). The dummy variable
(D7841) is intended to reflect a switch in the interest rate regime initiated in October
1978. The estimated cointegrating vector has theoretically plausible coefficients (Panel
II). However the validity of the income homogeneity restriction on MO demand has
also been tested for and it appears to be a valid restriction as the likelihood ratio test
has a marginal significance level of 31.5% (Panel IV). The cointegrating vector is
plotted in Figure 3A and is indeed stable. The null hypothesis that all the independent
variables in the MO demand equation are weakly exogenous can also be upheld (Panel
VI). Hence the estimated long run real MO demand function is as follows:
LR11/10, =1.000LRGDP, — 0.083R3FD1 — 0.945LERIS:
As suggested by the above equation, the long run income elasticity of real MO demand
is unity and expected exchange rate movements have a significantly negative bearing
on the demand in the long run with an elasticity of -0.95. Though this elasticity appears
large, it is noteworthy that in our subsequent modelling of the short run dynamics,
expected exchange rate changes do not yield any contemporaneous influence on real
MO demand (unlike the case of real M1 demand); they merely influence the demand for
real MO via the error correction process. The error correction coefficient is rather
small, estimated at -0.08. The deposit rate of interest also seems to yield a negative
influence on the long run demand with a semi-interest rate elasticity of -0.08.
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Table 3.IVA
The Johansen Procedure
Real MO
VAR with 8 lags, seasonal dummies, D7841 and ALCP included
Sample period: 1973Q1 - I991Q4 (76 observations)
Trended Case, no trend in DGP
I EIGENVALLTES: 0.28857 0.21453 0.086799 0.015929
Test statistics for the number of cointeizrating vectors
Ho: r = 0 r  I r < ? r < 3
Trace 52.3499 26.4735 8.1211 1.7204
(48.2800) (31.5250) (17.9530) (8.1760)
Xmax 25.8764 18.3524 6.9007 1.2204
(27.1360) (21.0740) (14.9000) (8.1760)
II ESTIMATED COINTEGRATING VECTOR
LRMO -1.0000
LRGDP 0.8648
R3FD -0.0993
LERIS(+1) -0.8326
III ESTIMATED ADJUSTMENT MATRIX
LRMO -0.0582
LRGDP 0.0315
R3FD -0.0719
LERIS(+1) -0.0812
IV RESTRICTED COINTEGRATING VECTOR
LRMO -1.0000
LRGDP 1.0000
R3FD -0.0832
LERIS(+1) -0.9450
LR Test of Restriction x 2 (1) = 1.0080 [0.315]
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V TESTS FOR APPROPRIATE LAG LENGTH (8)
ALRMO ALRGDP AR3FD ALERIS(+0
Serial Corr: x 2 (4) 8.018 [0.091] 9.273 [0.055] 4.849 [0.303] 8,583 [0.072]
F(4,35) 1.032 [0.405] 1.216 [0.322] 0.596 [0.668] 1.114 [0.366]
Normality: x 2 (2) 4.062 [0.131] 0.323 [0.851] 41.311 [0.000] 0.770 [0.681]
VI EXOGENEITY TESTS
Ho: a2
 = a3 a4 =0 2	 •X 05 with ..)cl.f. =6.5169
(7.81)
Notes: i) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below test statistics refer to 95% critial values
ii) Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels.
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Results of the cointegration tests for real Nil demand are given in Table 3.IVB. Akin to the
case of real MO demand, the trace statistic alludes to the presence of one cointegrating vector
(Panel I) estimated on the basis of 6 laL4s, with D7841 and ALCP included alongside the
centered seasonal dummies as I(0) variables. The imposition of income homogeneity
restriction as in the case of MO is found to be valid at the marginal significance level of 68%
(Panel IV). Figure 3B shows the estimated cointegrating vector and it satisfies the stability
condition. Weak exogeneity of all the arguments in the real Ml demand function is confirmed
(Panel VI). The estimated long run real MI demand function is thus as follows:
LRA/I = 1.000 LRGDP, — 0.077 R3	 — .442 LE1?1,5';'
The equation above indicates an unit long run income elasticity of real MI demand as in the
case of real MO. The deposit rate of interest also yields a negative influence albeit with a
nominal semi-interest elasticity of -0.077 on the demand. Though in the long run, the demand
for real Ml is also negatively affected by expected exchange rate depreciation, the influence
seems to be less than in the case of real MO demand with an elasticity of -0.442.
Table 3.IVB
The Johansen Procedure
Real M1
VAR with 6 lags, seasonal dummies, D7841 and ALCP (incuded)
Sample period: 1973Q1 - 1991Q4 (76 observations)
Trended Case, no trend in DGP
I EIGENVALUES: 0.26736 0.22860 0.071767 0.0006643 
Test statistics for the number of cointeuating vactors
Ho: r = 0 r< 1 r < 9 r < 3
Trace 49.0796 25.4358 5.7104 0.050506
(48.2800) (31.5250) (17.9530) (8.1760)
Xmax 23.6438 19.7254 5.6599 0.050506
(27.1360) (21.0740) (14.9000) (8.1760)
II ESTIMATED COINTEGRATING VECTOR
LRM1 -1.0000
LRGDP 0.8503
R3FD -0.1344
LERIS(+1) -0.4358
III ESTIMATED ADJUSTMENT MATRIX
LRM1 -0.0218
LRGDP 0.0167
R3FD -0.1656
LERIS(+1) -0.0424
03
IV RESTRICTED COINTEGRAT1NG VECTOR
LRM1 -1.0000
LRGDP 1.0000
R3FD -0.0774
LERIS(+1) -0.4421
LR Test of Restriction x2(1) = 0.1702 [0.680]
V TESTS FOR APPROPRIATE LAG LENGTH (6)
ALRM1 ALRGDP AR3FD ALERIS(+1)
Serial Corr: x2(4) 4.183 [0.382] 13.957 [0.007] 5.293 [0.259] 5.376 [0.251]
F(4,43) 0.626 [0.646] 2.418 [0.063] 0.805 [0.529] 0.818 [0.521]
Normality: x 2 (2) 1.706 [0.426] 0.429 [0.807] 28.960 [0.000] 0.008 [0.996]
VI EXOGENEITY TESTS
Ho: a, = a3 = a4 = 0	 x 200.5 with 3d.f=7.2402
(7.81)
Notes: i) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below test statistics refer to 95% critical values
ii) Figures in square parenthese [	 refer to marginal significance levels
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At the 5 per cent significance level, an examination of the trace and maximal eigenvalue
statistics in Table 3.IVc reveals the existence of one cointegrating vector in the case of real
M2 demand (Panel I). The cointegrating vector has been estimated with a lag length of 6
without any serious serial correlation and normality problems. Coefficients which are
theoretically consistent are found in the estimated cointegrating vector (Panel II). While the
imposition of a zero restriction on the coefficient of expected exchange rate movements is
found to be valid at a marginal significance level of 94.5% (Panel IV), the imposition of
income homogeneity restriction can be dismissed as invalid at a marginal significance level of
1.4%. The estimated cointegrating sector is plotted in Figure 3C and is indeed stable.
Contrary to the cases of real MO and Ml, weak exogeneity tests carried out reveal that income
is not a weakly exogenous . variable in the real M2 demand function while the others are (Panel
VI). 2 The estimated long run real M2 demand function is reproduced below:
LR1V = 1.672 LRGDP, +0.027 R3172 — 0.0611?3 TB,
The long run income elasticity of real N12 demand is estimated at 1.672. In the long run, the
demand for real M2 is positively and negatively influenced by its own rate of return (R3FD)
and the rate of return on some alternative assets (proxied by R3TB) respectively though the
magnitudes are rather small.
2This calls for an application of the instrumental variables estimation technique instead of the OLS estimation
technique in the process of estimating the short run M2 demand function.
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Table 3.IVC
The Johansen Procedure
Real M2
VAR with 6 lags and seasonal dummies included
Sample period: 1973Q1 - 1991Q4 (76 observations)
Trended Case, No Trend in DGP
I EIGENVALUES: 0.39675 0.25358 0.20084 0.063951 0.018907
Test statistics for the number of cointegrating vectors
Ho: r = 0 r 
 1 r < ? r < 3 r < 4
Trace 84.1518 45.7394 23.5123 6.4733 1.4507
(70.5980) (48.2800) (31.5250) (17.9530) (8.1760)
38.4124 22.2271 17.0390 5.0226 1.4507
(33.3190) (27.1360) (21.0740) (14.9000) (8.1760)
II ESTIMATED COINTEGRATING VECTOR
LRM2 -1.0000
LRGDP 1.6730
R3FD 0.0272
R3TB -0.0611
LERIS(+1) 0.0068
III ESTIMATED ADJUSTMENT MATRIX
LRM2 -0.2466
LRGDP 0.4543
R3FD 0.4579
R3TB 0.8482
LERIS(+1) 0.0655
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IV RESTRICTED COINTEGRAT1NG VECTOR
LRM2	 -1.0000
LRGDP	 1.6717
R3FD	 0.0270
R3TB	 -0.0606
LERIS(+1)	 0.0000
LR Test of Restriction x 2(1) = 0.0047 [0.945]
V TESTS FOR APPROPRIATE LAG LENGTH (6)
ALRM2	 ALRGDP	 AR3FD	 AR3TB	 ALER1S(+1)
Serial Corrx 2 (4) 6.307 [0.177] 5.185 [0.269] 10.582 [0.032]17.848 [0.001] 6.147 [0.188]
F (4,39) 0.882 [0483] 0.714 [0.588] 1.577 [0.200] 2.993 [0.030] 0.858 [0.498]
Normality x 2 (2) 1.735 [0.420] 0.544 [0.763] 10.855 [0.004] 1.774 [0.412] 0.633 [0.729]
VI EXOGENEITY TESTS
Ho: a2 = a3 =a4 - ccs =0
Ho: a2 = 0
Ho: a3 = 0
Ho: a4 = 0
Ho: a5 = 0
X-o.05 with 4d.f. = 15.4597
(9.49)
X 2 0.05 with ld.f. = 15.1163
(3.84)
X 2o.o5 with ld.1 = 0.0398
(3.84)
2	 .
X0.05 with ld.f = 0.2364
(3.84)
X -0.05 with 1 d.f = 0.3141
(3.84)
Notes: i) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below test statistics refer to 95% critical
values
ii) Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels.
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A comparison across all the three equations above suggests that expected exchange rate
depreciation has a greater impact on the long run demand for narrow money than on the
demand for money more broadly defined. The high income elasticity of the demand for real
M2 may reflect the growing degree of monetisation in the Malaysian economy with a more
extensive branching of banking networks to remote areas and the drawing of an increasing
number of rural folks into the mainstream of economic development.
3.6 Estimates of Short Run Money Demand Functions:The General-to-Specific
Approach
Following the general to specific procedure, the short run dynamics of demand for each of the
monetary aggregates is modelled. The procedure departs from the following general
autoregressive distributed lag representation with an error correction term (EC) formed by the
relevant cointegrating vector estimated in the preceding section, rate of inflation (ALCP), and
dummy variable (D7841) embedded in it:
.-1( L ),_1(	 p), = a, + B( L)-11.1?GDP, + C(1.)_11?, +D( 	 + (1.)_ILERLS' + a ,EC, + a 	 + a .D784 + EG,S, + e,
	 (3.6.1)
where A(L) 	 E(L) are lag polynomials and S, 's refer to seasonal dummies. In the case of real
MO and Ml, the term C(L),%11?,' does not arise. The rate of inflation and the dummy variable
which are I(0) variables that do not constitute elements in the VAR for estimating the long run
relationships are however 'tagged' onto the model herein as they potentially influence the short
run dynamics.
Table 3.V provides some summary statistics contrasting between the initially
overparameterized model based upon equation (3.6.1) and the parsimonious model reached
finally for each of the money demand functions. While there has been a significant reduction in
the parameters from more than 30 to about II, final specifications still maintain superiority
over initial specifications both in terms of equation standard error and explanatory power.
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Given that income is not weakly exogenous in the real M2 demand function, its short run
function has been estimated using both the Instrumental Variables (IV) technique and the OLS
technique for comparison purposes.
Table3.V
General-to-Specific Reductions of Overly-Parameterized
ADL for LRNIO, LRM1 and LRM2
LRNIO** LRM1** LRM2* LRM2**
Initial Specification
No of Parameters 38 3<1 3€ 3€
Std. Error of Regression 0.0155 0.0134 0.0166 0.0164
R2 0.7944 0.8070 0.4492 0.4579
Final Model
No. of Parameters 11 12 11 9
Std. Error of Regression 0.0147 0.0129 0.0153 0.0153
Rh 0.8154 0.8187 0.5320 0.5297
* Instrumental Variables Method
** Ordinary Least Squares Method
The 'final' estimates are given in Appendix 3A. The dummy variable (D7841) has been
dropped in the sequential reduction process. All the estimated coefficients are highly
significant generally and all the four models passed a battery of diagnostic tests for functional
form misspecification, normality of residuals, autocorrelation, autoregressive conditional
heteroscedasticity, homoskedasticity and the joint significance of all the explanatory variables.
The estimated short run equations are concisely reproduced below:
ALRA10,= 0.31 + 0.1 5ALRGDP, - 0.0 lAR31,1),- 0.08E17v10,_, + 0.0 1AR3FD1
+0.01AR3FD, 5 + 0.23ALRA//0„ - 0.25ALRA/O, „ + 0.06S1- 0.045'2 + 0.03S3
(OLS method)
ALRA/11,= 0.08+ 0.2ALRGDP,-0.01AR3FD,-0.75ALCI),-0.16ALERIS te - 0.03ECM11
+0.0 1AR3FD, + 0.22ALRM1, + 0.27AL/6141, 3 ± 0.32ALRA41 1
 + 0.05S1- 0.03S2
(OLS method)
ALRM 2, = -0.99 + O. 3 OALRGDP,- 0. 02 Al?3TB, - O. 62 ALC'P,- 0.18 ECM2,
+0.17ALERISte_ 4 +0.28ALRIVI2„+0.23ALRA/2, ,+0.03S/- 0.01S2-0.01S3
(IV method)
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ATRAl2, = —1.11+ 0.296.1,1?GDP, — 0 02 AR3 TB, — 0.68ALCP, — 0.2ECN12,
+0.19,ALERIS,e, + 0.26ALRA42„ 4- 0 28ALM /2, -r 0 0351
(OLS method)
With respect to short run real M2 demand equations, it is interesting to note that both the OLS
and IV techniques do not yield any si gnificant difference in terms of estimated parameters and
variables of statistical significance. Acknowledging the possible influence of the switch in the
interest rate regime in October 1978 in Malaysia, both types of Chow test are administered to
the MO and MI models taking 1978Q3 as the breakpoint. While the Chow's second (predictive
failure) test appears to dismiss the notion of a structural break in the Malaysian real MO and
M1 demand functions as a consequence of the regime switch at the 5 per cent significance
level, Chow's first test su ggests otherwise.
A more rigorous mode for testin g parameter stability is the recursive estimation technique
which may be re garded as a special case of the Kalman filter (see Cuthbertson et.al, 1992) as
unlike the Chow tests, no a priori knowled ge of the possible breakpoint is required. Plots of
the recursive coefficients of the variables of interest for real MO and MI are furnished in
Figures 3D, 3E, 3F, 3G, 3H, 31, 31 and 3K. The recursive coefficients for both the money
demand models do fall within their 2 standard error bounds. With respect to the real MO
demand, the coefficients of chan ges in real GDP and the error correction term have never
exhibited any twist in the direction while the coefficient of changes in the 3-month fixed
deposit rate did experience a temporary switch in the direction from negative to positive over
the 1979Q4-1981Q4 period. This may call for a re-deployment of Chow tests for parameter
stability, this time shifting the breakpoint from 1978Q4 to 1979Q4 and 1981Q4. The evidence
in favor of parameter stability is mixed with Chow's first test suggesting the non existence of a
structural break in 1979Q4 while the second test suggests otherwise (Table 3.VI). In the case
of 1981Q4, while Chow's first test rejects the notion of parameter stability, the second test
suggests the contrary.
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Table 3.VI
Chow Test Statistics of Possible Break Points
Break
Points 1st Test 2nd Test
ALRMO 1979Q4 F(11,54) = 1.8254 [0.072] F(48,17) = 2.2092 [0.038]
1981Q4 F(11,54) = 2.9558 [0.004] F(40,25) = 1.6350 [0.098]
ALRM1 1978Q3 F(12,52) = 2.5333 [0.010] F(53,11) = 2.2025 [0.077]
1981Q3 F(12,52) = 1.9423 [0.050] F(41,23) = 1.2407 [0.295]
Note: Figures in square parentheses refer to marginal significance levels
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Figure 3F
Coef. of Lagged EC Term d its 2 S.E. Bands based on Becursioe OLS (P10)
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Figure 3G
Coef. of DR3FD and its Z S.E. Bands based on Recursiue OLS (for M1)
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Figure 3H
Coef. of DLRGDP and its Z S.E. Bands based on Recursiue OLS (for Ni)
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Figure 31
Cod, of DLCP and its 2 S.E. Bands based on Recursiue OLS (for 111)
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Figure 3J
Coef. of DLERIS(+1) and its Z S.E. Bands based on Recursiue OLS (111)
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Figure 3X
Coef. of Lagged EC Term 	 its 2 S.E. Bands based on Becursiue OLS (i11)
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Hence proceeding on the assumption that there indeed exists a structural break, the short run
real MO demand function is reestimated from 1981Q4 through 1991Q4. Full details of the
revised estimates are presented in Appendix 3B and they are presented concisely below:
Period: 1981Q4-1991Q4
ALRM 0 = 0.2 + 0.1 8ALRGDP, — 0.02A1?3FD, — 0.05ECM0 +
0.01AR3FD + 0.01AR3FD + 0.27ALR1VJO — 0.04 ALRM 0 6 0.06S1— 0.06S2 — 0.003S3
Based upon the revised estimates, the short run income elasticity of real MO demand is 0.18.
Though nominal in magnitude, interest rates also have a bearing on real MO demand with an
estimated semi-interest rate elasticity of -0.02.
With respect to real M1 demand, the coefficients of the rate of inflation and expected
exchange rate changes in particular appear to display a sustained switch in their direction from
positive to negative. This occured in 1978Q3 and 1981Q3 for the rate of inflation and
expected exchange rates respectively. Accordingly, the Chow tests have been reconducted for
these two possible structuial break points. Evidence from these tests is also mixed with the
Chow's first test suggesting a structural break at 1978Q3 while this is refuted by the second
test (Table 3.VI). As for 1981Q3, a structural break is ruled out by both tests. Hence the short
run real MI demand function is reestimated over the period from 1978Q4 through 1991Q4.
Appendix 3C furnishes the full details of the revised estimates while they are summarised
below:
Period: 1978Q4-1991Q4
ALRA11, = 0.14 + 0.16ALRGD1, — 0.01 AR3 FD — 0.23ALERLS7 — 0.27ALCP1
 —
0.06ECM1 + 0.01AR3FD, + 0.1 1ALRA/11, + 0.30AL/641, + 0.29ALRM1, 4 0.06S1 — 0.02S2
It is indicated by these revised estimates that real M1 demand has an estimated short run
income elasticity of 0.16. Expected exchange rate depreciation also seems to yield a
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contemporaneous influence on the demand with the elasticity estimated at -0.23. While
inflation does not have any bearing on real MI demand by virtue of the statistical
insignificance of its coefficient, interest rates do have albeit nominally' with an estimated short-
run semi elasticity of -0.01.
Over to the demand for real M2, estimates based upon the IV technique as reported earlier
suggest 0.30 as its short run income elasticity. Though it is not sensitive to the own interest
rate of M2, it is nominally sensitive to movements in alternative rates of interest as proxied by
the R3TB. The relatively large coefficient (-0.62) of the rate of inflation possibly reflects the
averseness of the Malaysian public to inflation that potentially erodes the purchasing power of
their savings.
Plots of the actual changes in real money (MO, MI and M2) demand vis-a-vis their fitted
values are presented in Figures 3L through 3N. The plots of fitted values of changes in real
MO and MI demand are based upon their second period estimates as they would be of current
relevance. Whilst the plot for changes in real N12 demand is based upon the full sample
estimate via the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation technique. By visual inspection of
these figures, our estimated models seem to have a good ability to track the direction of
changes in the demand for money as variously defined.
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Figure 3L
Plot of Actual and Fitted Ualues for Changes in LRMO
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Figure 311
Plot of Actual and Fitted Ualues for Changes in LRM1
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Figure 3M
Plot of Actual and Fitted Ualues for Changes in LRMZ (IU method)
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In the light of our earlier findings that the parameters estimated via the OLS and IV techniques
do not differ much in respect of the short run NI2 demand function, a series of Chow tests is
administered at several possible structural breakpoints. They are 1978Q3 to account for the
possible influence of the October 1978 interest rate liberalisation exercise, 1977Q1 and
1977Q4 owing to a switch in the direction of the coefficient of changes in LRGDP at these
points and 1976Q2 and 1977Q1 owing to a directional switch in respect of the error
correction term (Figures 30, 3P, 3Q and 3R). The results of these Chow tests are presented in
Table 3.VII. Both Chow tests seem to rule out the possibility of a structural break at all these
points except 1976Q2 in which the occurance of a structural break is suggested by Chow's
second test. Hence proceeding on the assumption that a structural break did occur at this
point, the short run M2 demand function is reestimated over the 1976Q3-1991Q4 period. The
revised estimates are fully presented in Appendix 3D and are summarised below:
Table 3.VII
Chow Test Statistics of Possible Break Points for M2
Break
Points
ALRM2 1976Q2
1977Q1
1977Q4
1978Q3
First Test
F(9,58) = 1.8665 [0.070]
F(9,58) = 1.1634 [0.330]
F(9,58) = 1.1832 [0.323]
F(9,58) = 1.2613 [0.277]
Second Test
F(62,5) = 8.3839 [0.010]
F(59,8) = 0.9042 [0.620]
F(56,11) = 1.2539 [0.358]
F(53,14) = 1.3717 [0.264]
Note: Figures in square parentheses refer to marginal significance levels.
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Figure 30
Coef. of DLRGDP and its 2 S.E. Bands based on Recursiue OLS (for 112)
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Figure 3?
Coef. of DR3TB and its 2 S.E. Bands based on Recursive OLS (for M2)
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Figure 3Q
Coef. of DLCP and its 2 S.E. Bands based on Recursiue OLS (for M2)
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Period: 1976Q3-1991Q4
ALRM2, = —1.26 + 0.3 IALI?GDP, — 0.02A/?311-3, — 0.96ALC'1), —
0.22ECM2, + 0.27 ALERIS, +0.31ALRM2, + 0.29ALRA42,_ 4 + 0.03S1
It is on the basis of these revised estimates that we shall be making inferences pertaining to
real M2 demand. The estimated short run income and interest rate elasticities of 0.31 and -
0.02 respectively do not differ markedly from those estimated via the IV method over the full
sample period though the coefficient of the rate of inflation (-0.96) is significantly larger. This
in fact underscores the concern amongst the Malaysian public over the capability of M2 to
assume a storehouse of value role. It is shown by Figure 3S that these new estimates could
also track the direction of actual movements in real M2 demand reasonably well.
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Figure 33
Plot of Actual and Fitted Values of Changes in LEM
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3.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter represents a modest attempt to model long run real money demand relationships
and their associated short-run dynamics with money variously defined as MO, M1 and M2
using recent econometric techniques. Quarterly data generally spanning from 1971 through
1991 have been utilised for this purpose. Since readily published quarterly data are mostly end-
of-period observations, monthly data have been gathered instead to derive periodic average
data. This study is also intended to fill the research vacuum left by other researchers in respect
of money demand relationships in Malaysia.
Given the fact that Malaysia is a small open developing economy, the possibility of money
demand being affected by expected exchange rate movements is also explored. In our attempt
to capture this influence, we simply postulate the existence of perfect foresight in the
formation of exchange rate expectations.
Prior to the actual modelling exercise, the time series properties of the data have been
explored to establish their order of integration and also to establish whether seasonal unit root
problems are present. The results of these analyses suggest that none of the series considered
is integrated of order beyond 1 and that most series do not exhibit stochastic seasonals once
deterministic seasonal dummies are introduced.
The long run real money demand relations have subsequently been estimated using the
Johansen Procedure. Primarily the results suggest that cointegrations exist between real
money demand as variously defined on one hand and real gross domestic product, interest
rates and expected movements in the exchange rate on the other, thus suggesting the
existence of a stable long run relationship amongst them in spite of the financial liberalisation
and innovation process that the Malaysian financial system has been undergoing. The income
homogeneity assumption of money is upheld in the long run in the case of MO and M1
but not in the case of M2 which has an income coefficient exceeding unity. This may be due to
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continued improvements made to the banking infrastructure in Malaysia over the years that
facilitate access to banking facilities by a larger segment of the Malaysian population. It is
interesting to note that all the arguments in the real MO and M1 demand functions are weakly
exogenous while in the case of real M2, only income has failed to satisfy the weak exogeneity
assumption.
In adherence to the general-to-specific procedure, the short run demand functions for MO, M1
and M2 are derived which could withstand a battery of diagnostic tests. In the case of short
run real M2 demand function, both instrumental variables and OLS techniques have been
deployed for its estimation. Though stable long run money demand relationships exist despite
the process of financial liberalisation and innovation experienced by the Malaysian financial
system as suggested by the presence of cointegrating vectors, such process did render the
short run real money demand functions unstable. Hence this calls for a reestimation of short
run functions over more recent periods as a stable money demand function is a prerequisite for
a monetary policy to attain its short run targets. In our case, this has necessitated a
reestimation of these demand functions over more recent periods namely, 1981Q4-1991Q4 for
real MO, 1978Q4-1991Q4 for real MI and 1976Q3-1991Q4 in the case of real M2. All these
estimates could also satisfactorily withstand the battery of diagnostic tests.
Subject to the caveats of our study, the following are some interesting policy implications that
can be drawn from our analysis of short run dynamics based upon recent period estimates:
I. While a one-percent rise in income would contemporaneously lead to a 0.18% rise in the
demand for MO, it would precipitate a 0.16% increase in the demand for MI and 0.30% for
M2. Assuming that domestic liquidity has a profound impact on the economy, the monetary
authority will have to somehow ensure that the various monetary aggregates grow by these
percentages just to avert any liqudity squeeze that may originate from a current 1% rise in
income alone;
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2. Interest rates on deposits do have an instantaneous impact on the demand for real MO and
M1 though none on M2 demand. However the impact is only nominal with a one percentage
point rise in the interest rate on deposits expected to reduce the demand for MO by 0.015%
and for M1 by 0.012%. This implies that any monetary policy that affects interest rates may
however not affect the demand for these aggregates materially;
3. Inflation has a significant dampening impact on the demand for real M2. A 1% rise in the
price level could precipitate a 0.96% decline in the demand for real M2. Hence to preserve the
demand for real M2 if desired, it is crucial that price stability be safeguarded by the monetary
authority. Otherwise financial disintermediation may set in; and
4. Expected exchange rate depreciation can be expected to yield a negative influence on real
M1 demand instantaneously with a contemporaneous expected exchange rate elasticity of -
0.23. Thus the effectiveness of an expansionary monetary policy may be compromised to some
extent if it is implemented in a situation when confidence in the domestic currency is lacking.
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APPENDIX 3A
Parsimonious Equations
OLS Method
LRMOt = 0.3109 + 0.1456 ALRGDPI -0.0126 AR3FD,
(5.3084) (2.7059)	 (-3.5621)
-0.0760 ECNIO,_,
	
+0.0120 AR3FDt_i
(-5.0990)	 (3.1459)
+0.0124 AR3FD 1 _ 5	+0.2309 ALRMO(.5
(3.6421)	 (2.5310)
-0.2493 ALRMOi-6 	 +0.0562S1
	
(-2.7436)	 (7.9057)
-0.0369S2 + 0.0259S3
	
(-4.7637)
	 (2.6819)
-R2 = 0.8154
	
Autocorr: X 2 ( 1 ) = 0.7232 [0.395]
F (10,65) = 34.1366 [0.000] 	 X 2 (2 ) = 1.3544 [0.508]
S.E. of Regression = 0.0147
	
	
x 2 (3) = 1.4245 [0.700]
x
2 (4) = 1.4248 [0.840]
Normality: x 2(2) = 0.9650 [0.617]
Heteroscedasticity: x 2(1) = 0.1666 [0.683]
ARCH: x2 (1) = 1.1519 [0.283]
X 2 (2) = 2.0437 [0.360]
X 2 (3 ) = 2.0315 [0.566]
X 2 (4) = 2.1150 [0.715]
Functional Form:	 X 2 ( 1 ) = 0.0679 [0.794]
Chow's First Test*: F(11,54) = 1.9349 [0.055]
Second Test*: F(53,12) = 1.8624 [0.119]
* Breakpoint: 1978Q3
Notes: I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
II)Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels
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OLS Method
A LRM1t = 0.078 + 0.1997 ALRGDP,
	
-0.0115 AR3FD,
(2.9663) (4.5970)	 (-4.1997)
-0.7516 ALCPt	 -0.1551 ALERIS +1
(-4.9176)	 (-2.2145)
-0.0325 ECM1t-i	 +0.0104 AR3FDt-4
(-2.7594)	 (3.5773)
+0.2164 ALRIVI I t-i 	 +0.2703 ALRM11_3
(2.9098)	 (3.6011)
+0.3156 ALRM1,.4 	 +0.0497S1
(3.7502)	 (6.9560)
-0.0297S2
(-4.4188)
-R2= 0.8188
	
Autocorr: X 2 ( 1 ) = 0.2969 [0.586]
F (11,64) = 31.7999 [0.000]	 X 2 (2) = 0.5276 [0.768]
S.E. of Regression = 0.0130
	
	
X 2 ( 3 ) = 0.5290 [0.912]
X 2 (4) = 0.7523 [0.945]
Normality: x 2 (2) = 1.0553 [0.590]
Heteroscedasticity: x 2 (1) = 1.3500 [0.245]
ARCH: x 2 (1) = 0.0332 [0.856]
X 2(2) = 0.7670 [0.681]
x2(3) = 1.2875 [0.732]
x 2(4) = 1.1784 [0.882]
Functional Form:	 X 2 ( 1 ) = 0.0021 [0.964]
Chow's First Test*: F(12,52) = 2.5333 [0.010]
Second Test*: F(53,11) = 2.2025 [0.077]
*Breakpoint: 1978Q3
Notes: I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
II)Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels
98
Instrumental Variables Method
A LRM21 = -0.9894 + 0.3026 ALRGDP,
(-3.0025) (1.7697)
-0.6214 ALCPt
(-3.6969)
+0.2794 ALRM21.1
(2.6375)
+0.0286S1
(2.3607)
-0.0165 AR3TBt
(-2.9146)
-0.1756 ECM2t_1
(-3.0658)
+0.2288 ALRM44
(1.9810)
-0.0089S2
(-1.1390)
+0.1713 ALERTS .4
(1.9211)
-0.0086S3
(-1.2056)
- 2R = 0.5320
F (10,65) = 9.5258 [0.000]
S.E. of Regression = 0.0153
Autocorr: x 2 (1) = 0.2505 [0.617]
x 2 (2) = 1.7005 [0.427]
X 2 ( 3 ) = 1.7151 [0.634]
x 2 (4) = 2.0554 [0.726]
Normality: x 2(2) = 1.1324 [0.568]
Heteroscedasticity: x 2(1) = 0.1098 [0.740]
Functional Form: x 2(1) = 0.0355 [0.851]
Instruments:	 C, ALRM2 1 _ 1 , ALRM2,4 , ALRFGTE t ,
AR3TB t , ALERTS ;? _4. , ALCPt,ECM2t-i.
Sl, S2 and S3
Notes: I) LRFGTE = Log of real federal governement total expenditure
II) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
III) Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels
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OLS Method
A LRM21
 = -1.1109 + 0.2846 ALRGDP, -0.0165 AR3T13,
(-5.9316) (4.4513)	 (-3.3680)
-0,6752 ALCP,
(-4.1314)
+0.1919 ALERTS ;1 _4
(2.3191)
-0.2754 ALRM21-4
(2.8889)
-0.1969 ECM2i-1
(-6.0312)
+0.2632 ALRM2,4
(2.9938)
+0.0314S1
(4.8101)
k2= 0.5297
	
Autocorr: X 2 ( 1 ) = 1.3600 [0.244]
F (8,67) = 11.5594 [0.000]	 X 2 ( 2 ) = 2.9677 [0.227]
S.E. of Regression = 0.0153
	
	
X 2 ( 3 ) = 2.9747 [0.396]
x 2 (4) = 3.7071 [0.447]
Normality: x 2(2) = 1.5626 [0.458]
Heteroscedasticity: x 2(1) = 0.5353 [0.464]
ARCH: X 2( 1 ) = 1.2601 [0.262]
x2 (2) = 1.7910 [0.408]
x2 (3) = 4.3263 [0.228]
x2(4) = 4.6435 [0.326]
Functional Form:	 X 2( 1 ) = 0.0907 [0.763]
Notes: I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
II)Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels
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-0.0149 AR3F1D1
(-3.4762)
AR3F1Di-i
(2.3632)
-i-0.2716 ALRMOi_s
(1 9379)
1-0.0572S1
(6.9132)
Period: 1981Q4- 1991Q4
A LRMO, = 0.1946 + 0.1831 ALRGDP,
(2.9213) (3.0835)
-0.0479 ECM0i-1
(-2.8253)
+0.0082 AR3F1)1.5
(2.2619)
-0.0425 ALRM0i-6
(-0.3166)
-0.0570S2 - 0.0031S3
(-4.5822)	 (-0.2072)
-R2 = 0.8758
	
Autocorr:
	 2(1) = 0.0136 [0.907]
F (10,30) = 29.2046 [0.000] 	 X 2 ( 2 ) = 2.6233 [0.269]
S.E. of Regression = 0.0130
	
	
X 2 ( 3 ) = 2.8153 [0.421]
x 2 (4) = 4.5573 [0.336]
Normality: x 2 (2) = 0.0988 [0.952]
Heteroscedasticity: x 2 (1) = 3.5554 [0.059]
ARCH: x 2 (1) = 1.5896 [0.207]
x 2 (2) = 2.6630 [0.264]
x 2 (3) = 3.3836 [0.336]
x 2 (4) = 2.7805 [0.595]
Functional Form:	 X 2 ( 1 ) = 1.6608 [0.198]
Notes: I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
II)Figures in square parentheses [ refer to marginal significance levels
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Period: 1978Q4 - 1991Q4
-0.0120 AR3FD1
(-4.3907)
-0.2713 ALCP,
(-1.1570)
+0.0135 AR3FDt-4
(4.2956)
+0.3043 ALRM11.3
(3.5307)
+0.0561S1
(6.4691)
A LRM1, = 0.1413 + 0.1612 ALRGDP,
(3.8713) (3.5071)
-0.2296 ALERTS
(-2.8366)
-0.0598 ECM11
(-3.7626)
+0.1069 ALRM1,_1
(1.0068)
+0.2943 ALRM14
(2.3034)
-0.0186S2
(-1.7383)
R2 = 0.8723 Autocorr:	 2(1) = 0.3796 [0.538]
F (11,41) = 33.2380 [0.000] X 2 ( 2 ) = 0.4168 [0.812]
S.E. of Regression = 0.0119 X 2 ( 3 ) =- 1.5543 [0.670]
X 2 (4 ) = 4.2178 [0.377]
Normality: x 2 (2) = 1.7132 [0.425]
Heteroscedasticity: x 2 (1) = 0.5241 [0.469]
ARCH: x2(1) = 0.1733 [0.677]
x 2(2) = 1.1019 [0.576]
x 2(3) = 1.3664 [0.713]
x2 (4) = 2.8795 [0.578]
Functional Form:	 X 2 ( 1 ) = 0.4603 [0.498]
Notes: I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
II)Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels
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Autocorr: X2(1) = 0.0136 [0.907]
X 2 (2 ) = 2.6233 [0.269]
X 2 (3 ) = 2.8153 [0.421]
X - (4) = 4.5573 [0.336]
R2= 0.8758
F (10,30) 29.2046 [0.000]
S.E. of Regression = 0.0130
Appendix 313
Revised Estimates of Short Run Money (MO) Demand Function
Period 1981Q4- I991Q4
ALRMO,
	
0.1946 + 0.1831 ALRGDP, - 0.0149 AR3FD,
(2.9213) (3.0835)
	
(-3.4762)
- 0.0479 ECM0,. 1 -r 0.0102 AR3F1),./
(-2.8253)
	
(2.3632)
+ 0.0082 AR3FD 1 . 5 - 0.2716 ALRMO5
(2.2619)	 (1.9379)
- 0.0425 ALRMO,..6 + 0.0572S1
(-0.3166)	 (6.9132)
- 0.0570S2 - 0.0031S3
(-4.5822)	 (-0.2072)
Normality: x 2(2) = 0.0988 [0.952]
Heteroscedasticity: x 2 (1) = 3.5554 [0.059]
ARCH: x 2 (1) = 1.5896 [0.207]
x2 (2) = 2.6630 [0.264]
x2 (3) = 3.3836 [0.336]
x2 (4) = 2.7805 [0.595]
Functional Form:	 X 2 ( 1 ) = 1.6608 [0.19S]
Notes: I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
II)Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels
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Appendix 3C
Revised Estimates of Short Run Money (NI1) Demand Function
Period 1978Q4 - 1991Q4
ALRM1,	 0.1413 + 0.1612 ALRGDP, - 0.0120 AR3FD,
(3.8713) (3.5071)	 (-4.3907)
-0.2296 A
	
- 0.2713 ALM
(-2.8366)	 (-1.1570)
-0.0598 ECN11 1 _ 1 - 0.0135 AR3F1D1-1
(-3.7626)	 (4.2956)
+ 0.1069 ALRM1 1 _ 1 ± 0.3043 ALRM11-3
(1.0068)	 (3.5307)
+ 0.2943 ALRM1 4
 + 0.0561S1
(2.8034)
	
(6.4691)
- 0.0186S2
(-1.7383)
Autocorr: X2 ( 1 ) = 0.3796 [0.538]
X 2 ( 2) = 0.4168[0.812]
X - ( 3 ) = 1.5543 [0.670]
x 2 (4) = 4.2178 [0.377]
R2 = 0.8723
F (11,41) = 33.2880 [0.000]
S.E. of Regression = 0.0119
Normality: x2 (2) = 1.7132 [0.425]
Heteroscedasticity: x 2 (1) = 0.5241 [0.469]
ARCH: x2(1) = 0.1733 [0.677]
x2 (2) = 1.1019 [0.576]
2(3)_ 1.3664 [0.713]
x2(4) = 2.8795 [0.578]
Functional Form:	 X 2 ( 1 ) = 0.4603 [0.498]
Notes: I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
II)Figures in square parentheses [ refer to marginal significance levels
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Appendix 3D
Revised Estimates of Short Run NIoney (M2) Demand Function (OLS Method)
Period: 1976Q3 - 1991Q4
ALRM2,	 -1.2617+0.3111 ALRGDP, - 0.0161 AR3T13,
(-6.5383) (4.4925)	 (-3.2351)
0.9608 ALCP, - 0.2231 ECM21_1
(-3.7589)
	
(-6.6270)
0.2729 A LERIS, + 0.3118 ALRM21-i
(2.8836)
	 (3.1678)
0.2847 ALRM2 1 .4 - 0.0312 Si
(2.8.436)	 (4.3834)
R 2 = 0.5801	 Autocorr:	 X-(1) = 0.1695 [0.681]
F(8,53) = 11.5354 [0.000]	 X 2 ( 2 ) = 1.0632 [0.588]
S.E. of Regression = 0.0151	 X 2 ( 3 ) = 1.0759 [0.783]
Normality: x 2 (2) = 1.8956 [0.388]	 X 2 (4 ) = 2.0397 [0.728]
Heteroscedasticity: x 2 (1) = 1.9386 [0.164]
ARCH: x 2 (1) = 0.5367 [0.464]
X 2 (2) = 0.7743 [0.679]
X 2 ( 3 ) = 1.6928 [0.639]
x2 (4) = 1.5120 [0.825]
Functional Form: x 2 (1) = 0.7945 [0.373]
Notes:
(I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
(II) Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels
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Chapter 4
CREDIT
4.0 Overview
This chapter has a dual objective namely:
1) to assess the possibility that banks in Malaysia do practise equilibrium credit
rationing in particular the notion of equilibrium credit rationing as advanced by
Stiglitz & Weiss (1981 &, 1983) and to infer the extent of excess demand for loans
that this potentially brings; and
2) to evaluate the significance of bank credit to the Malaysian economy relative to a
broader credit aggregate (defined to include credit extended by finance companies
and merchant banks apart from commercial banks), money supply (M1 and M2),
and the lending rate imposed by commercial banks and to identify the causal links
between these variables and economic activity.'
Equilibrium credit rationing implies that the lending rate may not be responsive to loan
demand and supply factors and there could be an implicit "lid" placed on the average of
lending rates chargeable by banks. In our opinion, the effect of equlibrium credit rationing
on the amount of deposits (loanable funds) that banks mobilise and the interest rate
payable on them could depend on the interest rate elasticity of their flows.2
'The study of credit availability in an economy and its links to economic activity may be important as it
potentially represents some harbingers of economic development so essential for economic planning.
21n a separate vein however, the presence of equlibrium credit rationing may defeat the objective of
pursuing financial liberalisation as if banks have limited leeway to raise their lending rates, neither would
they be able to do the same for deposit rates. Thus financial liberalisation may not yield the desired results
if an economy is plagued with asymmetric information problems.
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The first objective is accomplished via an estimation of interest rate elasticities of deposits
received by commercial banks, an exploration of the loan demand and supply factors that
determine the lending rate, and by forming a Vector Autoregression (VAR) System to
capture the credit transmission mechanism in the Malaysian economy. With regard to the
latter objective, the VAR approach will also be utilised.
There are at least two alternative conditions under which we think equilibrium credit
rationing may not entail any severe excess demand for loans:
I) A deregulated interest rate and an either interest inelastic (zero elasticity) or highly
interest elastic supply of deposits (funds) environment. In the case of zero
elasticity, if it is unprofitable for banks to raise the lending rate for fear of adverse
selection effects, banks may instead lower the interest rate payable on deposits
especially if interest rates are deregulated and if the supply of funds to the banks by
depositors is interest inelastic. Within this context, one may conclude that a
liberalised interest rate regime may entail less credit being rationed and hence more
credit being extended compared with a regulated one. However, we must
emphasise that this strand of argument differs from the conventional argument for
removing the lid placed on deposit rates that normally presumes that both loan
supply and deposit demand will rise as a consequence. Our notion of a liberalised
interest regime is premised simply upon the freedom of banks to set the interest
rates on deposits and on lending. In fact the traditional argument for financial
liberalisation with the hope of seeing a subsequent rise in the interest rate on
deposits may fall short of expectations when equilibrium credit rationing is in
operation. Hence it may be pertinent to assess the interest rate elasticity of
Malaysian deposits. The 1978 interest rate deregulation undertaken by Malaysia
when the ceiling on deposit rates was removed might not have contributed to any
significant shift in the credit policy of banks. If deposits have been interest
inelastic, interest rate liberalisation may not yield any perceptible change in the
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lending policy. 3 On the other hand, the higher is the interest rate elasticity of
deposits, the greater will be the amount of deposits secured and the interest rate
payable on them by the banks (see Appendix 4.1 for a mathematical proof). Cateris
paribus, the excess demand for loanable funds may be relatively less compared to a
low interest rate elasticity situation. 4
 Moreover a small increase in the optimal
lending rate that can be charged by the bank would lead to a larger increase in the
interest rate payable on deposits by banks in an interest elastic condition. The
interest rate elasticity of deposits may also be crucial to the determination of the
extent of depressibility of the deposit rate for a given optimal lending rate that
banks may charge as dictated by the gravity of asymmetric information problems.
In fact for a given optimal lending rate, the larger is the elasticity, the higher can be
the interest rate on deposits payable b y banks.
II) The second possible condition is the lack of alternative modes of investment
available to banks. Hence a greater supply of loanable funds. Developments in the
asset and liability positions of banks may be mutually independent if a well-
developed securities market exists and or access to overseas financial markets is
facilitated. For instance if banks are granted the liberty to channel their surplus
funds abroad, an increase in deposits (liability) harnessed by banks may not yield a
commensurate rise in loans (asset) granted domestically by them. Within the
Malaysian context, the number of alternative portfolio investment opportunities
available to banks may be limited owing to legal restrictions imposed on banks to
indulge in the stock market and that there is only a captive market for government
securities (thus their lack of popularity) though efforts have been made in recent
years to develop the market. Moroever the process of privatisation and
3 0n the lending front, the 1978 deregulatory policy vas one of removing the floor set for the loan rate.
4However a credit crunch may be more severe in the event of an adverse twist in the optimal lending rate
which may be brought about by an economic recession if deposits are interest elastic. Compared to a
situation of low responsiveness, a decline in the optimal rate may entail a more substantial loss of loanable
funds. Hence equilibrium credit rationing may have a procyclical effect on the economy as both upward
and downward swings of the economy are being accentuated when deposits are highly interest elastic.
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government expenditure rollbacks are gaining momentum in the Malaysian
economy and unless the government chooses to finance its core expenditures
predominantly by issuing securities, the supply of government securities may be
expected to be relatively limited in the future.
This chapter is configured as follows. Section 4.1 provides a historical review of the
lending and deposit-taking performance of commercial banks in Malaysia. A review of the
literature is provided in Section 4.2. Since the methodology used in the present exercise
has already been discussed in the money demand chapter earlier (except the VAR by Sims
approach), Section 4.3 is devoted to a description of this approach. Section 4.4 presents
the empirical results of the deposit-based study while those related to the lending rate in
Section 4.5. Results of the VAR analysis are presented in Section 4.6. Finally the chapter
has some concluding remarks in Section 4.7.
Data utilised in this chapter are of monthly frequency drawn from numerous issues of the
Monthly and Quarterly Economic Bulletin issued by the Central Bank of Malaysia. Where
quarterly data are involved, they are derived as a periodic average of monthly data. The
period of estimation in this Chapter generally spans from 1979 to 1992 except for the
VAR analyses that in certain cases involve monthly data from 1987. Unlike demand,
savings and fixed deposits used to compute MO, MI and M2 in our earlier exercise on
money demand, the deposit series used here are more inclusive as deposits held by
statutory authorities and other state and federal government agencies are included.
4.1 Lending and Deposit-Taking by Malaysian Commercial Banks: A Historical
Review
Gerschenkron (1968) maintains that bank credit contributed significantly to the industrial
development in Germany during the industrial revolution. This may be true also in the case
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of Malaysia. Generally over the past two decades , there has been a steady rise in the ratio
of bank credit to GDP in Malaysia reflecting the growing significance of the banking
system as a major source of financing for economic activity and investment. Total loans
and advances granted by commercial banks as a proportion of nominal GDP rose
dramatically from about 19.41% in 1970 to about 70.68% in 1993 (Figure 4A). The rising
trend was only interuptted briefly over the 1973-74 period which coincided with the first
oil price shock and during the Malaysian recessionary years in the mid 1980s. The figure
also seems to suggest a dramatic pick-up in the lending activities of commercial banks
during the post-1978 interest rate liberalisation period which is somewhat consistent with
the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis of financial liberalisation. The significance of bank loans is
further manifest in Figure 4B which depicts parallel movements between total bank credit
and nominal GDP except during the mid 1980s recession when bank loans did not seem to
fall with GDP though their growth did decelerate.
Banks in Malaysia have also appeared to be more aggressive in their lending policy in
recent years as highli ghted by the risin g, trend in the loans-deposit ratios (excluding trade
bills) observed by them (Figure 4C). From about 60% in the early 1970s, the ratio rose
though not steadily to 87.33% when computed on the basis of total deposits (excluding
negotiable certificates of deposit) and to about 78.84% (when NCDs are included) in
1993. Government securities also seem to be losing its prominence in the asset portfolio of
banks as Figure 4D indicates. Over the years, direct lending to the government has never
exceeded 3.5% of total loans and advances extended by the banks. However this increased
aggressiveness has not been unaccompanied by an improvement in their equity position
(defined as capital and reserves as a proportion of total liabilities) from about 3.17% in
1970 to about 4.10% in 1993 (Figure 4E). Furthermore there is evidence of a growing
preference amongst banks in meting out lon ger term loans over granting short-term loans
(Figure 4F). The share of total loans granted for a period of between one and four years in
total loans and advances rose from 2.39% in 1970 to 5.76% in 1993 while that of term
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loans exceeding four years rose more markedly from 4.33% to 35.75% though short term
loans remain dominant.
The Malaysian banking scene also suggests a close correlation between the deposit-taking
activities of banks and their lending operations. As projected by Figure 4G, the volume of
deposits accepted by these institutions varies closely with the volume of their lending. This
underscores the importance of deposits in funding their lending operations. Hence banks in
Malaysia do play the role as financial intermediaries with an increasing degree. By a visual
inspection of Figure 4H, funds received by these institutions are predominantly long term
in the form of fixed deposits as opposed to more volatile deposits such as demand and
savings deposits. In fact fixed deposits as a percentage of total deposits mobilised has
displayed a moderately risin g trend and this could have contributed to the greater
willingness of banks in issuing lon ger term loans.
Not only has there appeared to be a positive correlation between GDP and loans but a
similar correlation seems to exist between deposits and GDP as attested to by Figure 41.
Akin to the former relationship, economic recession in the mid 1980s did not seem to
provide a damper to the absolute level of deposits though not in growth terms. All this
speaks of a direct relationship amon gst loans, deposits and economic activity which is
possibly governed by or or dictating the lending policy of banks.
Our attention has so far been centered on commercial banks in line with our research
objective. Finance companies and to a much smaller extent merchant banks are gaining
prominence in the Malaysian financial system as mobilisers and providers of funds (Figures
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4J & 4K). Nevertheless their role is relativel y minor to that of commercial banks as loans
granted by finance companies and merchant banks only constituted about 37.34% and
7.79% respectively of total loans and advances offered by commercial banks in 1993. In
terms of nonbank deposits, finance companies only commanded 35.57% of the total
amount of deposits placed with commercial banks.
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Credit Rationing
Broadly defined, credit rationing is characterised by a situation of excess demand for loans
as loan rates are quoted below the Walrasian market clearing level (Jaffee & Stiglitz,
1991). Numerous definitions of credit rationing exist and they include inter alia:
1) Interest rate (or price) rationing. Under this condition, a borrower would only be
extended a loan smaller than the desired amount at a loan rate but would have to
pay a higher rate to secure a larger loan. This may be a standard price rationing or
the rationing idea of Freimer and Gordon (1965). They attribute the upward
sloping interest rate schedule that borrowers may face to the perception by banks
that default probabilities vary directly with the amount of loans extended to a
particular borrower;
2) Divergent views rationing. This prevails when certain individuals fail to borrow on
interest rate terms they deem appropriate to their self-perceived probability of
default;
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3) Redlining. This phenomenon arises when a borrower is refused credit due to a
failure in meeting the required rate of return of the lender at any interest rate given
their risk classification. Moreover loans previously viable might lose their viability
when the required rate of return is revised upwards; and
4) Pure credit rationing. This arises when some individuals manage to obtain loans
while others who are apparently identical fail to borrow at precisely the same terms
due to imperfect information. In fact imperfect information is one of the plausible
explanations for the maintenance of loan rate below the market clearing leve1.5
Pure credit rationing may also be referred to as equilibrium rationing. It arises when the
return on a loan does not increase monotonically with the interest rate char ged owing to
adverse selection and incentive effects (Kin g., 1986). An increase in the lending rate may
precipitate a decline in the return on a bank's portfolio since this may attract riskier pool of
borrowers (adverse selection) and encoura ge existing borrowers to undertake riskier
ventures (adverse incentive) especially in the absence of perfect and costless monitoring.
Under such circumstances, it may not pay banks to levy high interest rates and market
equlibrium may be characterised by credit rationing (Stiglitz, 1988). The loan rate would
then be set by the bank to the point where an increase in the loan rate would yield a zero
marginal return and the bank would equate the marginal net return on loans to the
opportunity cost of funds - the rate on open market securities plus the expected cost of
entering open markets as a borrower (King, 1986). In the absence of rationing, an increase
in core deposits would lead the bank to reduce its loan rate due to a decline in the
probability of deposit insufficiency and hence the expected cost of open market
borrowing. However the loan rate may not vary in response to an influx of deposits in the
presence of rationing as it would then be determined solely by risk factors and the
securities rate. Hence the complete dichotomy emerged between the loan and deposit
5 In fact there is another type of credit rationing which is a policy-induced phenomenon referred to by
Galbis (1977). It is associated with a government's direct move to restrict credit supplies following a
restriction on interest rates payable by banks.
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markets (or the asset and liability sides of banks' balance sheets). Any increase in deposits
may not lead to a corresponding increase in the volume of loans and these new deposits
may be invested in securities and required reserves. A swing in favor of holding liquid
securities may have a depressive impact on the economy over and above the effect from a
contractionary monetary policy as happened during the Great Depression (Bernanke,
1983; Hein & Mercado-Mendez, 1992).
It is in fact also uncertain that banks could resolve the asymmetric information problem via
a demand for more collateral or for a greater equity participation of the borrower in the
project to be financed. Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) pointed out that more stringent
requirements as such may even instead contribute to a decline in the returns to the banks
as again this may reduce the avera ge de gree o 'risk aversion of the pool of borrowers. For
instance if smaller projects happen to be high risk projects, collateral and equity
requirements for securing loans to finance them may be more easily satisified. Hence banks
may find themselves ending up with a pool of debtors made up predominantly of the high
risk. Another possibility is that those who could afford to satisfy these requirements are
those who have earlier succeeded in hi ghly risky ventures that brought them significant
profits. Their risk-loving attitude may perpetuate and in this case, banks may find their
expected returns undermined.
It is noteworthy that information-based credit rationing has also earlier been postulated by
Jaffee and Russell (1976). They explain how unobserved differences in the quality of
borrowers might give rise to rationing. They demonstrated a situation under which the
probability of default by borrowers varies directly with the loan size. Even default
probabilities may differ across borrowers for a g iven loan size due to factors unobservable
by lenders. Owing to this indistinguishability of borrowers ex ante, the market interest rate
may actually be carrying a risk premium. Thus low risk borrowers may feel disadvantaged
in terms of cost to participate in the market alongside hi gh risk borrowers. Given this
scenario, banks may find it rational to ration credit by restricting the loan size as this could
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alleviate the default incidence in the market and hence the reduced need to incorporate a
risk premium in the lending rate. This may appease high quality borrowers and encourage
their participation.
,
4.2.2 Financial Aggregates and Economic Activity
Traditionally there are two views regarding the influence of financial aggregates on
economic activity namely the money view and the credit view (Morgan, 1992). The money
view differs from the credit view simply in one important respect, i.e. the former holds that
only money matters w-hile the latter attaches importance to bank loans. While proponents
of the money view hold that firms have borrowing recourses in the event of a reduced
availability of bank loans, proponents of the latter hold that many firms lack such
recourses. Even if for some reason that market rates do not rise, a reduction in spending
could still be precipitated by a slack in the supply of loans. However two necessary
conditions have to prevail before bank loans could constitute a channel of monetary policy
transmission mechanism:
1) Loans and securities should be regarded by banks as imperfect substitutes on the
asset side of their balance sheets for a contractionary monetary policy to dampen
loan supplies; and
2) Loans and non-bank sources should also be viewed by firms as imperfect
substitutes on the liability side of their balance sheets for loan supplies to yield any
real effect.
It is shown by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) that portfolio adjustments made by banks to
the asset side of their balance sheets can impart a channel of monetary influence distinct
from the conventional money demand route. This is premised on the notion that banks are
better positioned to overcome the adverse selection and moral hazard problems inherent in
the financial market. They possess the expertise to gather information about firms and are
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capable of screening borrowers and monitorin g the loan performance at relatively low cost
(Diamond, 1984; Bernanke, 1986 Vale, 1992). According to Fama (1985), bank credit
is special for certain classes of borrowers and is not permutable with open market credit.
The presence of financial intermediation could help overcome informational problems that
might cause the incomplete nature of financial markets. By virtue of their specialisation in
information gathering about loan projects and their ability to pool and distribute risks,
these intermediaries in fact aid in curbin g, market imperfections and in the promotion of a
better resource allocation. While a firm may face a heavy risk burden by borrowing as it
has to face all profit eventualities itself, the severity of imperfections in the credit market
has led to an unpopularity amongst firms to raise capital by new equity issues (
Greenwald, et.al, 1984 & Stiglitz, 1992). In fact if equilibrium credit rationing does exist
in the loans market, it may also imply a difficulty for firms to raise equity in the open
market. Asymmetric information problems may adversely affect the value of a firm's
existing assets and hence hampering its ability to seek financing from the equity
market. 6 Anyhow the credit view may be more inclined to prevail in a developing economy
like Malaysia as firms and consumers rely chiefly on bank loans as its private bond and
other commercial paper markets have yet to be developed.
With the onstream of financial liberalisation, new financial products which are close
substitutes for money have emerged. Banks have also been shedding their dependence on
the traditional deposit base as a source of financing their lending operations in favor of
funds raised from the wholesale market (Blundell-Wignall, Browne & Manasse, 1990).
This could have also impaired the relationship between traditional monetary aggregates
and economic activity, sparking off beliefs that credit instead of monetary aggregates is a
more appropriate barometer for monetary policy actions (King, 1986; Friedman, 1983;
6 C/to (1986) in contrast has stressed the importance of developing a \ vel I -functioning equity market and
the potential role it could play in the promotion of efficient capital allocation and risk sharing in a
liberalised financial environment. He argued that for a given degree of imperfect information, capital
would flow more efficiently through an equity market as equity finance is free from adverse selection and
moral hazard problems unlike debt finance.
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Brunner & Meltzer, 1988; Bernanke & Blinder, 1988 and Blundell-Wignall & Gizycki,
1992).
Changes in the availability of credit may have significant effects on economic activity while
changes in real interest rates may be a relatively minor explanatory factor for economic
fluctuations (Stiglitz, 1988). In the event of a move by the Central Bank to mop up
reserves from the banking system through the sale of bonds in an open market operation,
banks may be forced to reduce their loan supplies when banks are fully-loaned up. This
may curb investment and consumption activities as well as other operations requiring
working capital. Hence economic activity would be contained by a tight monetary policy
though interest rates may display only very little movements due to credit rationing
(Blinder & Stiglitz, 1983; Blanchard & Fischer,1989). If there is some truth in this,
interest rate liberalisation in Malaysia and its occasional reversals in the subsequent years
might not have yielded any parametric change in the links between monetary policy and
economic activity in a direct fashion. It is noted by Bernanke & Blinder (1988) that market
interest rates could even decline after some monetary policy tightening owing to spending
declines following a reduced supply of bank loans. The presence of credit rationing also
explains the way credit shocks may affect output without involving any significant change
in lending rates. Credit rationing due to asymmetric information may in fact provide a
larger scope for monetary policy to have real effects via the credit supply channel
(Bernanke, 1986; Gertler, 1988; and Vale, 1992). From the vantage point of credit, the
economy might respond sluggishly to an easy monetary policy depending partly on the
lending policy of banks (Morgan, 1992). The more cautious are banks towards lending,
the weaker would be the response of the economy to such policy. Credit crunches may
also result from bank runs, a combination of ti ght monetary policy and ceilings imposed on
bank deposit rates (Morgan, 1992) and a shortage of bank capital (Bernanke & Lown,
1991; and Johnson, 1991).
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When considered in relation to economic activity, perhaps we could liken credit granted
by financial institutions to the monetary base in a money multiplier framework. More
precisely, total credit granted in an economy is some multiple of total credit granted by the
banking system. There are transactions such as sales of goods and services in an economy
which are effected without involving mone y. However it can be stressed that credit issued
by the banking system constitutes the core or base of total credit granted in the economy
as the effect of a credit squeeze in the banking system would be trickled down to other
parts of the economy. This is somehow consistent with the notion expressed by Stiglitz
(1992) that there is a parallel between banks and firms. If firms face restricted access to
bank credit, not only will they scale down their investments in machines but also the credit
they grant to their customers. Thus the "benevolence" of banks in granting credit has a
ripple effect on total credit available in the economy.
The significance of credit in the determination of economic activity is further underscored
by a theoretical study of how credit constraints as dictated by the price of collateral may
interact with economic activity over the business cycle (Kiyotaki & Moore, 1993). The
dampening effect of the constraint could also magnify as the price of these assets may
itself be influenced by the credit condition in the economy. 7 Hence the dynamic interaction
between credit limits and asset prices may constitute a very strong transmission
mechanism via which the effects of shocks in a particular sector may persist and amplify
with spillover effects on other sectors of the economy.
More recent evidence on the existence of a loan supply channel of monetary policy
transmission mechanism is provided by Kashyap, et.al  (1993). They maintain that a
tightening of monetary policy could affect the external financing mix of firms by favoring
commercial paper issuances vis-a-vis bank loans. This may however indicate that a
contractionary monetary policy can be relied upon to induce a decline in loan supply and
7However, a borrower's net worth and thus the collateral that he is able to furnish may help reduce
borrowing costs as the informational risks faced by lenders may be correspondingly curtailed (Bcrnanke &
artier, 1986).
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hence investment especially when commercial paper issuances are not a handy alternative
as may be true in the case of Malaysia.
Monetarists however acknowledge that credit tightening does prevail during a recession
but view the event as an endogenous development (Hein & Mercado-Mendez, 1992). In
their opinion, commercial bank lending decisions are not exogenous forces influencing the
business cycle. It is rather the monetary forces that affect their lending decisions. The
traditional and most familiar analysis of central bank policy focuses upon the quantity of
the medium of exchange. This is predicated upon the belief that the central bank can
regulate the economy to the extent that it can control the quantity (Bernanke & Gertler,
1987). Hence the traditional focus has been on the liability side of banks' balance sheets.
However as initially contended by Gurley & Shaw (1956), this approach might have lost
its relevance with the emergence of substitutes for conventionally-defined money in
consumers' portfolios concomitant with financial innovations. Specifically, the money
stock may no longer be a precise yardstick for the flow of intermediary credit and that non
bank financial intermediaries might also have become an important repository and source
of loanable funds (Gertler, 1988). Coupled with the identification of asymmetric
information problems in financial markets, there has been an upsurge of interest in
examining the "asset" side of banks' balance sheets as well. Nevertheless this does not
amount to a dismissal of the effectiveness of monetary policy in influencing the real
activity. The potential influence remains via an influence on the extent of financial
intermediation though not on the quantity of the medium of exchange. In fact as early as
the 1960s apart from Gurley & Shaw, other economists such as Patinkin (1961) and
Brainard & Tobin (1963) also recognised the quality and quantity of services offered by
financial intermediaries as being crucial to macroeconomic performance. More specifically,
factors influencing the ability and cost of banks in the supply of intermediary services have
real effects (Bernanke & Gertler, 1987).
However within the academic circle that centers on the relationship between financial
intermediation and economic development, two viewpoints prevail that may also be
referred simply to as the "traditional" view and the "new" view (King & Levine, 1993).
While the traditional view holds that chan ges in intermediation yield merely small growth
effects relative to the effects of economic development on the demand for financial
services, the new view on the other hand believes that financial intermediation has a causal
role to play in the development process. Hence those who favour the traditional view
would contend that the underlying relationship of most of the observed correlations
between growth and financial intermediation actually reflect the direction of causality
running from the former to the latter. Small interest rate elasticities of savings and
investment and weak effects of physical capital accumulation on economic development
have been cited as reasons why distortions in the financial sector are viewed as farfetched
to investment and development. On the contrary, the new view assigns financial market
developments a greater causal role as it is believed that they influence capital accumulation
within the economy and hence productivity.
Finally however it is worth mentioning that neither money nor credit has been attached any
significance to in the determination of economic activity by the real business cycle theory.
Money is thought by the theory to be passive and its correlation with output exists merely
because agents increase their demand for transaction services when current or expected
future output is high (Bernanke, 1986). Advocates of this theory also maintain that
empirical findings of a money-income correlation actually refer to the correlation between
income and inside money rather than the base or outside money and the correlation is
merely a reflection of some collinearity between money and credit. In spite of this
contention, credit is not being regarded as a causal variable but like money a purely
endogenous one (King & Plosser, 1984). The real business cycle view is then somehow
akin to the Modigliani-Miller theorem (1958) which asserts that economic decisions are
made independently of the financial structure (Bernanke & Gertler, 1987). By implication
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then,	 financial	 intermediaries	 are
	 inconsequential	 to	 economic	 activity.
4.3 The VAR Methodology
The use of VAR technique has been promoted out of disillusionment with the ability of
large scale macroeconomic models to yield accurate forecasts (Hakkio & Morris,1984).
While in the 1970s most large-scale macroeconomic models underpredicted inflation and
unemployment, they failed to predict the strength of U.S. economic recovery in 1983. In
the light of these events, the use of vector time series models as an alternative to structural
econometric models as-advocated by Sims (1980) gained popularity.
Formally a vector autorecaession (VAR) may be represented as follows:
y,	 (4.3.1)
-
where y refers to a column vector of n variables and 13„ is a matrix of n x n dimension.
E(u,u,)= Y and altogether there are 11 2 L free coefficients in this model.
Assuming y consists of stationary series, an equivalent vector moving average
representation of the above system of equations (4.3.1) by virtue of Wold's decompositon
theorem is as follows:
y, = X ,p+	 (4.3.2)
where y = an N-variate stochastic process;
xip = deterministic component of y;
{//,}= an N-variate white noise process;
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and ii, and it,.are uncorrelated for t 	 s.
may be referred to as the innovation process for y. In order to perform variance
decomposition and to derive impulse response functions which represent the primary
purpose of estimating a VAR, innovations have to be orthogonalised as orthogonalised
innovations are not correlated across time and equations. This may be effected by applying
Cholesky decomposition to the contemporaneous covariance matrix, E. Given a
nonsingular and lower triangular matrix H, A . is replaceable by A s H and u by H-' u. The
matrix H is obtained by Cholesky decomposition which satisfies the following condition:
H 571 . = I
or	 HE' =
The orthogonalised innovations will then be	 = 11 1 1-1 -  with E(v,v; ) = I.
Based upon orthogonalised innovations, variance decomposition analyses may then be
conducted and impulse response functions derived. While impulse response functions
depict the responses of the system to a particular initial shock, a variance decomposition
analysis allows us to decompose the forecast error variance of a variable into parts
attributable to each of the innovation processes.
For guidance in ordering the variables in the system, we shall refer to both the F- and
Likelihood Ratio tests for exogeneity. 8 These tests will be described in the subsequent
paragraphs of this section. Variables perceived to have no predictive power about other
variables are positioned last in the ordering. Hence the first variable in the order will be
one that explains all of its own one step variance.
8 Both the outcome of variance decomposition and impulse response functions are sensitive to the
arrangement of variables in the system. However Spencer (1989) noted that results based upon semiannual
or annual data are likely to display greater sensitivity to the choice of ordering compared to those based
upon higher frequency data. This is in view of the fact that contemporaneous correlation amongst pre-
orthogonaliscd innovations is likely to increase NN ith the level of temporal aggregation of the data.
13:3
In fact the use of this methodology also thcilitates the process of determining whether a
variable z aids in the forecasting of another variable x in the causal sense of Granger. The
process can be effected either by conducting block F-tests on individual equations in the
VAR or Likelihood Ratio tests that take into account cross-equation relationships. The
latter are meant for determining the block exotleneity of a group of variables and it is in
fact a multivariate ueneralisation of Granger-Sims causality test.9
The likelihood ratio test statistic assumes an asymptotic 2,2 distribution with degrees of
freedom equal to the number of restrictions.'" It is computed as follows:
2,2 (T—C)('Inu'el	 —hide! I 10	 (4.3.3)
where Er and Eu are the covariance matrices from the restricted and unrestricted VAR
respectively, T is the total number of observations and C is a correction factor for
improving small sample properties. Sims (1980) suggested equating C to the number of
variables in each equation of the unrestricted VAR.
As forthmentioned, these tests will be relied upon by us as a guidance for ordering the
variables in a VAR.
4.4 A Deposit-Based Analysis
The methodology involved here is similar to that of our earlier analysis on money demand
namely the error correction approach. Though we are concerned chiefly with the interest
rate elasticity of total deposits received by commercial banks, we have also attempted to
establish these elasticities for different types of deposits. The various types of deposits
considered here are demand deposits (CBTDD), savings deposits (CBTSD), fixed
9 1n some sense, such tests may be regarded as tests for the exogencity of a set of variables.
I °This test will also be relied upon b y us for identifying the optimal lag length to be used in the
estimation of the VAR apart from the Ljung-Box test for serial correlation.
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deposits (CBTFD) and that of our central concern namely total deposits which is an
aggregation of the former three elements plus negotiable certificates of deposits (CBTD)
received by commercial banks. Their assumed general functional forms are as follows:
CBTDD, = f (CB1?3FD,, NGDP,) (4.4.1)
CBTSD, = g(CBR3FD,,CBSDR„ NGDR, PCSDR,,UKTB,) (4.4.2)
CBTFD, = h(CBR31. D„ PCR31.D,	 (/K7B1) (4.4.3)
CBTD, = i (CBR3 ED,, 	 R3 ED,, UK! B1 , NGDP,) (4.4.4)
where A (0,J' )0, gl (0,g2 )0, g3 )0. g4 (0, g5 (0,
)0,172 (0,h.  )0,h4 (0,6 )0,i 2 (0,/, \ 0 and /4)0.
In line with the broad theme of our study, the entire analysis is couched only in nominal
terms. Demand deposits which are non interest bearing are assumed to respond negatively
to the 3-month fixed deposit rate offered by commercial banks (CBR3FD) and positively
to movements in nominal GDP (NGDP). This is in recognition of the possibility that
economic agents may economise on holdings of demand deposits when interest rates on
other forms of deposits rise. Owing to the cash-quality of demand deposits, its holdings
may vary directly with the buoyancy of the economy.
With respect to the interest-bearing savings deposits (CBTSD), it is assumed to vary
directly with its own rate of return proxied by savings deposit rate (CBSDR), nominal
GDP for its storehouse of value role while moving inversely with the fixed deposit rate
offered by commercial banks (CBR3FD), the savings deposit rate of finance companies
(FCSDR) and a foreign interest rate proxied by the UK Treasury Bill (UKTB) rate owing
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to the relatively liberal exchange control regime maintained by Malaysia. It is also felt that
an inclusion of a foreign interest rate may assist in capturing some foreign market
ramifications on the domestic financial system."
Fixed deposits (CBTFD) in turn can be expected to respond positively to its own rate of
return proxied by the commercial banks' 3-month fixed deposit rate (CBR3FD), to
nominal GDP in the wealth accumulation process and negatively to movements in foreign
interest rates (UKTB) and rates offered by finance companies as proxied by finance
companies' 3-month fixed deposit rate (FCR3FD). This is to entertain the possibility of
competition posed by finance companies to commercial banks in deposit-taking activities.
Finally total deposits received by commercial banks are assumed to respond positively to
the interest rate offered by commercial banks (CBR3FD) and NGDP and negatively to
alternative domestic and foreign interest rates proxied respectively by finance companies'
3-month fixed deposit rate (FCR3FD) and the UK Treasury Bill rate (UKTB).
To steer clear of spurious regression problems, all the series involved are subject to both
conventional and seasonal unit root tests. The results of conventional unit root tests up to
second order without the inclusion of a time trend are presented in Table 4.1 while those
of selected series with the time trend included are presented in Table 4.11.
Table 4.1
Dickey-Fuller Tests (Without Time Trend)
Levels	 First	 Second
Difference	 Difference
LCBTDD -1.1675 -3.9154 -5.8861
LCBTSD -1.9607 -4.9186 -13.7868
LCBTFD -1.2376 -6.6647 -5.8552
LCBTD -1.7471 -2.8645 -11.6465
"Initially it was felt that we should derive a foreign interest rate series based upon the higher of the rates
prevailing in U.K. and U.S. at every point in the sample. However a plot of the two series reveals that the
rate in U.K. was most of the time higher in the sample period. Hence the idea was shelved.
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LNGDP -1.4727 -3.6150 -14.1402
CBR3FD -2.5410 -5.4225 -7.9867
CBSDR -0.4574 -6.4470 -10.5524
FCSDR -0.1970 -8.7115 -6.8209
LTKTB -1.9297 -7.3783 -7.0601
FCR3FD -2.0001 -5.7130 -8.9217
DIFF -4.8958 -7.2385 -3.3996
Notes:
(I) All variables are in natural logarithm except for interest rates.
(II) LCBTDD	 - Total Demand Deposits with Commercial Banks
LCBTSD	 Total Savings Deposits with Commercial Banks
LCBTFD	 - Total Fixed Deposits with Commercial Bank
LCBTD	 Total Deposits with Commercial Banks
LNGDP	 Nominal GDP
CBR3FD	 - 3-month fixed deposit rate offered by Commercial Banks
CBSDR	 - Savings deposit rate offered by Commercial Banks
FCSDR	 - Savings deposit rate offered by finance companies
UKTB	 U.K. Treasury Bill rate
FCR3FD	 - 3-month fixed deposit rate offered by finance companies
(III) Critical values at the 5 per cent si gnificance level for 50 and 100 observations are -
2.93 and -2.89 respectively
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Table 4.11
Dickey-Fuller Tests (with Time Trend)
Levels
LCBTDD -2.5001
LCBTSD -1.8002
LCBTFD -1.2857
LCBTD -1.7571
LNGDP -2.1155
Note: Critical values at 5 per cent significance level for 50 and 100 observations are -
3.50 and -3.45 respectively.
Seasonal unit root test results are furnished in Table 4.111.
As in the money demand analysis, steps were taken to ensure that time series properties of
a series are only inferred after appropriate adjustments for serial correlation in the auxiliary
regressions as reflected in LM tests from the first to the fourth order. As can be discerned
from these tables, the series concerned can all be regarded as I(1) and none of them suffers
from acute seasonal unit root problems. This motivates our cointegration tests.
Table 4.111
Seasonal Unit Root Tests (The HEGY Procedure)
't': fl i 't': 112 't': 113 {14 'F': II3 n 114
LCBTDD 2.4703 -1.5180 -1.4696 -1.6102 2.3736
-1.5629 -2.0790* -1.9760* -2.1096* 4.4353*
1,SD -0.5686 -5.1586* -5.0591* -6.7242* 59.2760*
I,Tr -2.5001 -2.3699* -2.9521* 2.6417* 8.6252*
I,SD,Tr -2.3093 -5.2559* -5.4994* -6.3922* 61.9360*
LCBTSD 2.4572 -5.5081* -3.4859* -8.3831* 57.4905*
-1.8309 -5.3608* -3.5109* -8.2130* 55.3622*
I,SD -1.7099 5.4540* -3.0519 -8.1343* 49.4021*
I,Tr -1.7960 -5.4665* -3.7930* -7.8685* 55.8547*
I,SD,Tr -1.8618 -5.5606* -3.3726 -7.7889* 49.8140*
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it':	 111 it':	 112 't': FI3 't': 11 4 'F': 113 nIT4
LBCTFD 3.1802
-1.3312
-5.8146*
-5.6549*
-3.8847*
-3.8635*
-7.1018*
-7.0236*
46.0504*
44.8969*
I,SD
I,Tr
-1.2841
-1.4291
-5.3998*
-5.6883*
-3.7924*
-3.9764*
-7.1617*
-6. g836*
46.3415*
44.8691*
I,SD,Tr -1.4241 -5.4304* -3.9098* -7.0199* 46.3404*
LCBTD 2.1505 -7.4533* -2.0095* -3.1580* 7.5322*
-1.9627 -2.3478 * -2.2037* -3.0158* 7.5601*
LSD -1.8727 -2.4799 -7.5217 -3.4435* 10.2088*
I,Tr -1.2314 - 2 .3660* -7.1517* -3.0009* 7.3800*
I,SD,Tr -1.6728 -3.3564* -2.0872 -5.0634* 15.0051*
LNGDP 2.7466 -3.4576* -2.7376* -2.6901* 7.3810*
-1.5487 -3.5056* -2.7961* -2.6920* 7.5496*
I,SD -1.4140 -5.3793* -4.8699* -4.7058* 32.2971*
I,Tr -2.1155 -3.4093* -2.8556* -2.5187* 7.2734*
I,SD,Tr -1.4859 -5.3920* -4.9691* -4.6341* 32.6642*
* Significant at the 5 per cent level.
Preliminary attempts to estimate long-run functions by using the Engle & Granger
technique proved disappointing as the hypothesis of cointegration could not be
established 12 . Subsequently we decided to use the Johansen's Maximum Likelihood
Procedure instead on the assumption that there is trend in the series but not in the data
generation process. However this approach has by no means been straightforward. Our
selection of appropriate cointegrated vectors is based upon multi-faceted criteria of
statistical satisfactions, theoretical plausibilities and valid adjustment coefficients of the
cointegrated vectors selected as representing long run relationships. In the identification
process, each possible function has been estimated with a varying lag length running from
2 to usually 8. We shall now discuss the empirical results for each type of deposits
separately as follows:
12 1n the estimation process. all variables except interest rates have been log transformed.
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a) Commercial Banks' Total Demand Deposits (CBTDD)
In the case of CBTDD, the null hypothesis that a cointegrating vector exists can be upheld
based upon the maximal eigenvalue statistic (Table 4.IV) at the 5% significance level. Five
lags and centered seasonal dummies are included in the estimation. There does not seem to
be any serial correlation problem with this number of lags as attested to by the LM and F
tests. The estimated long run relationship as implied by the cointegrating vector (plotted
in Fig 4L) is as follows:
LCB7DD, = 1.2597 LNGDP,
Table 4.1V
The Johansen Procedure
CBTDD
VAR with 5 lags and seasonal dummies included
Sample Period: 1979Q1 - 1992Q4 (56 observations)
EIGENVALUES 0.23527 0.0008407
Test statistics for the number of cointegrating vectors
Ho: r = 0 r < 1
Trace 15.0683 0.0471
(17.9530) (8.1760)
X. max 15.0212 0.0471
(14.900) (8.1760)
II	 ESTIMATED COINTEGRATING VECTORS
LCBTDD	 -1.0000
LNGDP
	
1.2597
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III	 ESTIMATED ADJUSTMENT MATRIX
LCBTDD	 -0.1152
LNGDP
	
0.4131
IV TESTS FOR APPROPRIATE LAG LENGTH (5)
ALCBTDD ALNGDP
Serial Correlation: x 2 (4) 5.8347 [0.212] 7.8163 [0.099]
F(4,39) 1.1340 [0.355] 1.5816 [0.198]
Normality (J-B): x2(2) 5.1995 [0.074] 8.5444 [0.014]
Notes:
(I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below test statistics refer to 95% critical
values.
(II) Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels.
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Figure 4L
Cointegrating Vector of Commercial Banks' Total Demand Deposits
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The estimated long run income elasticity of 1.26 is not unreasonable in view of the
growing popularity of checking facilities. The interest rate variable (CBR3FD) which was
originally being included as an argument in the function has been dropped owing to its
insignificance and the interpretational difficulties it poses upon its inclusion on numerous
occasions. This may however not be an unreasonable move as demand deposits are non
interest bearing and agents are merely maintaining them as a payments instrument, the
volume of which is largely determined by the level of economic activity.
In our quest for short-run elasticity estimates, the general-to-specific procedure has been
followed with the initial number of parameters set at 14 comprising 4 lags of change in
total demand deposits, current and 4 lags of change in nominal GDP, the cointegrating
vector selected as the error correction term, three seasonal dummies plus a constant. In
moving from the general to the specific, we have chosen two alternative courses, i.e. by
incorporating the error correction term first with a lag of one and then with a lag of 5. The
exercise based upon the 5th lag could yield a final equation satisfying the parsimonious
criterion on the basis of adjusted R-squared of 0.62 and the standard error of regression of
0.023. This should be contrast with the initial specification that yields an adjusted R-
squared of 0.59 and the regression standard error of 0.024 (Table 4.V). Details of the final
estimates are given in Appendix 4.2 and the preferred set of estimates is as below:
ALCBTDD, = —0.92 + 0.51 ALNGDP, + 0.3561. A/67)P, ±
0.1 8ALNGDP,_ 2 +0.25ALNGDP, — 0.27 EC , — 0.2 3ALCBMD + 0.06S1C
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Table 4.V
General-to-Specific Reductions of Overly-Parameterized ADL
CBTDD CBTFD
,
CBTD
Initial Specification
No of Parameters 14 9 9
Equation Standard Error 0.0244 0.0395 0.0172
ft2 0.5866 0.3657 0.5055
Final Model
No of Parameters 8 6 5
Equation Standard Error 0.0234 0.0393 0.0168
R 2 0.6176 0.3715 0.5277
Hence it can be deduced that demand deposits are not income elastic in the short run with
an estimated magnitude of 0.51. Adjustments to long run equilibrium also appears to be
sluggish with the coefficient of the error correction (EC) term estimated at 0.27.
b) Commercial Banks' Total Savings Deposits (CBTSD)
With respect to savings deposits (CBTSD), its estimated long run function is contained in
Table 4.VI. The estimates are based upon 4 lags with seasonal dummies included. At the
95% significance level, the null hypothesis of one cointegrated vector is upheld by both
test statistics. No serial correlation problem appears with this lag length. The cointegrated
vector is plotted in Figure 4M and the long-run relationship that it implies is as follows:
In CBTSD, --= O. 2347 CBSDI?, —0. 3403 ECSDI?, +1.1902 In NGDP,
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Table 4. VI
The Johansen Procedure
CBTSD
VAR with 4 lags and seasonal dummies included
Sample Period: 1979Q1 - 1992Q4 (56 observations)
EIGENVALUES: 0.51844 	 0.25467	 0.15911	 0.030467
Test statistics for the number of cointegrating vectors
Ho: r = 0 r < 1 r . 2 r < 3
Trace 68.8178 27.8970 11.4371 1.7327
(48.2800) (31.5250) (17.9530) (8.1760)
X max 40.9208 16.4599 9.7045 1.7327
(27.1360) (21.0740) (14.9000) (8.1760)
II	 ESTIMATED COINTEGRATING VECTOR
LCBTSD -1.0000
CBSDR 0.2347
FCSDR -0.3403
LNGDP -	 1.1902
III	 ESTIMATED ADJUSTMENT MATRIX
LCBTSD -0.0165
CBSDR 0.0855
FCSDR 2.7342
LNGDP 0.0951
IV	 RESTRICTED COINTEGRATING VECTOR
LCBTSD -1.0000
CBSDR 0.6344
FCSDR -0.6344
LNGDP 1.4926
LR Test of Restrictions: x 2 (1) = 10.4128 [0.001]
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V	 TESTS FOR APPROPRIATE LAG LENGTH (4)
ALCBTSD ACBSDR AFCSDR ALNGDP
Serial Correlation:
X 2(4) 6.1551 [0.188] 8.5197 [0.074] 2.7521 [0.600] 3.6540 [0.455]
F(4,33) 1.0188 [0.412] 0.1741 [0.679] 0.4264 [0.788] 0.5759 [0.682]
Normality (J-B):
x2(2) 2.5966 [0.273] 5.3613 [0.069] 2.5173 [0.284] 41.7086 [0.000]
Notes:
(I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below test statistics refer to 95% critical values.
(II) Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels.
Both the CBR3FD and UKTB which were originally postulated for inclusion in the
estimation have been ultimately excluded also owing to their insignificance and
interpretational difficulties they posed in most instances. The long run income elasticity of
savings deposit is estimated at around unity (1.19). These deposits also seem to be
responsive in the long run though not considerably to their own rate of return (CBSDR)
and the rate of return on savings deposits offered by finance companies (FCSDR) with
estimated long run coefficients of 0.24 and -0.34 respectively. Attempts to impose a
homogenous restriction on these semi interest rate elasticities however failed as it has been
overwhelmingly rejected by the likelihood ratio test at 0.1%. The estimated cointegrating
vector also seems to be appropriate as it enters the savings deposit fiinction with an
appropriate sign (-0.02).
The process of moving from the general to the specific however proved disappointing. A
total of 20 arguments have been incorporated at the initial stage. They include 3 lags of
change in LCBTSD, current and 3 lags of change in CBSDR, FCSDR and LNGDP, the
error correction term , 3 centered seasonal dummies plus a constant. Two sequences of
reduction have also been followed, one with the error correction term incorporated as the
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first lag and the other with it being incorporated as the fourth lag. However coefficients of
both CBSDR and LNGDP persistently display a perversity in their direction. Hence we do
not report the estimates of the short run CBTSD function.
c) Commercial Banks' Total Fixed Deposits (CBTFD)
Based upon the maximal eigenvalue statistics, the null hypothesis that one cointegrating
vector exists can be found for CBTFD (Table 4.VII). These estimates involve 2 lags and a
set of 1(0) variables such as DIFF (CBR3FD-FCR3FD) and centered seasonal dummies.
There is no indication that serial correlation problems exist with this number of lags. The
cointegrating vector - identified also departs from the originally postulated long run
function with the exclusion of UKTB. Again its exclusion is due to its insignificance and
the problem it posed in the estimation. Figure 4N plots the cointegrating vector and the
implied long run relationship is as follows:
LCBTFD, = 1.131 I LNGDI
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Table 4.VII
The Johansen Procedure
CBTFD
VAR with 2 lags, DIFF, and seasonal dummies included
Sample Period: 1979Q3 - 1992Q4 (54 observations)
EIGENVALUES: 0.25565 0.0042657
Test statistics for the number of cointegrating vectors
Ho: r = 0 r	 1
Trace 16.1743 0.2308
(17.9530) (8.1760)
X max 15.9435 0.2308
(14.900) (8.1760)
II	 ESTIMATED COINTEGRATING VECTORS
LCBTFD	 -1.0000
LNGDP	 1.1311
III ESTIMATED ADJUSTMENT MATRIX
LCBTFD	 -0.1221
LNGDP	 0.0401
IV TESTS FOR APPROPRIATE LAG LENGTH (2)
ALCBTFD ALNGDP
Serial Correlation: x2 (4) 2.4950 [0.646] 5.0459 [0.283]
F(4,44) 0.5129 [0.727] 1.0893 [0.374]
Normality: x-(2) 1.5521 [0.460] 10.9939 [0.004]
Notes:
(I)
	
Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below test statistics refer to 95% critical
values.
Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels.
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The long run income elasticity of fixed deposits is estimated at 1.13. Two alternative
courses are also taken to model the short run function, one with the error correction term
incorporated at a lag of 1 and the other at a la g of 2. However only the former alternative
yields slightly more superior final estimates in terms of adjusted R-squared and standard
error of regression compared with the most general representation (Tables 4.V). Initial
specifications involve 9 variables namely one la g, of change in LCBTFD, current and one
lag of change in LNGDP, the error correction term, DIFF, 3 centered seasonal dummies
and a constant. Nevertheless the final estimates are uninteresting without any
contemporaneous influence of NGDP or DIFF on CBTFD (Appendix 4.3).
d) Commercial Banks' Total Deposits (CBTD)
The most encouraging results in our exercise and incidentally the results of our main
concern relate to total deposits received by commercial banks (CBTD). Based upon the
trace and maximal eigenvalue statistics, one cointegrating vector appears to exist between
CBTD and NGDP (Table 4.VIII). The estimates are derived with 2 lags, DIFF and
seasonal dummies included as 1(0) variables. The hypothesis of no serial correlation
problem in the estimates is also confirmed. UKTB as an originally postulated argument in
the function also appears to fall out of favor in the process of estimating the long run
relationship. Plot of the cointegrating vector is given in Figure 40 and the implied long
run relationship is as follows:
LCBTD, =1.2520LNGDP,
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Table 4.\i II
The Johansen Procedure
CBTD
VAR with 2 lags, DIFF, and seasonal dummies included
Sample Period: 1979Q3 - 1992Q4 (54 observatiOns)
EIGENVALUES: 0.35657 0.0035798 
Test statistics for the number of cointegrating vectors
Ho: ro = 0 r < I
Trace 24.0049 0 1937
(17.9530) (8.1760)
X. max 23.8112 0.1937
(14.9000) (8.1760)
II	 ESTIMATED COINTEGRATING VECTORS
LCBTD	 -1 0000
LNGDP
	
1.2520
III ESTIMATED ADJUSTMENT MATRIX
LCBTD	 -0.1094
LNGDP	 -0.0096
IV TESTS FOR APPROPRIATE LAG LENGTH (2)
ALCBTD ALNGDP
Serial Correlation: X 2 (4) 4.4412 [0.350] 4.6497 [0.325]
F(4,42) 0.9409 [0.450] 0.9893 [0.424]
Normality (J-B): x2(2) 0.5370 [0.765] 15.7109 [0.000]
Notes:
(I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below test statistics refer to 95% critical
values.
(II) Figures in square parentheses [] refer to marginal significance levels.
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The long run income elasticity of 1.25 appears to be quite consistent with our earlier
estimates of real M2 demand. Final estimates of the short run function be they based on
the first lag or the second lag also seem to exhibit lower standard errors and higher
explanatory powers as opposed to their initial specification though the one based upon the
second lag has a higher adjusted R-squared and lower standard errors and hence is
reported (Table 4.V). It appears to satisfy the basic statistical criteria such as non serially
correlated errors, normality of residuals, and homoscedasticity (Appendix 4.4) and is
concisely reported as below:
ALCBTD, = —0.13 + 0.12ALNGDP, — 0.09EC1 2 - 0.03S2 — 0.01S3
The above estimate suggests a short-run income elasticity of 0.12 and a slow rate of
adjustment towards equilibrium. In terms of goodness of fit, they appear to fare reasonably
well with an adjusted R-squared of 0.53 and with a reasonable ability to track the turning
points of the actual data series (Figure 4P).
Hence based upon our analyses so far, there is an overwhelming evidence that deposits
whatever the type is are not interest elastic at least in the short run and they only respond
to income movements.
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4.5 Lending Rate Adjustments
This section analyses the sensitivity of lending rates to changes in the loan demand and
supply factors. Equilibrium credit rationing arising from asymmetric information problems
(Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981 & 1983), may manifest itself in sluggish interest rate adjustments
especially when banks are wary to do so in response to changes in the factors determining
loan demand and supply in particular demand.
In empirical endeavors, the following disequilibrium framework of the loan market is
usually adopted:
Ldt =X; a 1 +a 2 1?, +Hit	 (4.5.1 )
Ls, =Z;131 +AR, +112,	 (4.5.2)
= min(Dr,St)	 (4.5.3)
1?,	 +(I --,u)1?:
	
(4.5.4)
Equation 4.5.1 represents the demand for commercial bank loans while their supply is
represented by (4.5.2). Equation 4.5.3 is the "short-side" rule commonly introduced in the
quantity rationing literature. It specifies that the actual quantity transacted is demand- or
supply-determined depending on the minimum between the two. R refers to the actual
transacted lending rate and owing to gradual adjustments, deviations from the equilirbrium
rate (R*) are often expected. Factors other than the lending rate that determine the
demand and supply of loans are contained within vectors X' and Z' respectively. Equation
4.5.4 characterises the adjustment mechanism of the lending rate under disequilibrium
conditions. It is a direct adaptation from Bowden (1978) disequilibrium price adjustment
mechanism. The Bowden partial adjustment scheme postulates that the price in each
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period adjusts towards the equilibrium level from the level prevailing in the preceding
period.
A reduced form loan rate equation as follows may be derived by first solving for R* by
equating 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 and then substituting R* into 4.5.4:
= u	 6)(X,a1	 +O(u 1  -11,.) (4.5.5)
where = (1- 1.t)/,62 - a2.
Equation 4.5.5 permits us in fact to ascertain whether the loan rate is in equilibrium or
otherwise by evaluating the null hypothesis that ,t=0. If 1_1=0, R * and by implication the
market has been in equilibrium.
-
However in our empirical endeavors, we shall adopt the error correction approach in place
of (4.5.5) as a mere estimation of (4.5.5) may involve spurious regression problems as the
data series may not exhibit a common order of integration. The following loan demand
and supply functions are postulated:
L fd
 (CBAL1?EGILI?„1,PINSA„E(;I?-1,)
where Ld = loan demand (in nominal terms)
CBALR = the lending rate imposed b y commercial banks proxied by the average
lending rate imposed by them
FCALR = the lending rate levied by finance companies proxied by the average
lending rate imposed by them
LFINSA = financial savings defined as a summation of total deposits (inclusive of
NCDs) with commercial banks, finance companies and merchant banks
R,
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EGR4 = anticipated economic growth rate proxied by the difference between the
log of NGDP 4 periods ahead and the log of current NGDP and
Ad <0, f2d <0, f3d <0 and 14' d >0.
Demand for bank loans is expected to vary inversely with the rate imposed by commercial
banks and directly with the rate imposed by finance companies. The rationale for
incorporating the rate imposed by the latter is to recognise the possibility of competition
posed by the latter against the former in the loans market. However this may be quite
contentious as loans granted by commercial banks and finance companies are generally
different in nature except perhaps in recent years. Total financial savings held by other
economic agents may also have a negative influence on loan demand if the availability of
financial savings alleviates the need to borrow from commercial banks. In fact, Moore and
Threadgold (1985) suggests the inclusion of variables that capture the working capital
needs of firms which are partially financed by short term bank borrowings. Finally the
inclusion of anticipated economic growth rate (\n e shall be assuming perfect foresight) is
to address the idea that agents borrow in anticipation of future prospect of the economy.
With respect to loans supply, the variables included are such that the portfolio
management behavior of banks which is subject to resource, risk and institutional policy
considerations is captured within the following general functional form:
= fs(CBALR,,Ibl,,R7
where Ls = loan supply (in nominal terms)
RA = rate of return on alternative assets proxied by the 3-month Malaysian
Treasury Bill rate (R3TB) or what is preferable the excess liquidity ratio maintained by
commercial banks (CBELR)
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R7D = 7-day interbank rate which is to capture the cost of borrowing by banks to
meet whatever resource shortfall that banks may encounter transiently
RAO = rate of return on foreign assets accessible to banks proxied by UK Treasury
Bill rate (UKTB) or overdraft and other advances extended by banks abroad (LCBEOD)
RC = resource constraints proxied by log of total deposits received by commercial
banks adjusted for statutory and minimum liquidity reserve requirements (LCBADEP) or
capital and reserves of commercial banks as a proportion of their total assets/liabilities
(CARTL) or the ratio of total loans less capital to demand deposits net of reserve
requirements minus 1 (LIQ) (King's suugestion) or log of adjusted assets of commercial
banks computed by total assets of commercial banks minus statutory reserves minus total
loans and advances (LASSET) in conjunction with Melitz and Pardue (1973)
CO = current prospect of the economy proxied by current rate of economic growth
(EGR1). This is also to represent collateral availability of borrowers assuming that the
value of collateralisable assets vary directly with the macroeconomic performance and
fis >0, f; <0, f; <0, f; <0, 1; >0 and fo' >0.
Notice that we have not included the deposit rate in the loans supply function because in
our opinion, banks have the leverage to manipulate deposit rates in the light of our earlier
findings that deposits are not interest elastic.
Taking both the demand and supply factors together into consideration would result in the
following lending rate rate function to be estimated:
CBALR, = f (FCALR„LFINSA„EGI?-1„1?A„1?7 D, , RAO RC, ,C0f)
where f > 0, f, <0, •3 >0, f, >0, f; > 0, j,; > 0,1- < 0 and f, > or < 0.
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In the estimation process, lagged stock of bank credit was also examined as a probable
explanatory factor as adjustment costs may thwart full adjustments to the desired demand
and supply levels. However its inclusion did not yield any interpretable set of results. The
function is estimated generally over the period from 1979Q1 to 1991Q4. As usual the time
series properties of the data have been first examined via conventional and seasonal unit
root tests and the results of these tests are presented in Tables 4.IX (without a time trend),
4.X (with time trend for selected series) and 4.XI (for seasonal unit roots). While the
presence of seasonal unit roots in the data can somehow be ruled out, LFINSA and
LCBADEP are found to be I(2) variables. Hence in the subsequent empirical exercise,
these variables are transformed into 1(1) variables by log differencing. On the other hand,
EGR4, R7D, EGR1 are found to be 1(0) variables. Hence they have been included
alongside centered seasonal dummies as 1(0) variables in the process of estimating the long
run lending rate function. The rest of the variables are indeed 41).
Table 4.LX
Dickey-Fuller Tests (Without Time Trend)
Levels First
Difference
Second
Difference
CBALR
-1.7187 -3.9095 -9.2613
FCALR
-1.9800 -6.1980 -8.8764
LFINSA
-0.6965 -1.5645 -10.8167
EGR4
-4.5334 -6.0777 -5.0346
R3TB
-1.6756 -6.2678 -5.7915
CBELR
-2.1958 -4.9390 -7.1659
R7D
-3.6413 -7.9473 -7.8747
UKTB
-1.9297 -7.3783 -7.0601
LCBEOD
-0.3932 -6.9436 -10.8621
LCBADEP
-1.7054 -2.1972 -11.2268
CARTL
-1.1273 -7.6150 -9.5926
LIQ
-2.1397 -5.4300 -8.1655
LAS SET
-0.4564 -7.8992 -6.9683
EGRI
-3.6150 -14.1402 -10.3863
LCBDLOA
-2.4856 -3.0110 -5.0529
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Notes:
I) All variables are in natural logarithm except for interest rate, growth and ratio
variables.
II) CBALR	 Average lending rate levied by commercial banks
FCALR	 - Average lending rate levied by finance companies
LFINSA	 - Financial Savings
EGR4
	
Anticipated economic growth rate
R3TB
	
3-month Malaysian Treasury Bill rate
CBELR
	
Excess liquidity ratio maintained by commercial banks
R7D
	
7-day inter-bank rate
UKTB
	
U.K. Treasury Bill rate
LCBEOD
	
Overdraft and other advances extended by commercial banks
abroad
LCBADEP
	
Total deposits received by commercial banks adjusted for
statutory and minimum liquidity reserve requirements
CARTL	 - Capital and reserves of commercial banks as a proportion of their
total assets/liabilities
LIQ	 Ratio of total loans less capital to demand deposits net of reserve
requirements minus I
LAS SET Adjusted assets of commercial banks computed by total assets of
commercial banks minus statutory reserves minus total loans and
advances
EGR1
	
Current economic growth rate
LCBDLOA - Total loans and advances granted by commercial banks
domestically
III)	 Critical values at the 5 per cent significance level for 50 and 100 observations are -
2.93 and -2.89 respectively.
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Table 4.X
Dickey-Fuller Tests (with Time Trend)
Levels
LFINSA -3.2067
LCBEOD -2.9547
LCBADEP -1.6780
CARTL -1.8148
LIQ -1.5906
LASSET -2.1234
LCBDLOA -0.95154
Note:	 Critical values at the 5 per cent significance level for 50 and 100 observations are
-3.50 and -3.45 respectively.
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Table 4.X1
Seasonal Unit Root Tests (The I I EGY Procedure)
i t':	 11 1 't':	 11 2 't': 113 't': 114 'F': 113 n 114
LFINSA - 1.2175 -2.8434* -2.3984* -2.0847* 5.0467*
-0.6965 -2.8225* -2.3796* -2.0624* 4.9544*
I,SD -1.2686 -4.8694* -4.6572* -4.5427* 35.9328*
I,Tr -3.2067 -2.5818* -2.5520* -1.4673 4.3247*
I,SD,Tr -3.0930 - 2 .8 9 34 -3.3040 -2.1416* 7.7319*
CBELR -1.3870 -4.4942* -4.5397* -4.9259* 23.0920*
-1.9706 -4.3868* -4.5938* -4.9922* 23.6770*
I,SD -1.9865 -4.1995* -4.4690* -5.0739* 23.4931*
I,Tr -3.9503* -4.3473* -4.8430* -5.3284* 26.6698*
I,SD,Tr -3.9166* -4.1183* -4.7413* -5.4102* 26.5919*
LCBEOD 0.9954 -5.8023* -3.3086* -2.4608* 10.4111*
-0.6321 -5.7436* -3.3305* -2.3571* 10.1589*
I,SD -0.6535 -5.4570* -3.3966* -2.3860* 10.7299*
I,Tr -2.9207 -6.0496* -3.8893* -2.1117* 11.9214*
I,SD,Tr -2.8681 -5.7811* -4.0012* -2.0454 12.5451*
LCBADEP - 1.6518 -3.7546* - 7 .178 7 * -3.7224* 9.3252*
-1.7054 -2.6556* -2.7893* -2.6582* 8.1991*
I,SD -1.6512 -3.7215* -2.4804 -4.1130* 11.6301*
I,Tr -1.6780 -3.6431* - 7 .3102* -3.4768* 8.7527*
I,SD,Tr -1.6314 -3.6153* -2.4990 -3.9077* 10.8543*
CARTL 0.2014 -6.4224* -3.3873* -5.9982* 23.7230*
-0.9064 -6.3428* -3.3979* -5.8725* 23.0343*
I,SD -0.8760 -6.2800* -3.4901* -5.8914* 23.4323*
I,Tr -1.3414 -6.2492* -3.3780* -5.7049* 21.9498*
I,SD,Tr -1.2984 -6.1875* -3.4679* -5.7209* 22.3138*
LIQ 0.1048 -1.8884 -7.7347* -2.2093* 5.5184*
-2.6636 -2.8603* -1.8048 -3.0556* 6.2949*
LSD -2.3370 -4.2531* -3.5529 -4.7635* 26.5845*
-2.4573 -2.7946* -1.7981 -2.9213* 5.8803*
I,SD,Tr -2.0137 -4. 7 58 7 * -3.5731* -4.6587* 26.2696*
LASSET - 4.6064* -5.1585* -3.3480* -6.3124* 33.5578*
-0.7644 -5.0478* -3.3?99* -6.2486* 32.8582*
I,SD -0.6851 -4.3713* -3.3114 -6.9684* 40.7938*
I,Tr -2.0171 -5.1453* -3.6646* -5.9977* 33.5890*
I,SD,Tr -2.0606 -4.4606* -3.6954* -6.6691* 41.8166*
't':	 11 1 *t':	 11 2 't':	 11 3 't': 11 4 'F': 113 n 1-14
LCBDLOA - 2.0503 -3.0045* -1.4818 -4.9080* 14.0911*
-2.4856 -3.0000* -1.8500* -4.7042* 14.0137*
I,SD -2.3869 -3.2256* -1.7312 -5.441_7* 18.2817*
I,Tr -0.8667 -2.9908* -1.8100* -4.6772* 13.7730*
I,SD,Tr -0.7905 -3. 2 1 22 * -1.6945 -5.4046* 17.9458*
* Significant at the 5% level
Similar to the earlier process involved in identifying the long run deposit functions, the
process of identifying the lon g, run lending rate function is onerous. For each possible
reformulation, the number of lavs used in the estimation is generally varied from 2 to the
maximum possible which is usually 8. This is to find one or more cointegrating vectors
which could satisfy the multi-faceted criteria. Tables 4.XII and 4.XIII present two sets of
cointegration estimates deemed the best which we could identify so far.
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Table 4.X11
The Johansen Procedure
CBALR
VAR with 2 lags, seasonal dummies and EGR4, EGR1 and R7D included
Sample period: 1979Q2 - 1991Q4 (51 observations)
EIGENVALUES:	 0.76224	 0.39740	 0.34470	 0.21498 0.088001 -0.0000
Test statistics for the number of cointegrating vectors
Ho: r = 0 r	 1 r<2 r < 3 r < 4
Trace 137.6918 64.4301 38.5981 17.0423 4.6979
(76.0690) (53.1160) (34.9100) (19.9640) (9.2430)
X.max 73.2617 25.83-'0 21.5558 12.3444 4.6979
(34.4000) (28.1380) (22.0020) (15.6720) (9.2430)
II ESTIMATED COINTEGRATING VECTORS
CBALR -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000
PDFINSA -0.0042 1.2921 -3.0859
CBELR 0.3304 0.4959 0.2791
UKTB 0.1334 -1.0277 -0.1192
PDADEP -0.0971 -1.0237 2.4157
Intercept 1.3699 19.8519 10.7972
III	 ESTIMATED ADJUSTMENT NIATRIX
CBALR -0.1172 -0.0184 0.0098
PDFINSA 0.2484 -0.2954 -0.0024
CBELR 0.2796 0.0273 0.0637
UKTB 0.1968 -0.1955 -0.0251
PDADEP 0.2883 -0.4457 0.2152
IV	 TESTS FOR APPROPRIATE LAG LENGTH (2)
ACBALR	 APDFINSA	 ACBELR	 AUKTB	 APDADEP
Serial correlation:
2 (4) 5.6853 [0.224] 7.3264 [0.120] 3.1108 [0.539] 3.7920 [0.435] 8.6495 [0.070]
F(4,30) 0.9409 [0.454] 1.2581 [0.308] 0.4872 [0.745] 0.6024 [0.664] 1.5318 [0.218]
Normality:
x 2 (2) 23.3832 [0.000] 3.6562 [0.161] 0.2772 [0.871] 4.6768 [0.096] 29.6635 [0.000]
	
Notes: I)	 Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below test statistics refer to 95% critical
values
	
II)	 Figures in square parentheses [ refer to marginal significance levels.
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Table 4.XIII
The Johansen Procedure
CBALR
VAR with 2 lags, seasonal dummies and EGR4, EGRI and R7,D included
Sample period: 1979Q2 - 1991Q4 (51 observations)
EIGENVALUES: 0.75587 0.39862 0.35158 0.23341 0.037938 0.0000
Test statistics for the number of cointegrating vectors
Ho:	 r = 0	 r< 1	 r<2	 r < 3	 r < 4
Trace	 135.4697	 63.5571	 37.6221	 15.5284	 1.9725
(76.0690)	 (53.1160)	 (34.9100)	 (19.9640)	 (9.2430)
X, max	 71.9126	 25.9350	 22.0938	 13.5558	 1.9725
(34.4000)	 (28.1380)	 (22.0020)	 (15.6720)	 (9.2430)
II	 ESTIMATED COINTEGRATING VECTORS 
CBALR	 -1.0000	 -1.0000	 -1.0000
PDFINSA
	 -0 1350	 -1.2505	 0.5668
CBELR	 0.3063
	
-0.6531	 0.8434
UKTB	 0.1412	 -0.9569	 -0.7409
CARTL	 -0.0344	 -2.7127	 1.1420
Intercept
	
1.5132	 40.9548	 7.4971
III	 ESTIMATED ADJUSTMENT MATRIX
CBALR	 -0.1147	 -0.0272	 -0.0076
PDFINSA	 0.2565	 -0.3647	 -0.1438
CBELR	 0.2770	 -0.1606	 0.1098
UKTB	 0.2016	 -0.0298	 -0.1891
CARTL	 0.0129	 -0.0466	 0.0327
IV	 TESTS FOR APPROPRIATE LAG LENGTH (2)
ACBALR	 APDF1NSA	 ACBELR	 AUKTB	 ACARTL
Serial correlation:
2(4) 6.0484 [0.196] 7.5127 [0.111] 3.9134 [0.418] 9.6624[0.047] 10.6215 [0.031]
F(4,27) 0.9732 [0.438] 1.2525 [0.313] 0.5992 [0.666] 1.7012 [0.179] 1.9181 [0.136]
Normality:
x
2
 (2) 5.0648 [0.079] 0.2434 [0.885] 0.1122 [0.945] 3.2455 [0.197] 13.9519 [0.001]
	
Notes: I)	 Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below test statistics refer to 95% critical
values
	
II)	 Figures in square parentheses {j refer to marginal significance levels.
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They have been estimated based upon the assumption that neither is there a trend in the
DGP nor the series itself and with provisions for 2 lags and seasonal dummies. Tests for
autocorrelation reveal that it is not an inappropriate lag length. The first involves the use
of growth of adjusted deposits (PDADEP) as a resource constraint variable while the
latter has capital and reserves of commercial banks as a percentage of their total
liabilities/assets (CARTL) incorporated instead. For both sets of estimates, test statistics
reveal that 1 or 3 cointegrating relationships possibly exist amongst the variables
concerned. Of the 3 possible cointegrating vectors in each set, only the first appears to
project a long run lending rate function which is consistent with our theoretical priors.
Furthermore it enters the lendin g rate equation with a correct sign, i.e. negative. Plots of
the cointegrating vectors are given in Figures 4Q and 4R and the long run relationships
implied by them are as follows:
CBALI?, = 1.37 — 0.004 PDFINSA, + 0.330(	 + 0. 133UKTB — 0. 097PDADEP,
CBALR, = 1.5 13 — 0.135 PDFIN.S:4, -r 0.3 06C BEN?, + 0.14  IUKT B — 0.034 CARTL
In modelling the short run functions, two alternative courses have also been followed. One
that involves placing the error correction term as the first lag while the other involves
placing it at the second lag. The best estimates are based upon the second cointegrating
vector reported above and their full details are presented as equations (a) and (b) in
Appendix 4.5 and reproduced concisely below:
LICBALR = -0.08 +0. 08z1( 73117.1?, +0 05_11 .073, +0 I51?7 D, +0.1 LICBEL1?„ - 0.13 EC,_ i + 0.63 DUM,
LICBALR 0.08dCBEL1?, + 0.0-1_1111:7B, + 0. 1 51?7 1), +0.1 1 ACBEL1?„ - 0.1
	
+ 0.63DUM,
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It is on the bases of these equations that w e shall make our inferences. The first equation is
derived from an initial specification involving 17 variables comprising 1 lag of change in
CBALR, current and 1 lag of change in the growth of financial savings (DPDFINSA), in
the CBELR, in the UKTB, and in the CARTL and current and anticipated economic
growth rates (EGR1 and EGR4), 7-day interbank rate (R7D), seasonal dummies, DUM (a
dummy variable for outliers spotted in 1980Q4 and 1981Q3) and the error correction
(EC) term lagged 2. On the other hand, the initial specification of the second equation
involves merely an addition of an intercept to these variables. These estimates seem to
satisfy all the statistical criteria of non serially correlated and normally distributed errors
and homoscedasticity. The explanatory power of these estimates appears to be good in the
region of 80% despite the fact that the equation is couched in terms of change.
Furthermore they appear to track turning points in the historical series reasonably well
(Figures 4S and 4T).
The estimates su ggest that in the short run, the lendin g, rate is sensitive thou gh nominal in
magnitude to changes in the rate of return on other assets available domestically to the
banks (the coefficient being approximately 0.08) as indicated by the coefficient of change
in the CBELR and to overseas rate of interest (with a coefficient approximately 0.04) as
projected by the coefficient of UKTB. The lending rate also appears to be responsive to
the interbank rate with the coefficient estimated at approximately 0.15 as given by the
coefficient of R7D. However despite the statistical significance of these variables, their
magnitudes of influence on the lending rate are rather small which may suggest that banks
do maintain caution in revising their lending rates despite pressure from the supply-side
factors for fear of inducing adverse selection and adverse incentive problems. Considerable
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inertia in the adjustment of the lendin g, rate to disequilibrium is also reflected by the small
coefficient of the error correction term of between 0.13 and 0.14 in magnitude.
Furthermore there is no evidence of loan demand side factors influencing the lending rate
contemporaneously as su ggested by these estimates. This implies that at least in the short
run, lending rates albeit nominally are supply-determined rather than demand-determined.
Hence financial liberalisation (in so far as the Malaysian financial system can be considered
as liberalised), by maintaining an open financial system and facilitating access to overseas
financial instruments need not lead to a correspondingly hi gher domestic lending rate as
domestic lending rate does not appear to be si gnificantly sensitive to overseas interest rate
movements. It is known that equilibrium credit rationin g implies that the lending rate
should not be responsive to loan demand and supply factors. Incidentally this has
somehow been portrayed by our empirical analysis as it seems to suggest that the loan rate
appears to respond only neglibly to loan supply factors 1.‘ hile not a single loan demand
factor appears to have influenced it. 1-lence one may conclude that equilibrium credit
rationing could prevail in the Mala ysian financial system. However since deposits are
interest inelastic, the magnitude of excess demand may be relatively limited other things
being equal. Current and anticipated economic growth have no influence on the lending
rate as we mi ght not have thou g ht a priori.
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4.6 VAR Analysis
4.6.1 A NIultivariate Analysis
The section thoutth representing another attempt to examine the sensitivity of the lending
rate (CBALR) to the interbank rate proxied by the 7-day rate (R7DM) and then the
sensitivity of loans extended to these rates also incidentally enables us to analyse some sort
of a channel of monetary policy transmission mechanism from the inter bank money
market to economic activity. A four-variable VAR system comprising R7DM, CBALR,
LLOANS (log of commercial bank loans) and LNGDP is estimated
Monthly data generally spanning from April 1987 to December 1992 have been utilised for
this purpose. Preliminary test results for determining the optimal lag length to estimate the
system are presented in Table 4.XI V.
Table 4.XIV
Ljung-Box and Likelihood Ratio Statistics of the VAR system: R7DM, CBALR,
LLOANS and LNGDP
Period
(lags)
Eqn
1987:7- 1992:12
(9)
1987:4- 1992:12
(6)
1987:4- 1992:12
(3)
R7DM Q(24) = 19.5618 Q(24) = 23.2074 Q(24) = 29.6728
[0.7214] [0.5076] [0.1958]
CBALR Q(24) = 21.6881 Q(24) = 24.5436 Q(24) = 21.9652
[0.5978] [0.4309] [0.5814]
LLOANS Q(24) = 15.8253 Q(24) = 14.8266 Q(24) = 12.1177
[0.8943] [0.9257] [0.9786]
LNGDP Q(24) = 10.2485 Q(24) = 25.2388 Q(24) = 56.0703
[0.9934] [0.3929] [0.0002]
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Likelihood Ratio Statistics
3 vs 6 lags: x 2 (48) = 53.4790
[0.2720]
6 vs 9 lags: X2 (48) = 51.9052
[0.3242]
Notes:
I) Figures in parentheses below test statistics refer to the marginal significance level
II) Q is the Ljung-Box test statistic for serial correlation with 24 degrees of freedom
Overall the table shows that the use of 6 lags is optimal as the use of 3 would involve
serial correlation problems in the nominal GDP equation as indicated by the Q statistic
though the likelihood ratio statistic (z 2 ) reveals that 3 may be favored against 6. The use
,
of 6 lags against 9 is supported by the r statistic ot 51.91
An attempt is then made to evaluate the following hypotheses uing the multivariate
generalisation of Granger causality test:
H R7DM and CBALR do not Granuer cause LLOANS and LNGDP
H2: R7DM does not Granuer cause CBALR, LLOANS and LNGDP
Table 4.XV provides the results of these tests. The results show that these two hypotheses
can be rejected at the 5 0 0 significance level. Hence there exists a causal relationship
running generally from R7DNI and CBALR to LLOANS and LNGDP13.
13 However in our subsequent anal n sis of variance decomposition and impulse response functions, it is
found that the effect of R7DM on CBALR and other variables arc AN cak thus also suggesting the presence
of equilibrium credit rationnw. Furthermore it is difficult to conclude on the basis of the results of the test
of H2 that R7DM does Gmnger cause CBALR since the latter is not the sole but one of three target
variables.
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Table 4XV
Multivariate Generalization of Granger Causality Tests
Var System: R7DN1, CBALR, LLOANS, LNGDP
2 ,
X C24 )	 42.6971
[0.0108]
H2 2X ( 18 )	 =	 31 94093
[0.0223]
HI
Note: Figures in parentheses below test statistics refer to the marginal significance level.
The exogeneity of interest rate variables namely R7DM and CBALR in LLOANS and
LNGDP equations may be established by conducting the F-tests for exogeneity in
individual equations (Table 4.XVI).
Table 4.XV1
Individual Equation F-tests
VAR System: R7DNI, CBALR, LLOANS and LNGDP
Target/
Causal
R7DNI CBALR LLOANS LNGDP
R7DM 4.9967 1.9044 2.1506 1.8903
[0.0006] [0.1014] [0.0663] [0.1039]
CBALR 1.5344 35.3894 3.1249 1.8004
[0.1895] [0.0000] [0.0123] [0.1211]
LLOANS 1.0399 0.3919 183.2752 2.90976
[0.4128] [0.8802] [0.0000] [0.0178]
LNGDP 0.4324 0.28867 1.9347 1.4740
[0.8533] [0.9392] [0.0963] [0.2093]
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the marginal significance level.
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The following interesting inferences can be drawn ti-om the table:
1)	 LNGDP, LLOANS and CBALR do not Granger cause R7DM. Thus there is no
feedback influence from the real sector to the interbank money market;
2) R7DM, LLOANS and LNGDP do not Granger cause CBALR. This is somewhat
consistent with the view of equilibrium credit rationing that banks do not
indiscriminately revise their lending rates as it may adversely affect the mix of
borrowers;
3) R7DM and LNGDP do not Granger cause LLOANS though CBALR does;
4) While R7DM and CBALR do not Granger cause LNGDP, LLOANS does. This
underscores the skmificance of the volume of loans (liquidity) instead of interest
rates in determining economic activity, a traditional controversy surrounding the
monetary economics literature.
Based upon estimated moving average representations, a variance decomposition analysis
of each variable in the system is conducted and the results are presented in Table 4.XVII.
Variance of the inter-bank rate (R7DNI) is accounted predominantly by innovations in the
rate itself as shocks in the rate explains about 96.54% and 93.54% of its own variance at
the 2- and 3-month horizons respectively. The linkage betw een the inter-bank rate and the
lending rate (CBALR) appears to be weak as innovations in R7DM only explain about 5%
of the variation in the CBALR over a 2-month horizon, with 95% being accounted by own
innovations.
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Table 4.XVII
Variance Decomposition of Variables
VAR System: R7DN1, CBALR, LLOANS, LNGDP
Variables
Explained
Forecast Horizons
(Months Ahead)
Due to Innovations in
R7DN1 CBALR LLOANS LNGDP
R7DM 1 100.00 - - -
7 96.54 2.09 1.32 0.05
3 93.54 4.11 1.22 1.13
6 87.06 6.77 1.74 4.43
9 S3.70 9.07 2.33 4.9
12 79.76 12.03 3.19 5.02
24 63.44 20.53 4.04 6.99
CBALR 1 5 97 94.03 - -
n
_
4.67 95.1 0.03 0.25
3 10.96 38.18 0.13 0.73
6 3.45 86.4 2.81 2.34
9 7.40 36.93 3.4) 2.26	 (
12 6.58 85.56 5.69 2.17
24 7.01 73.00 14.2 5.79
LLOANS 1 0.00 4.38 95.62 -
? 7.38 2.26 89.1 1.26
3 12.57 1.40 85.26 0.77
6 20.49 1.35 72.21 5.95
9 24.99 3.52 53.83 17.66
12 22.61 8.35 46.92 22.12
24 18.71 28.96 29.82 22.51
LNGDP I 0.00 0.70 4.21 95.09
2 7.86 1.28 5.97 84.89
3 10.06 1.24 7.68 81.02
6 9.97 2.53 10.86 76.64
9 10.06 8.43 10.56 70.95
12 10.04 10.72 11.69 67.55
24 11.41 16.41 11.90 60.28
There also seems to be a limited impact of the lending rate on loans extended as shocks in
the lending rate merely account for 4.4% of the variance in loans extended at a 1-month
horizon. In fact both these findin gs of a limited influence of the inter-bank rate on the
lending rate and then the lending rate on loans granted may constitute an additional
evidence that equilibrium credit rationing is being practised. Finally the table has also shed
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us some light on the relative si g nificance of lending rates and bank loans in the
determination of economic acti% itv. Bank loans as opposed to the lending rate seem to be
a more significant determinant of economic activit y . For instance at a 6-month horizon,
innovations in bank loans explain about 10.9% of the variation in NGDP while innovations
in the lending rate merely explain 2.53%.
4.6.2 A Bivariate Analysis
In order to determine the direction and magnitude of the relationship between bank credit
and economic activity, \\C have pursued a bivariate VAR analysis between the two
variables in real terms. We have however also attempted to ascertain whether movements
in a broader credit a ggregate (defined to include loans granted by commercial banks,
finance companies, and merchant banks), money supply namely M1 and M2 and the
lending rate levied by commercial banks have a stronger bearing on economic activity than
commercial bank credit i4 The anal yses are pursued for the period generally between 1980
and 1992.
With respect to the relationship between real commercial bank loans (LRCBLO) and real
gross domestic product (LRGDP), Table 4.XVIII suggests that the use of 12 lags is
appropriate in estimatin g, the VAR system.
I4Both the MI and M2 series mobilised in this exercise differ from those of our earlier study on money
demand as the series here include parts of M I and M2 held by statutory authorities and other government
agencies.
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Fable 4.XVIII
Ljung-Box and Likelihood Ratio Statistics
VAR System; LRCBLO and LRGDP
Period
(lags)
Eqn
1980:1 - 1992:12
(9)
1980:1 - 1992:12	 '
(12)
1980:4- 1992:12
(15)
LRCBLO
LRGDP
Q(36) =
Q(36) =
19.9847
[0 9858]
147.977
[0.0000]
Q(36) =
Q(36) =
17.1647
[0.9967]
41.8009
[0.2334]
Q(36)
Q(36)
=
=
14.3588
[0.9995]
33.9892
[0.5645]
Likelihood Ratio Statistics
9 vs 12 lags:	 X 2 (12) = 73.0935
[0.0000]
12 vs 15 lags:	 X 2 (12) = 15.1273
[0.2346]
Notes:
I) Figures in parentheses below test statistics refer to the marginal significance level
II) Q is the Ljung-Box test statistic for serial correlation with 36 degrees of freedom.
It is interesting to note that the causal relationship between these two variables is only
unidirectional, running from bank loans to economic activity as can be discerned from
Table 4.XIX.
Table 4.XIX
Individual Equation F-tests
VAR System: LRCBLO and LRGDP
Target
Causal
LRCBLO LRGDP
LRCBLO 1607.7883 1.9564
[0.0000] [0.0333]
LRGDP 1.6210 24.4948
[0.0931] [0.0000]
Note: Figures in parentheses below test statistics refer to the marginal significance level.
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The table shows that while the hypothesis that LRGDP does not Granger cause LRCBLO
can be accepted at the 5% significance le\ el, the hypothesis that LRCBLO does not
Granger cause LRGDP can be rejected at the same significance level. Based upon variance
decomposition, innovations in LRCBLO do have a tangible effect on LRGDP with the
innovations explaining 7.57% of the one-step ahead forecast error variance of LRGDP and
about 19.9% in respect of a 24-step ahead (Table 4.XX).
Table 4.XX
Variance Decomposition of Variables
VAR System: LRCBLO and LRGDP
Variables
Explained
Forecast Horizons
- (Months Ahead)
Due to Innovations in
LRCBLO LRGDP
LRCBLO 1 100.00 0.000
_ 99.87 0.13
3 99.92 0.08
b 99.52 0.48
9 99.32 0.68
12 99.44 0.56
24 90.63 9.37
LRGDP 1 7.57 92.43
1
_ 8.11 91.89
3 8.11 91.89
(.) 12.08 87.92
9 18.11 81.89
12 19.87 80.13
24 19.90 80.10
The impulse response functions of all the variables in this bivariate VAR system with
respect to a one-standard deviation shock in LRCBLO are presented in Table 4.XXI. An
impulse response function indicates the timing and direction of movements of a variable
over a time horizon followinu, a given shock. Thus the function merely traces out the
typical response of a variable to a given shock.
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Table 4.XX1
Responses to one-standard deviation shock in LRCBLO
Impulse Response Functions of
Months LRCBLO
,
LRGDP
1 0.0073 0.0120
2 0.0079 0.0038
3 0.0083 0.0024
4 0.0096 0.0080
5 0.0106 -0.0023
6 0.0112 -0.0054
7 0.0117 -0.0072
8 0.0114 -0.0038
9 0.0107 -0.0108
10 0.0112 -0.0037
11 0.0111 -0.0049
12 0.0106 -0.0056
13 0.0106 0.0016 
0.0103 -0.0008
15 0.0099 -0.0019
16 0.0098 0.0018
17 0.0090 -0.0036
18 0.0082 -0.0068
19 0.0074 -0.0082
20 0.0066 -0.0062
21 0.0057 -0.0111
-y-) 0.0050 -0.0069
23 0.0044 -0.0069
24 0.0038 -0 0072
To facilitate comparisons, the response functions are normalised by the standard deviation
of the innovations in the respective variables. The table suggests that a positive shock in
LRCBLO would yield a positive impact on LRGDP that lasts for four months after the
shock15.
With regard to the relationship bemeen a broader credit aggregate (LRTLO) defined as
the sum of loans granted by commercial banks, finance companies and merchant banks in
15 Attempts were also made to re-order the VAR sn stein by placing LRGDP before LRCBLO. However this
has not yielded any significant change in our qualitative conclusions with regard to the relationship
between the two variables in terms of direction and strength.
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real terms, and economic activity (LRGDP), it is found that the use of 12 lags is
appropriate for estimation purposes in a bivariate VAR sytem (Table 4.XXII).
Table 4.XXII
Ljung-Box and Likelihood Ratio Statistics
VAR System LRTLO and LRGDP
Period
(lags)
Eqn
1980:1 - 1992:12
(9)
1980:1 - 1992:12
(12)
1980:4- 1992:12
(15)
LRTLO
LRGDP
Q(36) =
Q(36) =
20.2433
[0.9841]
151.946
[0.0000]
Q(36) =
Q(36) =
17.7989
[0.9952]
40.2659
[0.2870]
Q(36)
Q(36)
=
=
14.9894
[0.9992]
33.7507
[0.5760]
Likelihood Ratio Statistics
9 vs 12 lags:	 x 2 ( 1 2) = 74.4256
[0.0000]
12 vs 15 lags:
	 x2 (12) = 14.2155
[0.2872]
Notes:
I) Figures in parentheses below test statistics refer to the marginal significance level
II) Q is the Ljung-Box test statistic for serial correlation with 36 degrees of freedom.
The table indicates that the use of 9 lags would result in a serial correlation problem while
the use of 12 or 15 lags is free from the problem. However the likelihood ratio tests reveal
that 12 lags can be preferred to 15 lags. Proceeding with 12 lags, Table 4.XXIII suggests
that there is an unidirectional causality running from LRTLO to LRGDP though the null
hypothesis to the contrary can only be rejected at a slightly greater than the usual 5%
significance level. Based upon variance decomposition, it is noteworthy that innovations in
LRTLO could explain slightly more than LRCBLO the variation of LRGDP particularly
over a 9-month horizon (Table 4.XXIV).
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Table 4.XXIII
Individual Equation F-tests
VAR System: LRTLO and LRGDP
Target
Causal
LRTLO LRGDP
LRTLO 2349.2226 1.7985
[0.0000] [0.0546]
LRGDP 1.4108 22.4377
[0.1687] [0.0000]
Notes: Figures in parentheses refer to the marginal significance level
Table 4.XXIV
Variance Decomposition of Variables
VAR S ystem: LRTLO and LRGDP
Variables
Explained
Forecast Horizons
(Months Ahead)
Due to INNOVATIONs in
LRTLO LRGDP
LRTLO 1 100.00 0.000
,-)
_ 99.94 0.06
3 99.97 0.03
6 99.73 0.27
9 99.56 0.44
i'' 99.63 0.37
24 92.37 7.63
LRGDP 1 10.11 89.89
') 10.38 89.62
3 10.40 89.60
6 13.78 86.22
9 18.16 81.84
12 19.55 80.45
24 19.41 80.59
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This is somehow confirmed by an analysis of the impulse response function of LRGDP
with respect to a one-standard deviation shock in LRTLO (Table 4.XXV). The shock in
LRTLO has a slightly greater impact than that of LRCBLO on LRGDP though the
positive effect also prevails over a 4-month period.
Table 4.XXV
Responses to one-standard deviation shock in LRTLO
Impulse Response Functions of
Months LRTLO LRGDP
1 0 0065 0.0139
2 0.0071 0.0033
3 0.0080 0.0029
4 -	 0.0094 0.0082
5 0.0103 -0.0013
6 0.0111 -0.0044
7 0.0118 -0.0054
8 0.0117 -0.0033
9 0.0114 -0.0099
10 0.0122 -0.0025
11 0.0121 -0.0045
12 0.01 I S -0.0054
13 0.0121 0.0035
14 0.0119 -0.0010
15 0.0118 -0.0017
16 0.0117 0.0018
17 0.0110 -0.0034
18 0.0104 -0.0067
19 0.0097 -0.0072
20 0.0090 -0.0062
21 0.0081 -0.0109
22 0.0075 -0.0067
23 0.0068 -0.0071
24 0.0062 -0.0075
On the relationship between real N12 (LRNI2) and economic activity (LRGDP), table
4.XXVI suggests the appropriateness of using 15 lags to estimate it in a bivariate VAR
framework.
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Table 4.XXVI
Ljung-Box and Likelihood Ratio Statistics
VAR System: LRN12 and LRGDP
Period 1980:1 - 1992:12 1980:1 - 1992:12 1980:4 - .1992:12 1980:7- 1992:12
(lags) (9) (12) (15) (18)
Eqn
LRM2 Q(36) = 36.9724 Q(36) = 35.4246 Q(36) = 23.6002 Q(36) = 26.8632
[0.4238] [0.4958] [0.9444] [0.8652]
LRGDP Q(36) = 146.677 Q(36) = 45.4966 Q(36) = 29.2829 Q(36) = 19.5673
[0.0000] [0.1334] [0.7785] [0.9883]
Likelihood Ratio Statistics
9 vs 12 lags: x 2 (12) = 59.4377
[0.0000]
12 vs 15 lags: ;( 2 (12) = 21.9827
[0 0377]
15 vs 18 lags:	 x 2 (12) = 15.1153
[0.2352]
Notes:
I) Figures in parentheses below test statistics refer to the marginal significance level
II) Q is the Ljung-Box test statistics for serial correlation with 36 degrees of freedom.
The use of 9 lags is inadvisable as it is plagued with serial correlation problems. Though
the use of 12, 15 and 18 lags would not involve such problems, the likelihood ratio
statistics indicate that 12 lags cannot be favored against 15 though 15 lags can be accepted
against 18. Nevertheless, F-tests seem to suggest an absence of any relationship between
the two variables as they do not seem to have any causal influence on each other in a
Granger sense (Table 4.XXVII). Assuming however that LRM2 does have an impact on
LRGDP, the variance decomposition analysis shows that innovations in LRM2 explain far
less than LRCBLO, LRTLO and even LRM1 (as we shall see) the variance of LRGDP
(Table 4.XXVIII). An examination of the impulse response function also highlights the
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weak link with the shock in LRN12 yielding a positive but negligble impact on LRGDP
only in the first month (Table 4.XXIX).
Table 4.XXVII
Individual Equation F-tests
VAR System: LRIV12 and LRGDP
Target
Causal
LRM2 LRGDP
LRM2 107.6203 0.9840
[0.0000] [0.4761]
LRGDP 1.3155 14.2646
[0.2030] [0.0000]
Note: Figures in parentheses below test statistics refer to the marginal significance level.
Table 4.XXVIII
- Variance Decomposition of Variables
VAR System: LRIV12 and LRGDP
Variables
Explained
Forecast Horizons
(Months Ahead)
Due to INNOVATIONs in
LRN12 LRGDP
LRM2 1 100.00 0.00
,
_
3
99.97
99.62
0.03
0.38
6 99.09 0.91
9 95.93 4.07
12 91.98 8.02
24 56.87 43.13
LRGDP 1 0.11 99.89
-) 0.87 99.13
3 1.25 98.75
6 6.80 93.20
9 6.35 93.65
l'? 7.12 92.88
24 7.05 92.95
187
'Fable 4.XX1X
Responses to one-standard deviation shock in LRM2
Impulse Response Functions of
Months LRN/12 LRGDP
1 0.0127 0.0014
2 0.0107 -0.0038
3 0.0107 -0.0031
4 0.0088 0.0012
5 0.0064 -0.0119
6 0.0059 -0.0014
7 0.0061 -0.0010
8 0.0049 0.0009
9 0.0031 0.0009
10 0.0033 0.0029
11 0.0035 0.0028
12 0.0039 0.0037
13 0 0062 0.0015
14 0.0056 -0.0018
15 0.0051 -0.0033
16 0.0047 0.00009
17 0.0040 -0.0084
18 0.0034 -0.0015
19 0.0031 -0.0004
20 0.0020 0.0021
21 0.0015 0.0013
22 0.0014 0.0041
?; 0.0015 0.0034
24 0.0018 0.0039
With respect to LRM1, its relationship with LRGDP can be estimated within the bivariate
VAR context with the use of 15 1as. While Table 4.XXX shows that no serial correlation
exists when estimatim4 with 12 and 15 lags, the likelihood ratio statistics show that 15 lags
is appropriate against 12 or 18 lags. There seems to be some evidence of a bidirectional
causal relationship existing between LRNI1 and LRGDP (Table 4.XXXI). However this
could possibly be ruled out as while the hypothesis that LRGDP does not Granger cause
LRM1 can be rejected marginally at the 5% significance level, the hypothesis that LRM1
does not Granger cause LRGDP can be overwhelmingly rejected.
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Table 4.XXX
Ljung-Box and Likelihood Ratio Statistics
VAR System: LRNI1 and LRGDP
Period 1980:4- 1992:12 1980:4- 1992:12 l980:7- 1992:12
(lags) (12) (15) (18)
Eqn
LRM1 Q(36) = 32.9460 Q(36) = 37.4098 Q(36) = 30.8876
[0.6146] [0.4042] [0.7102]
LRGDP Q(36) = 29.7720 Q(36) = 26.1199 Q(36) = 24.4857
[0.7584] [0.8871] [0.9273]
Likelihood Ratio Statistics
12 vs 15 lags:	 X 2 (12) = 43.0399
[0.0000]
15 vs 18 lags:	 X2 (12) = 7.3475
[0.8338]
Notes:
I) Figures in parentheses below test statistics refer to the marginal significance level
II) Q is the Ljung-Box test statistic for serial correlation with 36 degrees of freedom.
Table 4.XXXI
Individual Equation F-tests
VAR System: LRNI1 and LRGDP
Target
Causal
LRN11 LRGDP
LRMI 50.2068 3.3505
[0.0000] [0.0001]
LRGDP 1.7664 9.7836
[0.0471] [0.0000]
Note: Figures in parentheses below test statistics refer to the marginal significance level
A variance decomposition analysis reveals that innovations in LRM1 explains 1 through 9
months ahead forecast error variance of LRGDP less than LRCBLO and LRTLO (Table
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4.XXXII). This is somehow confirmed by our examination of the impulse response
function of LRGDP with respect to LRNI I (Table 4.XXXIII).
Table 4.XXXII
Variance Decomposition of Variables
VAR S ystem: LRNI1 and LRGDP
Variables
Explained
Forecast Horizons
(Months Ahead)
Due to Innovations in
LRMI LRGDP
LRM 1 1 100.00 0.00
_ 99.87 0.13
3 98.86 1.14 
6 95.43 4.57
9 93.80 6.20
12 94.63 5.37
24 96.06 3.94
LRGDP I 0.59 99.41
-)
_ 3.39 96.61
3 3.42 96.58
6 6.41 93.59
,
1-
16.37
29.56
83.63
70.44
24 51.10 48.90
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Table 4.XXXIII
Responses to one-standard deviation shock in LRM1
Impulse Response Functions of
Months LRM1 LRGDP
1 0.0213 0.0029
2 0.0110 -0.0064
3 0.0120 0.0018
4 0.0127 0.0069
5 0.0112 0.0006
6 0.0125 0.0015
7 0.0115 0.0091
8 0.0103 0.0079
9 0.0110 0.0072
10 0.0104 0.0085
11 0.0102 0.0114
12 0.0164 0.0123
13 0.0189 0.0056
14 0.0209 -0.0024
15 0.0183 0.0111
16 0.0151 0.0048
17 0.0170 0.0080
18 0.0151 0.0067
19 0.0142 0.0113
20 0.0134 0.0131
21 0.0131 0.0124
27 0.0128 0.0130
...
'-') 0.0133 0.0159
24 0.0158 0.0145
Particularly the response of LRGDP to a shock in LRM1 in the first four months following
the shock is smaller than the responses of LRGDP to LRCBLO and LRTLO.
Furthermore, there appears a tendency for LRGDP to decline slightly in the second month
after the shock to LRM1.
Finally we explore the relationship between the lending rate (CBALR) and LRGDP. Both
the Ljung-Box and Likelihood Ratio statistics point to the optimality of using 12 lags in
the estimation (Table 4.XXX1V).
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Table 4.XXX1V
Ljung-Box and Likelihood Ratio Statistics
VAR System: CBALR and LRGDP
Period 1987:7- 1992:12 19S7:7- 1992:12 1987:10'- 1992:12 1988:1 - 1992:12
(lags) (6) (9) (12) (15)
Eqn
CBALR Q(24) = 13.9670 Q(24) = 15.7751 Q(21) = 9.6706 Q(21) = 7.5541
[0.9474] [0.8960] [0.9829] [0.9968]
LRGDP Q(24) = 66.0369 Q(24) = 31.7374 Q(21) = 12.9292 Q(21) = 11.9052
[0.0000] [0.1336] [0.9111] [0.9421]
Likelihood Ratio Statistics
6 vs 9 lags:	 X2 (12)
9 vs 12 lags:	 x" (12)
12 vs 15 lags:	 X 2 (12) =
23.8693
[0.0219]
45.4722
[0.0000]
6.360
[0.8969]
Notes:
I) Figures in parentheses below test statistics refer to the marginal significance level
II) Q is the Ljung-Box test statistic for serial correlation.
However it is interesting to note that these variables do not seem to have any causal link
with one another (Table 4.XXXV).
Table -I.XXXV
Individual Equation F-tests
VAR System: CBALR and LRGDP
Target
Causal
CBALR LRGDP
CBALR 56.4309 1.4743
[0.0000] [0 1769]
LRGDP 1.4039 18.0395
[0.2067] [0.0000]
Note: Figures in parentheses below test statistics refer to the marginal significance level.
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Nevertheless, proceeding on the assumption that the lending rate does influence economic
activity, a variance decomposition as conducted and the impulse response function
derived for the relationship. As can be discerned from Table 4.XXXVI, innovations in
CBALR only explain about 0.07% of the variation in LRGDP at a one-month horizon and
8.1% at a 6-month horizon.
Table 4.XXXVI
Variance Decomposition of Variables
VAR System: CBALR and LRGDP
Variables
Explained
Forecast Horizons
(Months Ahead)
Due to Innovations in
CBALR LRGDP
CB ALR 1 100.00 0.00
-) 99.9 0.1
3 99.87 0.13
6 97.77 2.23
9 95.8 4.2
12 93.88 6.12
24 82.29 17.71
LRGDP 1 0.07 99.93
2 6.66 93.34
3 6.7 93.3
6 8.10 91.9
9 20.41 79.59
12 25.51 74.49
24 27.4 72.6
This should be contrasted with those due to innovations in LRCBLO estimated at 7.57%
and 12.08% respectively. Even on the basis of impulse response functions, LRGDP seems
to respond more to a shock in LRCBLO than in CBALR (Table 4.XXXVII). All this
reinforces our earlier findings based upon a multivariate analysis in nominal terms that it is
the volume of loans rather than the interest rate that matters to the economy.
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Table 4.XXXVI1
Responses to one-standard deviation shock in CBALR
Impulse Response Functions of
Months CBALR LRGDP
1 0.1049 -0.0007
2 0.0459 0.0071
3 0.0455 0.0008
4 0.0316 0.0006
5 0.0392 0.0034
6 0.0384 0.0009
7 0.0208 -0.0094
8 0.0393 -0.0054
9 0.0288 -0.0023
10 0.0108 -0.0084
11 0.0100 0.0011
12 .	 0.0357 -0.0002
13 0.0194 0.0047
14 0.0127 0.0052
15 0.0196 0.0010
16 0.0241 0.0028
17 0.0156 0.0023
18 0.0194 -0.0014
19 0.0271 -0.0076
20 0.0211 -0.0025
21 0.0162 -0.004
22 0.0126 -0.0065
23 0.021 0.0022
24 0.0125 0.0007
Thus if financial aggregates are important factors determining the macroeconomic
performance, we may then conclude that monetary policy should focus more on credit
aggregates rather than monetary aggregates in the light of our findings.
4.7 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this exercise has been two-fold namely:
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1 to assess the possibility of a practice of equilibrium credit rationing by Malaysian
banks and to infer indirectly the seriousness of excess demand for loans as its
consequence and
2) to determine the significance of commercial bank credit to the Malaysian economy
relative to money supply (M1 & M2), the lending rate and a broader credit
aggregate defined as comprising loans granted by commercial banks, finance
companies and merchant banks.
One of the major implications of equilibrium credit rationing as postulated by Stiglitz &
Weiss (1981 & 1983) is the irresponsiveness of the lending rate to loan demand and
supply factors. The practice of equilibrium credit rationing would also implicitly impose a
ceiling on the rate that banks could charge for loans as it is to the banks' advantage to
observe a 'ceiling'. This may have different implications for the deposit rate that banks
could offer their depositors and hence the amount of deposits (loanable funds) they could
mobilise depending upon the responsiveness of deposits demanded to deposit rate
movements. Cateris paribus, this would dictate the extent of excess demand for loans in
the economy. This may be especially true in the case of Malaysia where deposits are a
major source of financing for the banks' lending operation. Amid such practices, the
volume of loanable funds secured by banks could be greater in a high interest rate
elasticity environment vis-a-vis a low one and so is the deposit rate payable by the banks.
In a separate vein, in an extreme case of zero interest rate elasticity, the extent of excess
demand may also be limited however as banks could always depress the interest rate
payable to the lowest possible level without significantly undermining the flow of deposits.
Nevertheless, a high interest rate elastic condition may imply that equilibrium credit
rationing has a procyclical effect on the economy with a credit crunch or boom tending to
be more pronounced.
The empirical inquiry of this chapter in fact commenced with an examination of
commercial banks' performance in lending and deposit taking over the years. A steady rise
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in the ratio of commercial bank loans to GDP was envisaged. There has been a rapid
build-up of loans extended by banks subsequent to the interest rate reform in 1978. Banks
have also exhibited an increased aggressiveness in lending with the lapse of time by their
tendency to lend to full capacity at times as warranted by deposits and their rising
preference for long term loans aL4ainst government securities. This can probably be
explained by the fact that deposits placed with them are gradually becoming more long
term.
Our subsequent deposit-based anal ysis reveals that deposits are not interest elastic though
the long run and short run income elasticities are 1.25 and 0.12 respectively. Thus
evidence that deposits are interest elastic in Malaysia has yet to be found despite the
development of the Malaysian financial system over the years. Coupled with our
subsequent findings that banks do possibly embrace equilibrium credit rationing as a
policy, this implies that the extent of excess demand for loans in the economy arising from
such rationing if any may not be very great.
Evidence alluding to the practice of equilibrium credit rationing by Malaysian banks is
found in our study related to the responsiveness of the lending rate to loan demand and
supply factors and also in our study of credit transmission mechanism. The lending rate
only responds negligibly to loan supply factors while not to a single loan demand factor.
Current and anticipated economic growth do not seem to have any bearing on the lending
rate. In the short run, the lending rate is influenced albeit nominally by supply-side factors
such as rates of return on alternative financial instruments (domestic and foreign) and the
inter bank rate. There is also a tremendous inertia in lending rate adjustments with the
coefficient of the error correction term estimated at only 0.14. If the Malaysian experience
is anything to go by, maintaining an open financial system as a financial liberalisation move
need not produce a higher lendinu, rate on the domestic front as it is only negligibly
sensitive to overseas interest rate movements.
196
All this may allude to the adoption of cautious attitudes amongst banks in revising their
lending rates probably for the sake of minimising risks from adverse selection and adverse
incentive. This evidence is corroborated by the outcome of our multivariate VAR analysis
intended to establish the sensitivity of the lending rate to the inter bank rate and then the
sensitivity of loans granted to these rates with the use of monthly instead of quarterly data.
Preliminary Granger causality tests conducted within the VAR analysis reveals that inter-
bank rate, loans and nominal GDP do not Granger cause the lending rate. This is
somewhat consistent with the view of equilibrium credit rationing that banks do not revise
their lending rates indiscriminately as the mix of borrowers may be affected adversely. The
linkage between the inter-bank rate and the lendinu, rate is weak as innovations in the
inter-bank rate merely -account for about 5% of the variation in the lending rate over a 2-
month horizon. There is also only a limited impact of the lending rate on loans extended as
shocks in the rate only explain about 4.4% of the one-step ahead forecast error variance of
loans extended. This also speaks of the possibility that equilibrium credit rationing exists.
Hence given all these suggestions that equilibrium credit rationing does prevail in the
Malaysian loans market, the implementation of a liberal interest rate policy by Malaysia
might have failed to produce the desired effects on deposit rates as most advocates of
interest rate liberalisation believe could. Moreover even if there is an improvement in the
optimal lending rate that banks could charge, the fact that deposits are not interest elastic
would imply that banks could afford to maintain a 'depressed' rate on deposits.
In order to meet the second objective of our exercise in this chapter, a bivariate VAR
analysis using monthly data was pursued by us in real terms between commercial bank
loans, total loans granted by commercial banks, finance companies and merchant banks,
Ml, M2 and the commercial bank lending rate interchangeably on one hand and economic
activity on the other. The significance of commercial bank credit to the Malaysian
economy is underscored as it yields a greater positive influence on economic activity
compared with money supply be it defined as M1 or M2 and the commercial bank lending
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rate of which their causal links with economic activity are even suspect in terms of
existence and direction. However a broader measure of credit that includes loans granted
by finance companies and merchant banks as well has a slightly greater impact on the
economy. This may call for a greater concern with credit rather than monetary aggregates
by the Central Bank in its conduct of monetary policy.
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APPENDIX 4.1
We shall consider a simple model of a profit-maximising bank that does not have an
alternative mode of investment apart from its lending operations for simplicity. The use of
a profit-maximising framework is not inappropriate as Tobin (1963) contends that banks
are firms and hence should be analysed in the same way as firms. Moreover this
framework is consonant with the banker's approach of asset and liability management.
Herein our analysis, the bank is subject to the following balance sheet constraint:
D+E=SR+L	 (I)
where D = Deposits Mobilised
E = Paid-up Capital
SR = Statutory Reserves
L = Loans
Assuming that the bank is compelled by law to commit some proportion (s) of the deposits
harnessed as statutory reserves with the monetary authority, equation (1) may be
rewritten as:
L = D(1-s) + E
	
(2)
Equation (2) suggests that at any point in time, the volume of loanable funds is determined
by deposits received, statutory reserve requirements and the bank's paid-up capital.
Assuming that the bank is risk-neutral, the profit function of the bank may be written as:
= -L /(D)I)	 (3)
where 11 = profits
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(4)
(4')
r, = the optimal lending rate charL4eable by banks as dictated by the degree of
asymmetric information problem in the loans market
rD (D)= the interest rate payable on deposits with r„. (D)>- 0
Differentiating FL with respect to L and equating the result to zero as follows:
— = r; –r	
1
o(D) 	  Dr,(D) 	 =(I – s)	 (1– s)
and after some manipulation yields the following first order condition (FOC):
01+ e)
r =
e(1– s)
where E refers to the interest rate elasticity of deposits.
Comparative Statics:
a) Equation (4) may be rewritten as follows:
rL e(1– s) 
=
e)
This indicates that ro varies positively with r;. By implication, the lower is r:, the lower
will be the rD
 that banks can afford to pay depositors. It also indicates that a small
improvement in r; leads to a greater jump in r„ that can be offered by banks in an interest
elastic condition. The following is a numerical verification of this point:
State I: E 0.3 s 0.02
Then 
dr
' =
8(1– s) 
=0.2262
dr;	 (I + e)
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State II: 6 = 0.5 s = 0.02
Then L2 = 0.3267
dr;
b) The elasticity of deposits is crucial to how depressed rD can be at a given r:. By
inspection of the ro equation at given r; and s, the greater is the elasticity (6), the higher is
rD offered by the bank. This can be proven by the following numerical example:
State I: r=0.05 s = 0.3 s = 0.02
E(I– s)
=	 = 0.01131(1+ s)
State II: r1 =0.05 6 = 0.5 s = 0.02
rD=0.01632
c) In order to derive the relationship between the volume of deposits and hence the
loanable funds on one hand and some other parameters in the model on the other, the FOC
given by equation (4') is transformed as follows:
LID
D =	 (1– s)–ro]
ch-D
dl)
drD 1+ s
where —
/ID 
0 as if otherwise, a different FOC will entail. The above result reveals that
drp
the greater is rt* given the other variables, the greater will be the amount of loanable funds
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(D) mobilised. And for a given /* the greater is the responsiveness of deposits to rD , the
larger will also be the volume of loanable funds.
By implication the above equation suggests that a credit crunch is likely to be more severe
in the case of an adverse twist in r," which may possibly be engendered by a decline in the
economic activity in the case of high responsiveness of deposits to r
	 to the
situation of low responsiveness. Hence equilibrium credit rationing may have a procyclical
effect on the economy as both upward and downward swings of the economy are
accentuated when deposits are interest responsive.
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APPENDIX 4.2
Parsimonious Equation
ALCBTDD,	 -0.9196 + 0.5105 .ALNGDP, + 0.3483 ALNGDPi_i
(-3.9698) (5.5439)	 (4.8885)
0.1747 ALNGDP 2 -r" 0.2449 ALNGDPI-3
(2.3207)	 (2.7355)
- 0.2695 EC; - 0.2333 ALCBTDDI-2
(-4.0249)	 (-2 2323)
+	 0.0555S1
(5.8091)
Autocorr:	 X - (
▪ 
1 ) = 1.5589 [0.212]
X 2 ( 2 ) = 1.5598 [0.458]
X 2 ( 3 ) = 1.7290 [0.631]
X 2 (4) = 2.0064 [0.735]
R 2 = 0.6176
F(7,47) = 13.4566 [0.000]
S.E. of Regression = 0.0234
Normality: x 2 (2) = 0.3549 [0.837]
Heteroscedasticity: x2 (1) = 0.3943 [0.530]
ARCH: x 2 (1) = 1.4298 [0.238]
x 2 (2) = 2.0530 [0.358]
x 2 (3) = 2.6105 [0.456]
x2(4) = 3.5816 [0.466]
Functional Form: x 2 (1) = 0.0026 [0.960]
Notes:
(I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
(II) Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels
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. n l'PEN DIX 4.3
Parsimonious Equation
ALCBTFD,	 -0.0952 - 0.3830 ALNGDP H - 0.1202 EC,
(-3.0082) (-2.7260) 	 (-3.8834)
0.0285S1 - 0.0572S2 -r" 0.3327 ALCBTFIDI.,
(-1.8603) (-3.4410)	 (2.8053)
R 2 = 0.3715	 Autocorr: x 2 (1) = 0.7459 [0.388]
F(5,47) = 7.1471 [0.000] x2(2) = 0.7479 [0.688]
S.E. of Regression = 0.0393 x2(3) = 0.3700 [0.775]
Normality: x - (2) = 2.2368 [0.327] X2(4) = 2.1226 [0.713]
Heteroscedasticity: x 2 (1) = 0.4289 [0.513]
ARCH: x 2(1) = 2.2278 [0.136]
x 2 (2) = 2.0750 [0.354]
x 2 (3) = 2.1302 [0. 546]
x 2 (4) = 2.1453 [0.709]
Notes:
(I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
(II) Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal siEmificance levels
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APPENDIX 4.4
Parsimonious Equation
ALCBTD,	
-0.1251 0.1160 ALNGDP, - 0.0932 ECt-2
(-4.6952) (2.0523) 	 (-5.8821)
0.0312S2- 0.0134S3
(-4.9432) (-1.9370)
R 2= 0.5277	 Autocorr:	 X2(l) = 1.3018 [0.254]
F(4,48) = 15.5235 [0.000]	 x 2 (2) = 1.5936 [0.451]
S.E. of Regression = 0.0168	 X 2 ( 3 ) = 5.1148 [0.164]
Normality: x 2 (2) = 1.1545 [0.561]	 x 2 (4) = 5.3276 [0.255]
Heteroscedasticity: x 2 (1) = 0.2386 [0625]
ARCH: x 2 (1) = 0.3537 [0.552]
x 2 (2) = 0.5922 [0.744]
x -(3) = 1.0705 [0.784]
x
2 (4) = 1.1205 [0.891]
Functional Form: x - (1) = 0.0862 [0.769]
Notes:
(I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
(II) Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels
205
APPENDIX 4.5
Parsimonious Equation
(a)
ACBALR,	 -0.0828 + 0.0784 ACBELR, + 0.0453 AUKTB,
(-0.9505) (3.7832)	 (2.3609)
0.1481 R7D, + 0.1066 ACBELR,_,
(12.9065)	 (4.8678)
0.1323 EC, -r 0.6323 DUN1MY,
(-8.9200)	 (6.2334)
R 2 = 0.8406	 Autocorr: x2 (1) = 2.1437 [0.143]
F(6,44) = 44.9599 [0.000] x 2 (2) = 2.4740 [0.290]
S.E. of Regression = 0.1352 x 2 (3) = 4.8482 [0.183]
Normality: x 2 (2) = 0.9484 [0.622] x 2 (4) = 5.8375 [0.212]
Heteroscedasticity: x - (1) = 1.2090 [0.272]
ARCH: x 2(1) = L3623 [0.243]
x 2 (2) -- 1.3198 [0.517]
x 2 (3) = 2.0602 [0.560]
x2 (4) = 3.3818 [0.496]
Functional Form:	 x-(1) = 3 8825 [0.049]
F(1,43) = 3.5432 [0.067]
ACBALRt 0.083 ACBELR, + 0.0434 AUKTB,
(4.1239)	 (2.2786)
0.1099 ACBELR,., + 0.1461 R7D,
(5.0868)	 (12.9634)
0.1419 EC 2 + 0.6286 DUMN1Y,
(-13.1284)	 (6.2003)
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R 2 = 0.8410
F(5,45) = 53.8869 [0.000]
S.E. of Regression = 0.1350
Normality: x 2 (2) = 1.0581 [0.589]
Heteroscedasticity: x 2 (1) = 1.7712 [0.183]
ARCH: 2 (1) = 1.8711 [0.171]
x -(2) = 1.8529 [0.396]
x 2 (3) = 2.9757 [0.395]
x 2 (4) = 3.7855 [0.436]
Functional Form:	 X2( 1 ) = 4 2325 [0.040]
F(1,44) = 3.9820 [0.052]
Autocorr:	 X 2 ( 1 ) = 1.2566 [0.262]
X 2 ( 2 ) = 2.0004 [0.368]
X 2-( 3 ) = 3.3551 [0.340]
X 2 (4) = 3.6102 [0.461]
Notes:
(I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) belcm estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
(II) Figures in square parentheses [ refer to marginal significance levels
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Chapter 5
EXCHANGE RATE ISSUES
5.0 Overview
This chapter of our thesis has a three-fold objective namely:
1) To discuss the implications for exchan ge rate, price and income (output) movements amid
the prevalence of equilibrium credit rationing in the domestic banking system. The
Dornbusch's (1976) model will be adapted as a theoretical basis of our discussions;
2) Following the above discussion which is mainly from a financial perspective, we proceed
with a consideration of the fundamental determinants of real exchange rates following
Edwards (1988a, 1988b & 1989). This would enable us to ascertain whether there has been a
misalignment of Malaysian exchan ge rates. Both bilateral (MS/US$) and effective real
exchange rates will be considered. The effective or multilateral real exchange rates may
constitute an indicator of a country's competiti\ eness vis-a-vis its trading partners on an
overall or a broad basis. Under the generalised floatin g system, multilateral real exchange rates
may exhibit significant departures from bilateral rates. The effective rates will be computed on
the trade-,export-, and import-weighted bases. There is a tendency amongst developing
countries to maintain an overvaluation of their real exchange rates. Hence it is interesting to
verify whether countries such as Mala ysia which are full of development ambitions do keep
their exchange rates undervalued. More specifically, the question whether Malaysia has been
maintaining a competitive exchange rate environment that probably explains its "success" story
in economic development can be addressed. In order to determine whether an exchange rate is
misaligned or otherwise, a priori knowledge of the behavior of the equilibrium real exchange
rate is needed. Real exchange rate behavior is often viewed as central to policy evaluation and
design (Edwards, 1988 & Cottani, et.al , 1990), and
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3) While the second objective above is founded upon the assumption that real exchange rate
movements are a crucial determinant of macroeconomic performance, the third objective here
is to verify whether exports and economic gro n\ ths achieved by Malaysia have been influenced
by exchange rate movements and to establish the direction of causality between the two. In the
process, a causality test will also be conducted to determine the direction of causality between
the exchange rate and the merchandise trade balance in order to resolve the controversy
surrounding this aspect.
The rest of this chapter is confiLmred as follows. Section 5.1 will discuss the exchange rate
experience of Malaysia against the backdrops of external trade and growth performance. A
review of the literature related to exchange rates is furnished in Section 5.2. Some implications
that can be drawn from Dornbusch's (1976) model in the context of equilibrium credit
rationing are discussed in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 will provide empirical estimates of the
fundamental determinants of real exchan ge rates a la Edwards (1988a, 1988b &1989) while
Section 5.5 Avi 1 I deal specifically NA, ith the issue of real exchange rate misalignment. Section 5.6
addresses the empirical question of Malaysian exchange rate movements and its links to
exports and economic growths. The chapter will conclude \\ ith
 remarks in Section 5.7.
Monthly data from 1973 onwards dra\An chiefly from the INIF's International Financial
Statistics and Bank Negara Malaysia's Quarterly Monthly Economic Bulletins and transformed
into quarterly where appropriate will be utilised in our empirical endeavors. Where terms of
trade and real exports and imports are concerned, the estimation period may have to end in
1987 as publications of data for unit value of imports have ceased since then. Data needed for
the computation of weights in respect of effective exchange rate indices are drawn from the
IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics
5.1 Malaysian Exchange Rates, Trade and Economic Growth Performance: A Historical
Review
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As noted in our background chapter of the Mala ysian financial system, Malaysia can be
construed as having been maintaining a mana ged-float exchange rate system. Foreign
exchange market intervention by the Central Bank is only a rare occasion aimed at curbing
excessive speculation except durin g the 1 98 1-84 period when it intervened in order to
maintain the strength of the rin ggit vis-a-vis the Singapore dollar. Contrary to the classification
by the World Bank that Malaysia maintains a basket peg system, the Malaysian exchange rate
system is one of managed float in practice (Lin, 1989). In fact the degree of variability in the
rinaait has led Rana (1981) and De Macedo (1984) to conclude that the ringgit exchange rate
system is one of managed float (see also A g hevli, 1981). In fact the degree of volatility of the
rinagit effective exchange rates is comparable to that of major currencies such as the
Deutschemark and the French franc based upon the variability indices computed by Gan
(1989a). Aahevli (1981) also contends that baskec pe s_l.gina m'ay Teganied as a managed
float if the currency composition of the basket is not publicly revealed as by virtue of its
confidentiality, the authority may not be committed towards maintaining the peg. Cho &
Khatkhate (1989) even went to the extent of maintainin g that Malaysia had a fairly open
capital account with a floating exchan ge rate. They also maintain that foreign factors had a
major influence on interest rates in NIala ysia e% en prior to interest rate liberalisation in 1978.
In spite of interest rate controls then, real interest rates w ere not low unlike the Korean
experience. Short term capital movements have also been quite responsive to international
interest rate differentials especially between Malaysia on one hand and Singapore and U.S. on
the other though domestic deposit rates have not assumed such sensitivity.
We shall now discuss both the effective and bilateral exchan ge rate (MS/US$) movements and
if any their relevance to trade and economic growth performance of Malaysia in the past.'
Some statistics related to the mean and %ariability of effective (of different weighting schemes)
and bilateral exchange rate indices of Malaysia since 1976 are furnished in Tables 5.1. Tables
5.IA, 5.IB, 5.1C and 5.ID reveal that the Malaysian nominal effective and bilateral exchange
rates have not displayed a distinct appreciable long run depreciating or appreciating trend since
I Details related to the derivation of these indices N% ill be furnished in Section 5.4.
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1976 based upon a cursory view of the periodic means of these indices. However in terms of
'band', standard deviation and the coefficient of variation, all the three nominal effective indices
seem to have experienced a growing variabilit y from 1976 through 1990. 2 This could be due
to the increasing volatility of foreign exchange markets over the years, a phenomenon
commonly cited in the literature. However 'is-a- y is the US$, the Malaysian $ appears to
exhibit a growing stability over the period in terms of all the variability measurements. A
sharp decline in the variability is witnessed in the1981Q1-1985Q4 period from the 1976Q1-
1980Q4 period. This perhaps has been due to some policy of pegging more to the US$ in the
1980s.
2The 'band' is defined as the difference bet N\ een the maximum and the minimum level observed over a period.
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Table 5.IA
Mean and Variability of :Nominal Effective Exchange
Rate Index (Trade-weighted)
1985=1.00
PERIOD
1976Q1-1980Q4 1981Q1-1985Q4 1986Q1-1990Q4 1991Q1-1993Q3
STATISTICS
Maximum 1.1999 1.1363 1.5442 1.5508
Minimum 1.0886 0.9617 1.1134 1.4329
Band 0.1113 0.1747 0.4308 0.1179
Mean 1.1318 1.0280 1.3687 1.5020
Std Deviation 0.0287 1 0494 0.1113 0.0378
Coefficient of
Variation 0.0254 0 0480 0.0813 0.0252
Table 5.IB
Mean and Variabilit y of Nominal Effective Exchange
Rate Index (Export-weighted)
1985	 1 00
PERIOD
1976Q1-1980Q4 1981Q1-1985Q4 1986Q1-1990Q4 1991Q1-1993Q3
STATISTICS
Maximum 1.2054 1	 1340 1.5386 1.5426
Minimum 1.0907 0 9615 1.1118 1.4250
Band 0.1147 0 1725 0.4268 0.1176
Mean 1.1361 1.0280 1.3657 1.4955
Std Deviation 0.0299 0.0490 0.1104 0.0378
Coefficient of
Variation 0.0263 0.0477 0.0808 0.0253
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Table 5.IC
Mean and Variabilit y or Nominal Effective Exchange
Rate Index (Import- weihted)
1985=1 00
PERIOD
1976Q1-1980Q4 1981Q1-1985Q4 1986Q1-1990Q4 1991Q1-1993Q3
STATISTICS
Maximum 1.1935 1.1413 1 5421 1.5518
Minimum 1.0872 0.9631 1.1140 1.4338
Band 0.1063 0.1782 0.4281 0.118
Mean 1.1279 1.0293 1.3666 1.5007
Std Deviation 0.0278 0.0506 0.1106 0.0376
Coefficient of
Variation 0.0246 0.0492 0.0809 0.0251
Table 5.ID
Mean and Variability of Nominal Bilateral Exchange
Rate Index (N1S/USS)
1985 = 1.00
PERIOD
1976Q1-1980Q4 1981Q1-1985Q4 1986Q1-1990Q4 1991Q1-1993Q3
STATISTICS
Maximum 1.0353 1.0218 1.1016 1.1178
Minimum 0.8618 0.9089 1.0002 1.0072
Band 0.1735 0.1129 0.1014 0.1106
Mean 0.9411 0 9495 1.0579 1.0592
Std Deviation 0.0623 0.0301 0.0335 0.0412
Coefficient of
Variation 0 0662 0.0317 0.0317 0.0389
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With respect to real effective and bilateral exchanue rate movements, no distinct long-run
depreciating or appreciating trend can be discerned either as suggested by their periodic means
(Tables 5.IIA, 5.IIB, 5.1IC and 5.IID). Over the period 1976-90, all exchange rate indices with
the exception of the bilateral index seem to exhibit some increased variability based on all
measurements. This implies that an y attempt to manage the external competitiveness of the
country via an exchange rate manmzement policy has become an increasingly formidable task.
Table 5.IIA
Mean and Variability of Real Effective Exchange
Rate Index (Trade-weighted)
1985=1.00
PERIOD
1976Q1-1980Q4 1981Q1-1985Q4 1986Q1-1990Q4 1991Q1-1993Q3
STATISTICS
Maximum 1.2072 1.2223 1.4524 1.4054
Minimum 1.0392 0 9607 1.0650 1.2131
Band 0 168 0.2616 0.3874 0.1923
Mean 1.0951 1.0488 1.2734 1.2855
Std Deviation 0.0565 0 0779 0 10008 0.0726
Coefficient of
Variation 0.0516 0.0742 0.078595 0.0565
Table 5.IIB
Mean and Variability of Real Effective Exchange
Rate Index (Export-weighted)
19S5= 1.00
PERIOD
1976Q1-1980Q4 1981Q1-1985Q4 1986Q1-1990Q4 1991Q1-1993Q3
STATISTICS
Maximum 1.2118 1.2250 1.4407 1.3936
Minimum 1.0414 0.9615 1.0619 1.2051
Band 0.1704 0 2635 0.3788 0.1885
Mean 1.1002 1.0501 1.2667 1.2745
Std Deviation 0.0561 0 0792 0.0976 0.0713
Coefficient of
Variation 0.0509 0.0754 0.0771 0.0559
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Fable 5.IIC
:Mean and Variability oiReal Effective Exchange
Rate Index (Import-weighted)
1985=1.00
PERIOD
STATISTICS
1976Q1-1980Q4 1981Q1-1985Q4 1986Q1-1990Q4 1991Q1-1993Q3
Maximum 1.2006 1 2189 1.4633 1.4169
Minimum 1.0343 0.9609 1.0684 1.2202
Band 0.1663 0.2580 0.3949 0.1967
Mean 1.0888 1.0477 1.2794 1.2964
Std Deviation 0.0564 0 0763 0.1024 0.0744
Coefficient of
Variation 0 0518 00728 0.0801 0.0574
Table 5.1ID
Meam and Variability of Real Bilateral Exchange
Rate Index (N1S/USS)
1985 = 1.00
PERIOD
1976Q1-1980Q4 1981Q1-1985Q4 1986Q1-1990Q4 1991Q1-1993Q3
STATISTICS
Maximum 0.9682 1.0301 1.1406 1.1089
Minimum 0.8471 0 9392 0.9764 0.9506
Band 0.1211 0.0909 0.1642 0.1583
Mean 0.9133 0.9803 1.0573 1.0160
Std Deviation 0.0318 0 0281 0.0579 0.0664
Coefficient of
Variation 0.0348 0 0287 0.0548 0.0654
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It is interesting to note from FiLwres 5. n and 5B that the choice of bases (trade, export and
import) for the computation of effective exchanue rate indices does make no material
difference at all to the outcome. As shown by the tis.2.ures, all the three indices have moved in
tandem over the years both in nominal and in real terms. Noteworthy is also the fact that real
effective exchange rate movements have since the mid 1980s been largely dictated by nominal
rate movements with insufficient offseting influence from relative price movements as opposed
to the period before then (Figure 5C). In bilateral terms however, nominal exchange rate
movements did translate into real exchan ge rate movements even in the 1970s until 1987 when
nominal movements have be gun to be reinforced by relatiN,e price movements (Figures 5D, 5E
& 5F). Hence if one is inclined to belie\ e that exchange rates have a significant bearing on
exports and economic growth, all this underscores the importance of managing the exchange
rate in order to preserve the external competitiveness oC the country.
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Figure 5A
Nominal Effectiue Exchange Rate Indices (1985=1.00)
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Figure 5B
Real Effectiue Exchange Rate Indices (1985=1.00)
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Figure 5D
Nominal Bilateral Exchange Rate (M$/US$) Index (1985=1.00)
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Figure 5E
Real Bilateral Exchanae Rate (MS/US$) Index (1985=1.00)
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It is evident that the Malaysian currency (in real and nominal effective terms) has been
undergoing a depreciation since !984Q3 thou gh it appears to be strengthening since 1990Q3
in real terms. Though exports (in real and nominal terms) also seem to have risen steeply since
the mid 1980s (Figures 5G and 51-1), it is not however altogether clear that it can be attributed
solely to the depreciating tendency of the rin ggit. The steep rise in exports was in fact made
possible by an intensification in the mid I 930s of the government's export promotion efforts
initiated in the early 1970s with a ‘ie\.‘ of broadening the nation's industrial base. Moreover
even if the depreciation did auxillariate the export-promotion exercise, it need not lead to a
faster economic growth . As Fi gures 51 and 5J indicate, merchandise imports have also risen
steeply both in nominal and real terms. This view is further corroborated by Figures 5K and 5L
that show a high positive correlation amongst exports, imports and GDP both in nominal and
real terms. Furthermore real and nominal merchandise trade balances have not exhibited any
upward surplus trend (Fi gures 5M and 5N). Ilence even if a real exchange rate depreciation
does contribute to export grox\ ths, by no means is it a sufficient condition for economic
growth. Perhaps as a policy lesson for developin g
 countries, real exchange rate depreciation
per se could only auxillariate economic growth if the industrial complex is already well
established. It is imperative to have an industrial or structural development policy as well.
Hence Malaysia's economic growth and development performance has not so far rested solely
on real exchange rate mana gement. As n\ ill be seen in the empirical section later, periods of
undervaluation and overvaluation have been quite commonly observed in the nation's history
let alone the weak relationships found amongst real exchange rates, exports and economic
growth.
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Figure 5G
Real Exports (M$ million)
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Nominal Exports (M$ million)
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Figure 51
Nominal Imports (M$ million)
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Figure 5J
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Figure 5M
Nominal Exports, Imports and GDP in M$ million
23059.11
V
16292.0L
9524.81'
A	 t'S
, n•• I f
2757.7
	
.73Q1
....... •..
76Q4
...
80Q3 84Q2 87Q4
Figure 5L
Real Exports, Imports and GDP in M8 million
Exports 	 	 Imports
229
76Q4	 80Q3	 84Q2	 87Q4
Figure 5M
Real Balance of Trade (M$ million)
230
Figure 5N
Nominal Balance of Trade (M$ million)
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5.2 Literature Review
The need to understand the real exchan ge rate situation may at hindsight never be
overemphasised for a small open developing economy such as Malaysia with exports and
imports accounting for about 70% of GDP and given the strong presence of foreign direct
investment in the country. Recent deliberations on exchange rate policy have centered on the
relative merits of "real targets" and "nominal anchor" approaches (Corden, 1990 & Tseng,
1992). While the former refers to the use of exchange rates as an instrument to sustain
external competitiveness, the latter refers to their use as an anti-inflationary anchor. Hence to
rely on the exchange rate policy for these purposes, a clearer understanding of the fundamental
determinants of real exchange rate and its feedback mechanism onto the rest of the economy is
needed.
The real exchange rate can be expected to displa y greater short-term variability in a floating
exchange rate regime vis-a-vis a fixed exchange rate regime and this is predominantly
accounted by persistent variability of nominal exchange rates rather than national price levels
(Nlussa, 1986). This is because in a floatin g exchan ge rate regime, nominal exchange rates
assume an asset price behavior as opposed to commodity prices and wages which are more
likely to exhibit sluggishness in their movements. Strong correlations exist between nominal
and real exchange rate movements. Nloreover the differences in the real exchange rate
behavior under different nominal exchan ge regimes appear too substantial and systematic to be
accounted solely by exogenous real shocks. Hence all this violates the property of nominal
exchange regime neutrality which states that no systematic difference in the behavior of real
exchange rate movements should be discerned \\ hen  moving from a fixed to a floating
exchange rate system and vice-versa.
Economic distress in a number of developing countries has largely been attributed to a
misalignment of their real exchange rates (Edwards, 1988a; 1988b; & 1989). The vices of
exchange rate misalignment have been w ell documented in Edwards (1988b) and they include
considerable losses of a country's welfare w hen the real exchange rate is maintained at a level
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inconsistent with its long run equilibrium alue. Real exchange rate misalignment is
characterised by sustained departures of the actual real exchange rate from its long run
sustainable equilibrium level. The misali gnment is in turn blamed on to inconsistent
macroeconomic policies typically pursued b y governments in LDCs. Developing countries
especially in Africa tend to favor a fixed exchange rate system and are quite reluctant to
devalue their currencies. They prefer trade restrictions and foreign exchange controls against a
currency depreciation or devaluation (see e. g . Collier, 1990).
As opposed to the nominal exchange rate \\, hich is a monetary concept expressing the relative
price of two currencies, the real exchan ge rate is a real concept expressing the relative price of
two goods. The real exchange rate is commonly established as the price of tradables relative to
nontradables is follows:
RER = E. / P.,. =1/ P,
where Pr = domestic price of tradables
P,, = domestic price of nontraclables
Pr* = world price of tradables
E = nominal exchange rate
In fact numerous and often competin g definitions of real exchange rate exist. The earliest
definition is purchasing power parity-based that regards the real exchange rate as being equal
to the nominal exchange rate (E) adjusted by the ratio of foreign price level (P*) to the
domestic price level (P), i.e. RER=EP* P. The use of consumer price indices has been popular
in this case. The reason put forth for favoring its use is that the index so derived would
represent a comprehensive measure of changes in competitiveness as CPIs encompass a broad
variety of goods including services (Genber g, 1978). However the use of CPI has a major
drawback as the basket of goods used in the computation comprises substantially non traded
goods as well (Edwards, 1988b). I Iarberger (1986), Diaz-Alejandro (1986) and Khan (1986)
have strongly recommended the use of the following measure of RER which we shall also be
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adopting in our empirical analysis as it is commonl y relied upon as an indicator of a country's
international competitiveness:
RER = E. P; i. = 1. 1111'I A'P
The foreign price level is proxied by the foreign country's WP1 in respect of bilateral real
exchange rates or a weighted avera ge of forei gn \\Pis when effective real exchange rates are
considered. With respect to the price of nontradables, the domestic consumer price index has
been suggested as a proxy. This is premised upon the notion that foreign countries' WPIs are
reasonable proxies for the yso, id price of tradables while the domestic CPI embodies a
significant proportion of nontradables. Khan (1986) in defending the use of CPIs further
maintains that it is a better yardstick of overall labor costs in the economy.
Movements in the RER may be decomposed into "justified" and "unjustified" changes
(Edwards, 1989). The former is induced by real events in the economy such as technological
progress, changes in external terms of trade, chan ges in taxation and etc and such changes may
be viewed as an equilibrium phenomenon "Unjustified" chan ges in the RER on the other hand
would result in its departure from the equilibrium value, a phenomenon which may be referred
to as a real exchange rate misali g nment or disequilibrium.
The equlibrium real exchange rate (ERER) in turn is a general equilibrium concept defined as
the relative price of tradables to nontraclables that leads to a simultaneous attainment of
equilibrium in both the external and domestic (nontraclable) sectors of the economy. It is
implicit that internal equilibrium involves clearing of the nontradable goods market without
unemployment beyond its natural level. On the other hand, external equilibrium implies that
the current account balances both present and in the litture are compatible with long run
sustainable capital flows.
In fact the equilibrium real exchange rate has multiple concepts. A formal analysis of the
determination of the equilibrium real exchange rate was earlier effected by Mundell (1971)
based upon a macroeconomic model of a monetary econom y. In his analysis, the equilibrium
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real exchange rate is defined as the relati\ie price of' international to domestic goods that
simultaneously maintains equilibrium in the mone y market, the domestic goods market and the
external goods market. In Dornbusch (1974), the equilibrium real exchange rate is defined as
the relative price of tradables to nontradables that equates income to expenditure and at the
same time producing equilibrium in the tradable and nontradable goods markets. Williamson
(1983, p.14) writes:
"The fundamental equilibrium exchange rate is that which is expected to generate a current
account surplus or deficit equal to the underlying capital flow over the cycle, given that the
country is pursuing international balance as best as it can and not restricting trade for balance
of payments reasons."
Frenkel & NIussa (1984, p.64) express:
"The long run equilibrium real exchange rate is expected to be consistent with the requirement
that on average (in present and future periods), the current account is balanced."
However we shall be adherinil, to the Edwards' (1989) notion of an equilibrium real exchange
rate. Edwards maintains that the equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER) should not be
perceived as time invariant but rather as a variable that evolves with changes in any of the
other variables influencing a country's internal and external equilibria over time. Based upon an
inter temporal model, Edwards (1989) contends that there exists a path followed by the
ERER over time instead of a single equilibrium value for RER. The ERER in a particular
period is then defined as the relative price of tradables to nontradables that produces
equilibrium simultaneously in the external and internal (nontradable) sectors given the
sustainable values of other variables such as world prices, technology and tariffs. Internal
equilibrium refers to the clearing of the nontradable goods market in a current period and that
this market equilibrium is expected to be sustained into the future period. By implication, this
equilibrium is struck when unemployment is at the "natural level". On the other hand, external
equilibrium refers to a condition when the current account balances (present and future) are
compatible with long run sustainable capital flows. Specifically, the ERER is a function of a
number of variables.These variables are referred to as real exchange rate fundamentals and
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can be categorised into external and internal. The external fundamentals may include terms of
trade, international transfers includin g flows of forei gn aid and real interest rates in offshore
financial sectors. Amongst the domestic or internal fundamentals are import tariffs, import
quotas, export taxes, exchange and capital controls, other taxes and subsidies, composition of
government expenditure and technological progress.
Though the equilibrium real exchange rate may solely be a function of real variables, the actual
real exchange rate is a function of both real and monetary variables comprising monetary and
fiscal policy variables. A real exchan ge rate misali gnment is then characterised by a situation of
large and persistent differences between actual and equilibrium real exchange rates and this
wedge may be driven by imprudent macroeconomic policies or more generally nominal
disturbances. Lizondo (1989) maintains that exchange rate overvaluations or undervaluations
arise from unsustainable macroeconomic policies such as undertaxation or overspending in the
public sector rather than being a consequence of failure of markets to clear or failure of
economic agents to behave in an optimising manner. There exist certain studies which resort
only to the PPP methodology for estimating the extent of real exchange rate overvaluation.
However the PPP hypothesis of real exchange rate determination has failed miserably to
withstand empirical tests (Edwards, 1989). Moreover, the phenomenon of price stickiness in
the goods market and the asset price behm,ior of exchange rates may combine to generate
considerable changes in the RER following monetary policy revisions as an exchange rate
overshooting may prevail (Dornbusch, 1976).
Though there is no precise definition of a real exchange rate misalignment, we adhere to
Edwards' definition , i.e. a situation characterised by sustained deviations of the actual real
exchange rate from its long run equilibrium level. In fact two types of misalignment can be
discerned:
1) Macroeconomic-induced misalignment that arise when the actual RER deviates from its
equilibrium value owing to inconsistencies between macroeconomic policies and the official
nominal exchange rate system. Within a flexible exchange rate re g ime, monetary policies could
236
influence both the nominal rate and the domestic goods prices. If an expansionary monetary
policy leads to a faster growth of domestic prices beyond the rate of inflation observed in the
rest of the world, a decline or an appreciation in the real exchange rate may be precipitated
(EP; PN); and
2) Structural misalignment arising from changes in the fundamentals of the equilibrium RER
(ERER) but of which their influence on the actual RER is denied. For instance, a change in the
country's international terms of trade should imply a chan ge in the ERER. Hence unless the
actual RER is permitted to adjust to these chan ges in the ERER, the RER wil be structurally
misaligned.
A real exchange rate misalignment could imply lower profitability in the industries which
relative prices are reduced. More often than not, it assumes the form of domestic currency
overvaluation thus undermining tradable activities. This may impair growth performance since
productivity improvements are usuall y concentrated around export-oriented or import-
competing industries. Agarwala (1983) demonstrates that a misalignment of the RER is the
most important form of distortion influencing economic growth in a diverse group of 31
LDCs. It acts as an implicit tax on exports (Ghura Grennes, 1993). With an increasing
overvaluation of the RER, the profitability of producing exportable goods declines and this
discourages production for exports. Imports could at the same time be adversely affected as
falling export earnin gs would contribute to a grow ing constraint on imports and may even
prompt governments to adopt a merchantilistic attitude towards foreign trade. Economic
growth would then be hampered by falling imports especially if they are critical inputs to the
domestic production process. Hence a 'vicious circle' of falling imports and exports will
develop. It has been empirically shown by Khan & Kni ght (1988), Hague et. al (1990) and Fry
(1989) that imports would fall in tandem with the volume of foreign reserves. Moreover it
could entail considerable losses of welfare and efficiency especially if it is 'condoned' by an
erection of exchan ge and trade barriers in order to decelerate foreign reserve losses
concomitant with a real exchange rate overvaluation. Such controls could involve economic
inefficiency costs and promote rent-seeking activities (Krueger, 1978 and Edwards, 1988b).
Moroever exports could be very adversely affected \ n.ith speculation and massive capital flights
as probable outcomes (Cuddington, 1986)
In the empirical literature, three different measures of RER misalignment have been relied
upon (Ghura & Grennes, 1993):
1) a PPP-based measure (Balassa, 1990; Au,arwala, 1983 and Cottani et.al , 1990);
2) a model-based measure using official nominal exchange rates (Edwards 1988a, 1988b &
1989; Cottani, et.al
 (1990) and Dollar (1992)) and
3) a model-based measure usini!, black market nominal exchange rates (Edwards, 1989 &
1990).
As mentioned earlier, we shall ho % n ever be following Edwards (1988a, 1988b & 1989) though
without giving any attention to the black market exchange rate as its significance can be ruled
out given that Malaysia has been maintaining a liberal exchange control regime.
Nominal devaluation is then often prescribed as a remedy for misalignment as the very process
itself assists in the restoration of the equilibrium real exchan ge rate via an adjustment of the
domestic price of tradables. Given that the RER is defined as follows:
RE]? =PT Pv
 =E. Pr. P,
a higher RER or a devaluation can be sustained by a rise in Pr or specifically E. A devaluation
has as its objective to boost a country's international trade competitiveness and hence bringing
about an improvement in the external payments position via expenditure reducing and
switching effects. However a devaluation may be contractionary if there is a severe increase in
the domestic price of imported intermediate products.
Broadly, the effects of depreciation on the macroeconomic performance in a flexible exchange
rate system parallel the macroeconomic effects of a devaluation in a fixed exchange rate
regime. It is commonly believed that in the absence of full employment, a nominal devaluation
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would have both expenditure switching and reducin g effects that could boost the production
of tradables, exports and the external pa y ments position of a country concerned. 3 A
devaluation may also expedite the adjustment of the real economy to disturbances be they
exogenous or policy-induced (van Wijnbergen, 1986).
There exists mixed evidence however on the effects of devaluation on economic activity,
giving rise to the controversy whether a devaluation is contractionary or expansionary
(Edwards, 1986 & van Wijnbergen, 1986). Doubts about the expansionary impact of a
devaluation arise from two intermediate ne gative effects that a devaluation could generate
namely the distributional effect (i.e. the effects of initial fiscal or current account deficit) and
the real balance effect. The positive expenditure switching effect could be overwhelmed by
these two effects. Moreover the contractionary impact of a devaluation on economic activity
may be transmitted not only via the demand-side of the economy (Diaz-Alejandro, 1963 and
Krugman & Taylor, 1978) but also via the supply side (van Wijnbergen, 1986). The incidence
of intermediate goods imports, real wage indexation based upon imported wage goods
(namely food) and the significance of the N,oluine of bank credit in real terms in the financing
of working capital requirements may constitute those channels via which a nominal
devaluation may yield a contractionary a ggregate supply impact. This may defeat or undermine
the original purpose of a devaluation if domestic inflation is fuelled by the supply shock.
Edwards' empirical results suggest that devaluations would have a negative impact on output
initially but a positive one in the subsequent period. Hence in general a devaluation is
contractionary in the short run but expansionary in the longer run.
Devaluation is also used as a policy instrument to boost the balance of payments position of a
country if its currency has been overvalued. Ilowever a sustained improvement in the balance
of payments can only be envisaged from a nominal devaluation if it is accompanied by a
reversal of unsustainable fiscal policies (Edwards, 1989) which in the first place could have
3 W/ten the economy is at full employment, a nominal devaluation NNould not yield any change in the real
exchange rate as it would merely lead to an equiproportionatc rise in prices (Johnson. 1976).
239
caused an overvaluation of the currenc y concerned. Nloreover inconsistent macroeconomic
policies may fuel expectations of a devaluation sparking off speculative attacks against the
currency (Krugman, 1979). Nevertheless in the case of Malaysia, on no occasion has the
government ever publicly declared an exchange rate devaluation. Hence in our empirical
analysis later, we shall assume that devaluation has never been relied upon as a policy
instrument. Doubts about the efficacy of a real exchange rate devaluation have also been cast
by a recent study by Faini de Melo (1990). In a review of countries pursuing structural
adjustment policies since 1982, Faini and de Melo contend that sharp devaluations of the
exchange rate is probably ineffective for countries exporting primary goods. This may not be
true for countries exporting manufactures.
While our attention has so far been focussed on the structural approach to real exchange rate
determination, there exists another approach in the literature that views the real exchange rate
(RER) as merely following a random walk with or without drift (C) (Stein, 1990).
Furthermore, the random walk hypothesis claims that neither is the drift term determined by
systematic economic forces. The random walk hypothesis of real exchange rates may be
represented as follows:
RER, =C +RER, , e,
where c is independently and identically distributed with zero mean. This approach
understandably does not concur with the long run purchasing power parity hypothesis where
the nominal exchange rate would vary with relative prices causing the convergence of the real
exchange rate to a constant value. Nevertheless, the random walk hypothesis could hardly
explain the observed movements in both nominal and real exchange rates.
Preservations of exchange rate competitiveness might have been a crucial factor to the
economic development success of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Korea. Fry's (1988)
examination of the monetary and financial policies of these countries reveal that:
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1) a complementarity exists between monetar n, and exchange rate policies and that there has
been no pressure for monetary expansion to finance government deficits in these countries;
and
2)domestic inflation due to accelerated monetary expansions has not been allowed to cause
any appreciation in their currencies in real terms unlike majority of developing countries.
Overvaluation of their domestic currencies has been forestalled since the early 1960s. These
have been the key to their successful export-led usowth. In fact liberalisation of trade and
payments regimes has generated a substantial depreciation of the real exchange rates of
Singapore and Korea over the 1960-79 period. In fact Korea's exchange rates have been the
key to the country's outstanding economic sg row th performance with its effect on exports
outstripping those of other domestic economic ariables (Balassa, 1991). The exchange rate
has been relied upon as a policy variable for offsetting any differential between domestic and
foreign inflation rates. The growing integration of' capital markets world wide with an ever
increasing degree of capital mobility across national boundaries as its outcome has led to sharp
exchange rate fluctuations since the advent of u,eneralised floating (Lin, 1989). This poses a
severe challenge to exchange rate manm:ement. Real exchange rate movements also
potentially dictate the problems and success of capital account liberalisation experiments as
highlighted by the experience of Southern Cone countries in the late 1970s (Edwards, 1987).4
Real exchange rate appreciation has been cited as the major cause behind the frustration of
these experiments as observed in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay towards the end of 1970s and
early 1980s. Financial liberalisation potentially leads to exchange rate misalignment particularly
overvaluation owing to two inter-related factors:
1) Massive influx of foreign funds as induced by the opening of the capital account; and
2) The fixing of nominal exchange rate as a move to curb inflation.
Hence this exercise will also enable us to ascertain whether Malaysia has been able to maintain
its real exchange rate competitiveness despite this trans-national capital mobility given its
liberal exchange control regime.
4An informal discussion of the impact of trade and capital account liberalisation on the real exchange rate can
be found in McKinnon (1973).
241
Edwards (1988a & 1989) analyses empirically the relative importance of nominal and real
variables in determining RER (bilateral and multilateral) movements of twelve developing
countries namely Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Greece, India, Israel, Malaysia, Philippines,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Yu goslavia using data spanning from 1965 through
1984. The pooling regression technique has been used in the estimation. It is discovered that
short run real exchange rate movements do respond to both nominal and real disturbances,
that expansive and inconsistent macroeconomic policies inevitably lead to a real overvaluation
and that the RER would adjust slowl y towards its equilibrium level in the event of any
deviation.
Edwards (1988b) also examines empirically the effects of real exchange rate misalignment on
economic growth in 12 developin g nations namely Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Greece,
India, Israel, Malaysia, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Yugoslavia using
data and pooling regression techniques over the period 1965-85. His empirical results suggest
the tendency for countries exhibiting lar ger and more persistent RER misalignments to exhibit
poorer economic performance than those that mana ged to maintain their real exchange rates
closer to the equilibrium level. Hence poor economic performance can be associated with real
exchange rate misalignments.
Cottani, et.al
 (1990) explores the correlation between RER behavior and economic
performance for a cross section of LDCs. They merel y concentrate on the bilateral exchange
rate behavior. The correlation could have arisen from the following circumstances:
1) the RER may constitute one of the links between policy and economic performance. Hence
policies that stabilise the RER around a realistic level may enhance growth via this mechanism;
and/or
2)both growth and the RER may be influenced by policy measures that somehow enhances the
correlation between the two without necessarily implying any causal relationship. For instance
policies that generate a stable environment and that promote a better utilisation of scarce
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resources may also induce an appropriate RER aliLmment. All in all a strong negative
correlation between macroeconomic performance on one hand and RER instability and
misalignment on the other is found by them. Ghura Grennes (1993) by using pooled time
series and cross section data for 33 countries in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) also reveal such an
inverse relationship. Their analysis also suggests that macroeconomic instability would retard
growth and other indicators of performance.
There has been some other work done on Malaysian exchange rates most notably by Rana
(1983) and Gan (1989a;1989b & 199 I ). Gans focus was also on the real effective exchange
rate of the Malaysian rimzgit but his attention was only restricted to the testing of the
purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis and to the relationship between the ringgit real
effective exchange rates on one hand and the external terms of trade and the price of
nontradables relative to the price of tradables on the other. Moreover in computing the two
real effective exchange rate indices, Gan uses consumer price and wholesale price indices
mutually exclusively. His conclusions are that:
I) the rirwgit effective exchange rate follows a random walk and there is a high persistence of
deviations from the PPP with scanty evidence of mean reversion behavior even in the long run;
and
2) there is no econometric evidence of a relationship between the long run swings in the
ringgit real effective exchange rate on one hand and the external terms of trade and relative
price of nontradables on the other.
Rana (1983) explores empirically the causal relationships between real exchange rates and
prices for Malaysia and Singapore. Bilateral exchange rates have been used namely M$/US$,
MS/Japanese Yen, SS/US$ and SS/Japanese Yen. It is contended by advocates of the
monetary approach to exchange rate determination that the causal relationship between
exchange rates and prices runs from the latter to the former though a bidirectional causality is
also a theoretically plausible view which may be referred to as the vicious/virtuous circle
hypothesis. This is because an exchan ge rate depreciation or devaluation may boost the cost of
imported inputs which may in turn contribute to a higher price of domestically-produced
goods. This may render the price of these goods less attractive relative to foreign ones in the
eyes of both domestic and foreign consumers. In turn this may cause a deficit in the
merchandise trade balance thus exerting a depreciating pressure on the domestic currency.
Based on his study, Rana concludes that there exists an undirectional causality running from
relative price changes to exchange rate changes except in the case of M$/US$ which the
vicious/virtuous circle hypothesis seems to hold.
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5.3 Possible Macroeconomic Implications of Equilibrium Credit Rationing: The
Dornbusch's Model
This section discusses the possible implications for exchange rate, price and output movements
in an economy where equilibrium credit rationing prevails in the domestic banking system. To
meet this objective, the Dornbusch's ( 1976) model is adapted. The basic assumptions involved
in our analysis are:
I) The country is small in the world capital market such that foreign interest rates may be
treated as exogenously given;
II) Asymmetric information in the domestic banking system prevails;
III) The smallness of the domestic economy implies that it faces a given price for imports;
IV) Imperfect substitutability between domestic output and imports;
V) Both the absolute and relative prices of domestic goods are determined by aggregate
demand;
VI) Prevalence of perfect foresight;
VII) Output responds in the short run to aggregate demand movements;
Our adapted version of the Dornbusch's model may be represented as follows in natural
logarithmic form:
International Arbitrage Condition:
	 r -h a =	 -r
where r = domestic interest rate
a= a constant capturing the severity of asymmetric information problem in the
domestic financial market
r* = foreign interest rate
x = expected rate of depreciation
a represents a wedge that prevents the domestic interest rate from matching the foreign level.
The larger is its magnitude, the greater the degree of asymmetric information problem it
reflects of the domestic financial market. This is premised on the notion that equilibrium credit
rationing in the bank credit market places a lid on the lending rate which also implies a
supression of other interest rates in the economy. For instance if banks find lending operations
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unattractive, they may prefer to invest their loanable funds in alternative financial instruments
that guarantee a safe return. The increased demand for such financial instruments would push
up the price of these instruments, thus limiting their rates of return. In fact implicit in equation
(1) is also the assumption that domestic financial institutions are 'encouraged' to disburse their
funds locally though they retain some liberty to invest abroad.
Money Demand Equation:	 m - p = cky - icr
	
(2)
where m = money supply
P = price level
y = income
- r = domestic interest rate
There is constant clearing in the domestic money market.
Goods Market Condition:	 y = In D = u + 6(e-p) + yy-ar	 (3)
*/) = MY-3')	 (4)
where y = output
U --- constant
e exchange rate expressed as the price of foreign currency in
terms of domestic currency
p= rate of inflation
y= full employment or potential output
Equation (3) is the short run goods market equilibrium condition suggesting the
responsiveness of output to changes in aggregate demand. The rate of inflation that varies
directly with the deviation between the current output level and the full employment output
level is depicted by equation (4). It may also be perceived as depicting the relationship
between wage and price inflation, and unemployment in a Phillips curve relationship and a
relation between unemployment and departures from potential output (y-y ) as described by
Okun's law.
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Consistent Expectations:	 x =	 -e)	 (5)
—
where e the known long run exchange rate at which the economy will
converge.
To begin our analysis, we transform (3) to arrive at the following output equation:
y = j.i(ui-6(e-p)-o-r)
	 (3A)
where IA --= 141-7)
Substituting (5) in (1) and then incorporatinE4 the result in (2), a new money demand equation
is obtained:
m-p = cky-Xr*-eVe
	
(2A)
Equation (2A) may be rearranged as follows:
(2B)
•n•
Since in the long run equilibrium, y = y and r r's -a , the long run goods market relation can
be obtained from (3A):
—
y = i_t(u+O(e -p)-G(r*-a)) 	 (3B)
The short run goods market equilibrium condition expressed in terms of deviation from long
run equilibrium may be derived by subtractin g (3B) from (3A):
y-y =i.1(O+cy0)(e-e )+j(p-p)	 (3C)
Given a fixed money supply, long run equilibrium implies that the domestic interest rate will
equal the foreign interest rate minus the asymmetric information interest rate dampening factor
by virtue of the equality between current and expected rates. Hence the long run price level
may be derived from (2B) with e = e as follow s:
—
p=m+X(r*-a)-(ky	 (2C)
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In order to obtain the money-market equilibrium condition in terms of deviation from long run
equilibrium, we subtract (2C) from (2B) and the following is derived:
(13-P)+11)(Y-)')=X0(e -e)
	 (2D)
Equations (3C) and (2D) can be solved simultaneously to yield the level of output and the spot
exchange rate as a function of the price level as follows:
y-y = -(1.i(5-1-ecy)+1.09X)(p-p)/(2,0+0(5+0a))
= -0 (1)-P)	 (3D)
where co=(.45+0G)+00X)/A and A=X0+445+0a)
Substituting (3D) in (2D) yields the following for the spot exchange rate:
MN.
e-e = -(( 1 -(14t5)/A)(p-p )	 (2E)
We shall now consider the impact and long run effects of some policy aimed at eradicating
asymmetric information problems in the financial market. Substituting (3B) in (4) we arrive at
the following:
p =11(y-l.t(u+6(e -p)-a(r*-a)))
Letting p. =0,	 y = 1.t(u+S(e -p)-a(r*-a))
-	 —Henceforth, e = p+(1/5)(a(r*-a)+( I -7)y-u)	 (6)
Substituting (2C) in (6), a new long run equilibrium exchange rate equation is obtained:
,
--(1—v) — u
C = m +[A. + — * -a ) -	 0.'	
(6A)
Differentiating e with respect to a:
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—cl e
— —
c/a
This implies that measures taken to curb information asymmetries (in this context a decline in
a) would precipitate a depreciation in the lon2, run equilibrium exchange rate. The magnitude
of the influence depends upon the interest elasticity of money demand and the interest and real
exchange rate elasticities of goods demand. The lower the interest elasticity of money demand,
the smaller will be the extent of the depreciation.
Then by differentiating (2C) with respect to a,
p
c/a
we note that an increase in the long run price level would be the outcome of any improvement
in the financial market condition. The magnitude of the increase hinges upon the interest
elasticity of money demand.
In order to consider the impact effect of a fall in a on the exchange rate, the following can be
derived from (2E):
e (I — cbith) cl p
—=  +
cia cla	 A	 c/a
— Opd-
= — A[ 1 + 	
A	 (5
Since the square-bracketed term is always positive, a reduction in a would lead to an
instantaneous depreciation of the spot rate. The extent of depreciation would be
correspondingly higher the greater is the interest elasticity of money demand.
By virtue of equation (3D), the impact effect on real output may be derived as follows:
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y—y =
	 P)
dy	 d p
= -
da	 da
=-20)
Hence dy da,w2. This implies that any policy measures taken to reduce a would result in
an instantaneous hike in the output level. The magnitude of the increase would also vary
directly with the interest elasticity of money demand.
5.4 Fundamental Determinants of Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates
Our real effective exchange rate indices have been computed as follows:
RER, = EAE„P P,
where RER = the real effective exchange rate index of Malaysia in period t (1985=1.00)
E„ = index of nominal exchange rate (price of foreign currency in terms of domestic
currency) between the Malaysian rini4git and country is currency in period t (1985=1.00)
1=1„k refers to the k partner countries used in the construction of the RER index
13, = weight assigned to partner i in the computation of RER index
/),: =wholesale price index of partner i period t (1985=1.00)
Pf =consumer price index of Malaysia in period t (1985=1.00)
The foreign countries and weights assigned to each of them in the computation of the various
RER indices are as follows:
Trade-Weighted - U.S. (16.5%), Australia (3.3° .01, Japan (28.4%), France (1.9%), Germany
(4.1%), Netherlands (4.5%), U.K. (3.8%), India (2.3°0), Singapore (21.2%), Thailand (4.1%),
Korea (5.1%), Italy (1.2%), Philippines (2.6%) and Canada (1°,0),
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Export-Weighted - U.S.(14.64"'0), Australia (1.96%), Japan (28.12%), France (1.20%),
Germany (3.01%), Netherlands (6.69'0), U K (2.95%), India (3.21%), Singapore (22.22%),
Thailand (3.92%), Korea (6.73%), Italy (0.94%), Philippines (2.74%), Canada (0.78%) and
Pakistan (0.90%); and
Import-Weighted - U.S. (18.91%), Australia (5.02%), Japan (28.48%), France (2.86%),
Germany (5.53%), Netherlands (1.37°0), U.K. (4.89%), India (1.00%), Singapore (19.59%),
Thailand (4.38%), Korea (2.77%), Ital y
 (1.46%), Philippines (2.31%), and Canada (1.42%).
The countries taken into consideration for the computation of trade-, export- and import-
weighted indices accounted for about 84.02%, 87.35% and 80.85% of total external trade,
exports and imports of Malaysia respectively in 1985.
The dynamics of the RER behavior is generally specified by Edwards (1988a & 1989) as
follows:
A In e, = 0{Ine:	 ç'II1 L.,	 k,	
— yi PA/11)1?, —PA/11)1?,} (5.4a)
The first term on the right hand side of the equation above (a partial adjustment term) is aimed
at capturing the autonomous tendenc y of the actual real exchange rate (e) to correct for
existing misalignments, i.e. to restore itself to its equilibrium level (e*). The rapidity of this self
adjustment is indicated by the estimate of O. The larger is the magnitude of 0, the faster is the
adjustment speed. The short run impact of inconsistent macropolicies on the real exchange
rate is captured by the second term i.e. -214 — Z;) . It suggests that the pursuit of
unsustainable macropolicies in the medium to longer run that is inconsistent with a pegged rate
{i.e. if Z,›- Z,.} would result in a real appreciation. The preponderance of this term over the
former could generate an increasin g deg.ree of overvaluation over time. The third term of the
equation, 0{111E, — In 1;',. 1 1 relates to the possible effect of nominal devaluation on the RER
movements. However since Malaysia has never openly declared a devaluation of its currency
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and furthermore since it does not maintain a fixed exchange rate regime, this term will be
excluded from our empirical analysis. Finally the term, — PAIPR, — PMPI?„,} relates to the
possible influence of movements in the parallel market premium on the real exchange rate.
Neither will this be considered in our analysis as the significance of the parallel market may be
ruled out by Malaysia's maintenance of a liberal exchange control regime. This is in fact
reinforced by the findings of Phylaktis Kassimatis (1994) that a black market exists for
foreign exchange in both Malaysia and Singapore albeit limited. Moreover the margin between
official and black market rates may not be significant and their movements are parallel.
Phylaktis and Kassimatis plot both the black and official exchange rates of a number of
countries namely Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. In
the case of Malaysia and Singapore, both rates appear to move remarkably closely with one
another. It is even maintained by N g (1988) that the black market for foreign exchange is
almost non existent in Malaysia and Sin gapore as a large proportion of the demand for foreign
exchange can be satisfactorily met in the official market.
To prepare the groundwork for estimating equation (5.4a), Edwards then specifies the
following equilibrium RER equation:
Ine; =A +A In TOT +,62 in NGCDI +,8, In1:41?, + 13,1n TPRO, +13,1n KAPP, +186 In INVY, +u,
	(5.4b)
The effect of a terms of trade (TOT) movement on the equilibrium real exchange rate (e: ) is
ambiguous as both an equilibrium real depreciation or appreciation could result from a TOT
improvement, i.e. /31 or 0. The direction of the effect depends on the relative strength of
income and substitution effects. A preponderance of the income effect over the substitution
effect emanating from an improved TOT may lead to an appreciation of e: . For instance, an
adverse twist in the external TOT may exert a negative income effect on demand for
nontradables irrespective of whether there is a rise in import prices or a decline in export
prices. The substitution effect may also reduce the demand for nontradables if export prices
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fall. If however import prices rise, then the maunitude of the net effect depends on the
substitutability between imports and nontradables So lon g as the income effect is stronger
than the substitution effect, the RER will depreciate when TOT deteriorates.
An increase in government consumption relati\ e to GDP (NGCDP) may lead to either an
equilibrium real appreciation or depreciation depending upon the composition of increased
government expenditure, 13,›- oi — 0. If the increased expenditure is mainly on nontradables,
an equilibrium real appreciation may be precipitated. I lowever if it is mainly on tradables, an
equilibrium real depreciation may result.
Hi gh import tariffs (TAR) potentiall y result in an equilibrium real appreciation, -< 0. Such
trade restrictions would exert a do \\ n\\ ard pressure upon the prices of tradables relative to
those of nontradables.
The variable technological progress ( rp Ro) has been included in acknowledgement of its
possible influence on the e, the so-called Ricardo-Balassa effect. The Ricardo-Balassa
hypothesis states that an equilibrium RER appreciation may be envisaged by countries
experiencing a faster rate of technolo g ical pro gress (Balassa, 1964). Technological changes
may boost the demand for nontraclables also \ in a real income effect (Bergstrand, 1991).
Nevertheless technological progress that enhances the availability of nontradables may
precipitate a decline in the price of nontradables. This implies that a real depreciation remains a
possibility.Hence an ambiguity arises as to the overall effect of technological progress,
›- or -< 0.
An equilibrium real appreciation may also be induced by exogenous inflows of capital,
/15 -< . The inclusion of capital flows (KAPF) is aimed at capturing the effect of capital
controls on the equilibrium RER. In the case of Malaysia since it has been maintaining a liberal
exchange control regime that permits ti-ee inllo\\ and outflow of capital, its inclusion in our
empirical analysis may not be appropriate. Moreover the absence of quarterly data on external
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capital flows precludes its inclusion. Ne% ertheless its exclusion in our empirical analysis entails
an implicit assumption that capital flo n \ s lead to REIZ movements \A,hich are inconsistent with
the fundamentals.
Finally the ratio of investment to GDP (INVY) has been included in order to capture the
possible influence of capital accumulation on the RER movements. The direction of its
influence is however also unclear a priori dependin g, upon the sector in which the investment is
taking place, tradable or nontradable. Hence )8. , ,-- or 0.
Edwards then makes use of the folio \\im2 variables in order to capture the short run influence
of inconsistent macroeconomic policies as represented by the term, —2/Z, —Z in equation
5.4a:
1) Excess supply of domestic credit (EXCRE) measured as the rate of growth of domestic
credit (DC) net of the lagged rate of uro\\ th of real GDP as follows:
EXCRE, = ci log Dr, —(1 lo,(..,,(51)1'.
This is premised on the assumption that the demand for domestic credit has a unit real income
elasticity. As an alternative, Edwards also makes use of the rate of growth of domestic credit.
In most LDCs, domestic credit is beinu expanded by governments either to finance fiscal
deficits or boost lending to the private sector. This may contribute to a real exchange rate
appreciation.
2) To allow for the possible fiscal policy ramifications on short run RER movements, Edwards
incorporates the ratio of fiscal deficit to lauued hiuh powered money (DEH).
Edwards then proceeds to a direct estimation of equation 5.4a based upon the following
operational equation:
lne =y, In T07; +7 2 In NCGDP, +y, In T-1R, + 7 In KAM . ; +y, In 1PRO, + 76
In /NM', + (I — 0) In e, , —	 —	 + ONOA //)/ . .1; — v(PAIPR, — PMPRt_1 )+11,
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where NOMDEV represents nominal devaluation Equilibrium RERs are then computed based
upon the estimated coefficients of the fundamentals and the values of the latter perceived as
appropriate. Edwards suggests three possible ways of setting the appropriate values of the
fundamentals as follows:
1) The use of actual values of the fundamentals. This will involve the assumption that these
values are sustainable values;
2) An arbitrary choice of values based perhaps upon some historical characteristics; and
3) The use of some averaging procedure to smoothen the series of the RER fundamentals.
However in our subsequent empirical exercise, we shall be deriving the equilibrium RER series
from estimated cointegrating vectors coupled w ith actual values of the fundamentals. This will
not be an unreasonable move as it appeals to our qualitative judgment that the Malaysian
fundamentals have generally been assuming sustainable values given that Malaysia has at least
never been plagued with any severe long term macroeconomic disequilibria both on the
external and the domestic front. Furthermore, it has been commended by international
agencies as a well-managed econom y
 and that its trade tariff policy has in fact not thwarted its
industrial development or progress. The use of the second and third approaches may only
serve to introduce another round of distortion to our analysis given the fact that the
parameters used in conjunction with them are also estimated from actual rather than the
desired values of the fundamentals Nevertheless just to satisfy our curiosity, we shall attempt
the second approach as well in our computation of the degree of real exchange rate
misalignment if any.
The long run equilibrium exchange rate to be estimated by us via the Johansen Procedure is as
follows:5
Iii RER, =,(3„ *pi hi	 +,62 //,
	
-Am A 1/l4.11n.1i, -7,134 hi NI 'GDP,
5 The fitted values of this equation is then treated as representinv, the tom; run equilibrium real exchange rate
while the discrepancy bet cell the fitted and actual is regarded as an overvaluation or undervaluation
phenomenon.
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where 1?ER, =the actual real exchanize rate (effective or bilateral)
TOT,=terms of trade expressed as the ratio of unit value of exports to unit value of
imports
FGCY, =federal government consumption as a proportion of national income proxied by
current budget (FGCBY) or total expenditure (FGTEY) of the federal government as a
proportion of nominal GDP (NGDP)
MTAXR14r = the ratio of total import duties collected to total retained imports
INVGDP,=the ratio of total imports of investment goods to nominal GDP (NGDP) as a
proxy for technological progress and or rate of capital accumulation.
A priori expectations of the signs of the various coefficients are as follows:
>- or -< O,/3, or -‹ 0 ,133 0,anc113, >-- or -< 0
Akin to our earlier chapters on mone y demand and credit, all the variables involved in this
section are subject to both autoreuessive and seasonal unit root tests to ensure a non
existence of spurious regression problems. Table 5.111 presents the results of the conventional
unit root tests without the inclusion of any time trend up to the second order while the results
with the time trend are presented in Table 5.IV. As can be discerned from the tables, all the
variables that are to be considered in long run estimates are I(1) variables while EXCRE
(excess supply of domestic credit) and EXM10 (excess MI supply) are essentially 40)
variables and hence their suitability in our subsequent short run analysis to be incorporated as
factors that drive the wedge between the actual and the long run equilibrium rates 6 . The results
of seasonal unit root tests are presented in Table 5.V. Generally all the variables are not laden
with seasonal unit root problems except for LFGCBY (natural log of the ratio of the federal
government current budget expenditure to total income) and LFGTEY (natural log of the ratio
6Both EXCRE and EXMIO are operationally defined as the rate of growth of domestic credit and MI
respectively net of the lagged rate of growth of real GDP.
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of the federal government total expenditure to total income). However since they only
constitute one of the variables involved in our analysis, their seasonal unit root characteristics
can be ignored.
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Table 5.111
Dickey-Fuller Tests (Without Time Trend)
Levels First Difference 'Second Difference
LMUSI -1.9345 -7.0047 -7.3851
LRMUSI -2.3968 -7.7483 -3.8480
LNERXWI
-0.3933
-3.4469 -7.6510
LREXVVI
-2.0394
-3.5521 -12.333
LNERTWI
-0.7899
-3.6564 -12.0126
LRETWI
-2.0045
-3.5518 -12.3427
LNERMVVI
-0.8039
-3.6549 -12.0152
LREMVVI
-1.9810
-3.5550 -12.2975
LTOT
-2.6319
-6.3452 -8.5148
LFGCBY
-2.9771
-4.4028 -9.5808
LFGTEY
-2.9163
-4.6357 -15.2902
LMTAXRM 2.3649
-6.8065 -7.9350
LINVGDP 0.30461
-10.8941 -7.4599
LFDEBTY
-1.7833
-2.7362 -12.5602
EXCRE -3.1081
-14.3 625 -6.9035
EXM10 -4.1286
-6.5051 -8.6400
Notes: I) All variables are-in natural logarithm except for EXCRE and E)11 0
II) LMUSI	 - Bilateral exchange rate (MS/US$) index
LRMUS I	 - Real bilateral exchange rate index
LNERXWI - Nominal effective exchange rate index (export-weighted)
LREXWI - Real effective exchange rate index (export-weighted)
LNERTWI - Nominal effective exchange rate index (trade-weighted)
LRETWI	 - Real effective exchange rate index (trade-weighted)
LNERMWI - Nominal effective exchange rate index (import-weighted)
LREMWI - Real effective exchange rate index (import-weighted)
LTOT	 - Terms of trade
LFGCBY - Ratio of federal government current budget expenditure to nominal
GDP
LFGTEY -Ratio of federal government total expenditure to nominal GDP
LMTAXRM - Ratio of total import taxes to total retained imports
LINVGDP - Ratio of total imports of investment good to nominal GDP
LFDEBTY - Ratio of total federal government debt to nominal GDP
EXCRE	 - Excess domestic credit
EXMIO	 - Excess M1 supply
III) Critical values at the 5 per cent significance level for 50 and 100 observations are
-2.93 and -2.89 respectively.
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Table 5.IV
Dickey-Fuller Tests (With Time Trend)
Levels
LMUSI -2.5470
LRMUSI -1.4957
LNERXVVI -1.8177
LREXVVI -2.2986
LNERTWI -1.8276
LRETWI -2.3025
LNERMWI -1.8585
LREMWI -2.3164
LTOT -2.363
LFGCBY -2.554
LFGTEY -7.9326
LMTAXRM -0.4707
LINVGDP -1.8026
LFDEBTY -0.8240
EXCRE -3.2766
Da/no -3.9329
Notes: Critical values at the 5 per cent siLtnificance level for 50 and 100 observations are -3.50
and -3.45 respectively.
Table 5.V
Seasonal Unit Root Tests (The IIEGY Procedure)
T: ll j t': 11 2 't': 11 3 't': 114 'F': 113 n 1114
LREXVVI - -0.8165 -8.421* -3.0195* -4.3459* 16.8888*
-2.0394 -8.4371* -3.1926* -4.2408* 17.1418*
I,SD -2.0437 -8.3651* -3.1404 -4.1513* 16.4398*
I,Tr -2.2986 -8.5086* -3.3 7 87* -4.1075* 17.2593*
I,SD,Tr -2.306 -8.4400* -3.2810 -4.0098* 16.5488*
LRETWI - -0.80014 -8.4353* -3.0164* -4.3376* 16.83*
-2.0045 -8.4468* -3.1815* -4.2343* 17.0528*
I,SD -2.0092 -8.4064* -3.1177 -4.1353* 16.242*
I,Tr -2.3025 -8.5266* -3.3307* -4.0942* 17.2033*
I,SD,Tr -2.3126 -8.4908* -3.2721 -3.9873* 16.3843*
LREMVVI -0.79124 -8.4264* -2.9927* -4.3481* 16.7857*
*-1.981 -8.4347* -3.1499* -4.2448* 16.9661*
I,SD -1.9859 -8.4238* -3.0754 -4.1357* 16.0526*
I,Tr -2.3164 -8.5236* -3.3152* -4.0961* 17.1538*
I,SD,Tr -2.3286 -8.5185* -3.2464 -3.9794* 16.2313*
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•t':
	 111 112 •t':	 11 3 't': 11 4 'F': 113
 n 114
LTOT -1.0325 -3.0314* -3.5591* -2.6289* 9.8116*
-3.0756* -4.8109* -4.5097* -4.1892* 28.8887*
I, SD -3.0028 -4.6791* -4.3467* -4.1174* 27.6858*
I,Tr -3.6429* -4 9561* -4.8783* -3.9127* 30.5882*
I,SD,Tr -3.6462* -4.8484* -4.7794* -3.8216* 29.7757*
LFGCBY -0.4182 -0.7999 -1.1692 0.2847 0.7250
-2.9771* -1.2748 -1.4093 0.4849 1.1162
I, SD -2.8930 -2.8673 -3.0195 0.3210 4.6181
I,Tr -2.5540 -1.2667 -1.4001 0.4816 1.1016
I,SD,Tr -1.6553 -2.6326 -4.5978* -0.0318 10.5719*
LFGTEY -0.4394 -0.612 1 -0.9724 0.2001 0.4933
-2.9163* -0.9831 -1.1670 0.2682 0.7184
I,SD -2.1667 -2.0876 -5.0598* 0.0854 12.8071*
I,Tr -2.9326 -0.9459 -1.0950 0.3087 0.6492
I,SD,Tr 11.8894 -2.7184 -5.2273* 0.8638 14.4824*
LMTAXRM - 3.4315 -3.3386* -3.3189* -3.6950* 15.9017*
I 2.3649 -3.1705* -3.0365* -3.6036* 13.9697*
I, SD 2.2638 -2.7908 -3.1052 -3.9285* 16.8061*
I,Tr -0.4707 -3.0548* -3.0832* -3.4695* 13.5581*
I,SD,Tr -0.4804 -2.6780 -3.1701 -3.7939* 16.4237*
LINVGDP -1.3734 -4.9067* -6.6041* -2.8292* 34.2447*
0.1809 -4.8439* -6.4243* -2.7586* 31.7389*
I, SD 0.0248 -5.0825* -6.6405* -2.7294* 33.7673*
I,Tr -1.7215 -4.7404* -6.3805* -2.4997* 29.5977*
I,SD,Tr -1.6933 -4.9700* -6.5848* -2.5041* 31.6141*
EXCRE --).4022* -?.718?* -3.5412* 0.8715 6.7811*
-3.1081* -2.7997* -3.5756* 0.8278 6.8597*
I, SD -3.3606* -3.5860* -5.6602* 1.1179 17.2243*
I,Tr -3.2766 -2.7975* -3.5674* 0.8111 6.8135*
I,SD,Tr -3.443 -3.5856* -5.6003* 1.1041 16.8511*
LFDEBTY - -0.2209 -4.0908* -2.8741* -2.3730* 7.0258*
I -1.7833 -3.9589* -2.8843* -2.2109* 6.6663*
I, SD -1.6732 -3.9809* -3.8718* -2.9350* 12.2107*
I,Tr -0.8240 -3.9310* -2.8601* -2.2000* 6.5802*
I,SD,Tr -0.8105 -3.9524* -3.8271* -2.9086* 12.0377*
LNERXW - 0.1199 -9.0086* -1.7565 -5.0934* 15.8822*
I -0.7974 -9,0173* -1.8455 -5.0092* 15.7216*
LSD -0.7912 -8.5372* -1.7707 -5.0138* 15.6557*
I,Tr -1.8046 -8.9445* -1.8676 -4.9455* 15.4313*
I,SD,Tr -1.7571 -8.4749* -1.7984 -4.9305* 15.2771*
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't': 11 t':	 11 2 't':	 11 3 't': 11 4 'F': 113 (--) 114
LNERTW 0.1175 -9.0432* -1.7498 -5.0752* 15.7643*
-0.7899 -9.0508* -1.8375 -4.9924* 15.6066*
I,SD -0.7826 -8.5905* -1.7656 -4.9875* 15.4948*
I,Tr -1.8276 -8.9783* -1.8614 -4.9268* 15.3120*
I,SD,Tr -1.7810 -8.5289* -1.7951 -4.9025* 15.1139*
LNERMVV - 0.0963 -9.0547* -1.7400 -5.0734* 15.7334*
-0.8039 -9.0625* -1.8280 -4 .9912* 15.5780*
I,SD -0.7949 -8.6376* -1.7568 -4.9729* 15.3896*
I,Tr -1.8585 -8.9928* -1.8530 -4.9933* 15.2742*
I,SD,Tr -1.8138 -8.5793* -1.7873 -4.8860* 15.0026*
EXMIO -7 .867 7* -2.6345* -2.4448* 0.1595 3.0024
-4.1286* -2.7234* -2.5496* 0.1603 3.2643*
I,SD -4.4431* -2.9542* -4.7374* 0.0117 11.2215*
I,Tr -3.9329* -2.7055* -7 .53 7 5* 0.1581 3.2207*
I,SD,Tr -4.2143* - 7 .93 7 1* -4.7042* 0.0121 11.0647*
LMUSI -1.3229 -5.9530* -2.7121* -6.4806* 28.8311*
-1.2774 -5.9097* -2.6950's -6.4361* 28.4460*
I,SD -1.2586 -5.9504* -2.5709 -6.2867* 26.7710*
I,Tr -1.8776 -5.8830* -2.6927* -6.4345* 28.4117*
I,SD,Tr -1.8695 -5.9312* -2.5709 -6.2850* 26.7476*
LRMU S I - -2.5904* -6.5248* -3.4847* -5.0714* 23.9126*
-2.4307 -6.4826* -3.4638* -5.0353* 23.6072*
I,SD -7.3877 -6.3552* -3.4130* -4.9244* 22.7066*
I,Tr -1.6061 -6.4532* -3.4681* -4.9660* 23.3939*
I,SD,Tr -1.5798 -6.3259* -3.4170* -4.8587* 22.4991*
* Significant at the 5 per cent level.
To maintain some elegance in our presentation, this section will be subdivided into two
sections. The following subsection will discuss the empirical results pertaining to effective
exchange rates while those of bilateral rates will be dwelt upon in the section that follows next.
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5.4.1 Effective Exchange Rates
The best available estimates of long run equilibrium exchange rate equations (based upon
cointegrating vectors) in terms of trade- and export- weighted indices are presented in Tables
5.VIA and 5.VIB.
Table 5.V1A
The Johansen Procedure (Non-trended Case)
LRETWI
VAR with 3 la gs and seasonal dummies included
Sample Period: 1975Q4 - 1987Q4 (49 observations)
EIGENVALLTES: -0.5059	 0.3176 
Test statistics for the number of cointegrating vectors
Ho: r = 0 r1
Trace 79.3052 44.7563
(76.0690) (53.1160)
A, max 34.5488 18.7275
(34.4000) (28.1380)
II	 ESTIMATED COINTEGRATING VECTOR
LRETWI -1.0000
LTOT -1.3238
LFGTEY -1.6407
LMTAXRM -1.6765
LINVGDP -0.5380
Intercept -6.8598
III	 ESTIMATED ADJUSTMENT MATRIX
LRETWI -0.0426
LTOT -0.1031
LFGTEY -0.0521
LMTAXRM 0.0030
LINVGDP 0.0179
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IV EXOGENEITY TESTS
Ho: a2 = a3 a4 a5 0
	 6.6714
(9.49)
V	 TESTS FOR APPROPRIATE LAG LENGTH (31
Serial
Correlation
x 2 (4)	 F(4,27)
Normality
2 (2)
ALRETW1 1.5983 [0.809] 0.2276 [0.921] 0.4910 [0.782]
ALTOT 2.7843 [0.595] 0.4067 [0.802] 1.0546 [0.590]
ALFGTEY 4.9412 [0.293] 0.7570 [0.562] 0.4669 [0.792]
ALMTAXR1V1 4.3273 [0.364] 0.6539 [0.629] 0.0330 [0.984]
ALINVGDP 14.4845 [0.006] 2.8327 [0.044] 0.6429 [0.725]
Notes:
Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below test statistics refer to 95% critical
values.
Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels.
Table 5.VIB
The Johansen Procedure (Non-trended Case)
LREXW1
VAR with 3 lags and seasonal dummies included
Sample Period: 1975Q4 - 1987Q4 (49 observations)
EIGENVALUES: 0.5090 	 0.3147
Test statistics for the number of cointegrating. vectors
Ho: r = 0 r
Trace 79.3396 44.4890
(76.0690) (53.1160)
A. max 34.8506 18.5137
(34.4000) (28.1380)
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II	 ESTIMATED COINTEGRAT1NG VECTOR
LREXWI -1.0000
LTOT -1.5238
LFGTEY -1.8431
LMTAXRM -1.7619
LINVGDP -0.4446
Intercept -7.0735
III	 ESTIMATED ADJUSTMENT MATRIX
LREXWI -0.0391
LTOT -0.0992
LFGTEY -0.0457
LMTAXIZM -0.0019
LINVGDP 0.0217
IV EXOGENEITY TESTS
Ho: a, = a3
 = a4 = as = 0
	
7 1201
(9.49)
V	 TESTS FOR APPROPRIATE LAG LENGTH (3)
Serial
Correlation
x-(4)	 F(4,27)
Normality
X2(2)
ALREXWI 1.6458 [0.801] 0.2346 [0.916] 0.4650 [0.793]
ALTOT 2.8206 [0.588] 0.4123 [0.798] 1.1016 [0.576]
ALFGTEY 4.9081 [0.297] 0.7514 [0.566] 0.5106 [0.775]
ALMTAXRM 4.5601 [0.335] 0.6926 [0.604] 0.0422 [0.979]
ALINVGDP 14.3684 [0.006] 2.8005 [0.046] 0.6409 [0.726]
Notes:
(I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below test statistics refer to 95% critical
values.
(II) Figures in square parentheses [ 1 refer to marginal significance levels.
No attempt has been made by us to estimate in terms of import-weighted index as our
overriding concern is with competitiveness and exchange rate linkages with economic growth.
They have been estimated on a quarterly basis from 1975Q4-1987Q4 with government
consumption proxied interchangeably by the ratios of federal government current budget
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expenditure (FGCBY) and federal government total expenditure (FGTEY) to nominal GDP
with the number of lags fixed at three assuming no trend in the DGP and in the series. 7 The
use of this number of lags can be deemed appropriate as no serious serial correlation and
normality problems arise. In all the cases reported in the Tables, the null hypothesis that one
cointegrating vector exists cannot be ruled out by virtue of the trace and maximal eigenvalue
statistics. Moreover exogeneity tests conducted on all the independent variables reveal that the
null hypothesis of their weak exo g,eneity can be upheld. Plots of the residuals of the
cointegrating vectors are furnished in Figures 50 and 5P and they all exhibit stationarity.
The estimated long run equilibrium exchange rate equations are reproduced concisely below:
LRETTVI = —6.86 — 1.32 L7'07; — I .6-1 LEG7E}; — 1.68 Llt/ITAXRM , —0.5-1LINVGDP,
LREXWI = —7 .07 — 1.52 LT07; — I .8-ILEGTEY, —1.76  LMTAXRM , —0.45 LINVGDP,
where LRETWI = log of real effective exchange rate index (trade-weighted)
LREXWI = log of real effective exchange rate index (export-weighted)
As suggested by the above equations, terms of trade, the share of federal government total
expenditure in the nominal GDP and the incidence of import tariff do yield a very strong
7Since there is a tendency for those estimates based upon FGTEY to yield higher explanatory power of short
run real exchange rate movements as will be subsequently seen, those estimates based upon FGCBY are not
reported. Attempts have also been made to estimate on the assumption that there is trend in the series though
no trend in the DGP. However while this approach does not yield any significant difference in terms of
estimated parameters, it persistently results in serial correlation problems in the real exchange rate equation.
Attempts have also been made to incorporate EXCRE or EXM 10 and DLFDBTY (change in the log of the
ratio of total federal government debt to nominal GDP) alongside centered seasonal dummies in the estimation
process. However this involves a loss of the weak exogencity property of the independent variables.
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appreciating impact on the real exchange rates in the long run with their estimated
coefficients exceeding unity. The ratio of total imports of investment goods to nominal
GDP which is supposedly a proxy for technological progress and rate of capital
accumulation also bears an appreciating influence on the real exchange rates though its
estimated long run coefficient is approximately 0.5. It is noteworthy that though the
coefficient of the terms of trade seems large, exceeding unity, subsequent short run
estimates reveal that terms of trade has only a negligible influence on the real effective
exchange rate (export-weighted) contemporaneously. The large long run terms of trade
coefficient could imply a preponderance of the income over the substitution effect on
the consumption of nontradables if a terms of trade improvement is engendered by a
decline in import prices. If the improvement is due to a surge in export prices, then
both income and substitution effects on the consumption of nontradables would be
mutually reinforcing to induce an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate.
Conditional upon the correct specification of these long run relationships, there is no
evidence of sustained overvaluation or undervaluation of the Malaysian ringgit over the
entire sample period as years of overvaluation and undervaluation could both be found
as indicated by the residuals of the cointegrating vectors (Figures 50 and 5P). The
sharp seasonality in the residuals in these figures is probably explicable by the seasonal
pattern of the federal government expenditure relative to nominal GDP (LFGTEY). A
plot of LFGTEY is given in Figure 5P.1. In order to get a clearer picture of the periods
of undervaluation and overvaluation, we have de-seasonalised the residuals of
cointegrating vectors for LRETWI and LREXWI respectively and the de-seasonalised
residuals are plotted in Figures 5P.2 and 5P.3 respectively. The plots reveal a period
of overvaluation followed by a period of undervaluation and then a return to an
overvalued position. Hence, all this may constitute an indication that Malaysia has not
made any systematic attempt to undervalue its currency throughout the period under
review to arrive at its current stage of economic development.
In modelling the short run real exchange rate dynamics, the general-to-specific
approach has been followed. In order to capture the influence of macroeconomic
policies on the real exchange rate causing it to deviate from its long run equilibrium
level, both EXCRE (excess credit) and EXM10 (excess M1) have been used
interchangeably as a monetary policy variable and the change in the total debt of the
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federal government as a proportion of nominal GDP (DLFDBTY) as an indicator of
the fiscal policy stance of the federal government s Two alternative courses of action
have been followed in moving from the most general to the most specific equation viz
by incorporating the error correction term derived from the above reported equations
with a lag of one and then with a lag of three. With respect to the trade-weighted
index, the initial specification of its short run equation involves 20 variables. The
variables include two lags of change in the trade-weighted exchange rate index and
present and two lags of changes in terms of trade, federal government total
expenditure, ratio of total import duties collected to retained imports and the ratio of
total imports of investment goods to nominal GDP, current excess credit (excess
supply of M1) and the change in the ratio of the total debt of the federal government to
nominal GDP, the error correction term and the seasonal dummies. The same applies
to the export-weighted index understandably with lagged changes in trade-weighted
index being replaced by changes in export-weighted index. In terms of the ability to
explain deviations of the real exchange rate from its long run equilibrium however,
only those equations estimated based upon EXCRE instead of EXM10 display
statistical significance of the monetary policy variable. Under no occasion has EXM10
appeared statistically significant. Hence estimates based upon EXM10 are not
reported. It can be discerned from Tables 5.VIIA and 5.VIIB that the equations finally
arrived at exhibit some superiority over their preliminary specifications in terms of
standard error of the regression and the explanatory power.
Table 5.VIIA
General-to-Specific Reductions of Overly-Parameterized ADL (Based upon Immediate
Lag of the Error Correction Term)
LRETWI LREXWI
Initial Specification
Number of Parameters 20 20
Equation Standard Error 0.015541 0.015674
_2
R 0.50284 0.48694
Final Model
Number of Parameters 7 7
Equation Standard Error 0.015449 0.015056
_2
R 0.50870 0.52657
s This yardstick for fiscal policy stance has been mobilised because total debt is bound to rise if the
government turns on its fiscal tap while the converse is also always true.
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Table 5.VIIB
General-to-specific Reductions of Overly-Parameterized ADL (Based on the Third Lag of the
Error Correction Term)
,
LRETWI LREXWI
Initial Specification
Number of parameters 20 20
Equation Standard Error 0.015541 0.015674
k 2 0.50284 0.48694
Final Model
Number of parameters 8 8
Equation Standard Error 0.015337 0.015467
R 2 0.51579 0.50039
These estimates could pass all the diagnostic tests for serial correlation, normality,
heteroscedasticity and functional form misspecifications (see Appendices 5.1 through 5.4).
The most preferred estimates of all are reproduced below:
ALRETWI , = —0.02 ALFGTEY, + 0.12 EXCRE , — 0.03 EC , _ 3 —
0.03 ALFGTEY, — 0.09 ALII/ITA XRAI , _ 1 — 0.09ALNI "GDP, _ 1 + 0.34 ALRETWI r _ i — 0.02S1
ALREXWI , = —0.09AL TOT — 0.04 ALFGTEY, + 0 .11EXCI?E , —
0.05EC,_ 1 + 0.06ALFGTEY 1 + 0.04ALFGTEY,_ 2 - 0.02S1
Based upon the equations above, changes in the extent of government fiscal involvment in the
economy (FGTEY) do have an appreciating impact albeit nominally in the short run on the
real exchange rate, be it trade or export-weighted. What is however more interesting to note
from these equations is that an expansionary monetary policy effected by an expansion in
domestic credit would lead to a real exchange rate depreciation rather than an appreciation as
being popularly conceived. This is somehow consistent with the monetary approach to
exchange rate determination which states that excess supply of money caused presumably by
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an expansionary monetary policy could lead to an exchange rate depreciation. In a situation of
price stickiness, nominal depreciations will be translated into real depreciations. The estimated
excess credit elasticity is approximately 0.1. Though terms of trade does seem to yield
contemporaneously an appreciating influence on the export-weighted real effective rates, albeit
nominally (-0.09), such influence is absent in the case of trade-weighted index. The estimated
coefficient of the error correction term of about 0.03-0.05 also suggests that there would only
be a very gradual adjustment towards the long run equilibrium in the event of any deviation.
5.4.2 Bilateral Rates (MS/USS)
The best estimate of the long run equilibrium exchange rate equation is given by the
cointegrating vector as detailed in Table 5.V111. The estimation period spans from 1975Q3
through 1987Q4 with a provision for two lags. No serious serial correlation and normality
problems arise either with the use of this number of lags. Based upon the trace and maximal
eigenvalue statistics, the null hypothesis that one cointegrating vector exists can be upheld. A
weak exogeneity test conducted on the independent variables also suggests that the null
hypothesis of weak exogeneity is also valid at the 5% significance level. The estimated
cointegrating vector is reproduced below:
LRMUSI = —0.03 LTOT, +0.09 LEGTEY, — 0.22 LMTAX1?11/1 , + 0.05 LINVGDP, — 0.34
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Table
The Johansen Procedure (Non-trended case)
LRNIUS1
VAR with 2 lags and seasonal dummies included
Sample Period: I975Q3 - I987Q4 (50 observations)
EIGENVALUES: 0.5871
	 0.4134 
Test statistics for the number of cointegrating vectors
Ho: r = 0 r < 1
Trace 88.8437 44.6117
(76.0690) (53.1160)
X max 44.2320 26.6700
(34.4000) (28.1380)
II	 ESTIMATED COINTEGRATING VECTOR
LRMUSI -1.0000
LTOT -0.0288
LFGTEY 0.0926
LMTAXRM -0.2172
LINVGDP 0.0509
Intercept -0.3396
III	 ESTIMATED ADJUSTMENT MATRIX
LRMUSI -0.4947
LTOT -0.3994
1,} +1.1212
LMTAXRM -0.1804
LINVGDP +0.1516
IV EXOGENEITY TESTS
Ho: a2 = a3 = a4 = as = 0
	
5.7009
(9.49)
V	 TESTS FOR APPROPRIATE LAG LENGTH (2)
Serial
Correlation
X
2 (4)	 F(4,33)
Normality
'	 X,2(2)
ALRMUS I 1.0476 [0.903] 0.1766 [0.949] 0.1959 [0.907]
ALTOT 3.3457 [0.502] 0.5916 [0.671] 9.8374 [0.007]
ALFGTEY 3.5909 [0.464] 0.6383 [0.639] 0.7285 [0.695]
ALMTAXRM 2.8626 [0.581] 0.5010 [0.735] 1.1135 [0.573]
ALINVGDP 10.8754 [0.028] 2.2932 [0.080] 7.6913 [0.021]
Notes:
(I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below test statistics refer to 95% critical
values.
(II) Figures in square parentheses [] refer to marginal significance levels.
The long run estimates above appear to be very distinct from the results based upon effective
rates. While terms of trade (TOT) improvement and trade restrictions (MTAXRM) seem to
have an appreciating effect on the real bilateral exchange rate, the extent of government's fiscal
involvment in the economy (FGTEY) and the relative magnitude of imports of investment
CCI•WG131? seem to }sield a depreciatin impact on the bilateral rate. This may be due to
a massive involvment of US$ in such transactions. Plots of the residuals of the cointegrating
vector are given in Figure 5Q and not unlike the case of effective rates, overvaluations and
undervaluations have been frequently experienced by the Malaysian RER.
In order to model the short run dynamics, the general-to-specific approach has also been
followed with excess domestic credit (EXCRE) and excess money supply (EXIV110) and the
change in the total debt of the federal government relative to nominal GDP (DLFDBTY) being
taken into consideration. In the process of discovering the parsimonious equation, the error
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correction term has initially been incorporated with a lag of one and then with a lag of two.
The most general specification of the short run dynamics involves 15 variables namely one lag
of change in the bilateral exchange rate index, present and one lag of change in the terms of
'
trade (TOT), federal government total expenditure as a proportion of nominal GDP (FGTEY),
import tariff incidence (MTAXRM), and total imports of investment goods relative to nominal
GDP (INVGDP), current excess domestic credit or money supply (EXCRE or EXM10), and
change in the ratio of the total federal government debt to nominal GDP (DLFDBTY), the
error correction term and 3 seasonal dummies. In terms of standard error and goodness of fit,
final specifications appear superior to the most general specification (Tables 5.IXA & 5.I)B).
Table 5.1lA
General-to-specific Reductions of Overly-Parameterized ADL based on EXCRE included as
an 1(0) variable
LRNIUSI	 LRMUSI
(Immediate Lag)	 (Second Lag)
Initial Specification
Number of parameters 15 15
Equation Standard Error 0.018892 0.018892
a2 0.51116 0.51116
Final Model
Number of parameters 6 6
Equation Standard Error 0.018020 0.017757
R2 0.55526 0.56816
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Table 5.1XB
General-to-specific Reductions of Overly-Parameterized ADL based on EKMIO included as
an 1(0) variable
'
LRMUSI
	 LRMUSI
(Immediate Lag)
	 (Second Lag)
Initial Specification
Number of parameters 15 15
Equation Standard Error 0.018767 0.018767
- 2R 0.51764 0.51764
Final Model
Number of parameters 6 6
Equation Standard Error - 0.018020 0.017757
ft2 0.55526 0.56816
Nonetheless, the monetary policy variable be it EXCRE or EXM10 does not seem to
influence the bilateral rate even in the short run as attested to by the parsimonious equations
detailed out in Appendices 5.5 and 5.6. Both processes of identifying the parsimonious short
run equations involving alternate uses of EXCRE or EXM10 yield the same final set of
equations. The most preferred equation is reproduced below:
ALRAIUSI , = 0.03 ALFGTEY, — 0.48EC,_, + 0.07ALFG TEY,— 0.11 ALTOT,
—0.09A In MTAXRAI  + 0.06S2C
Only the extent of government spending relative to the economy seems to yield a
contemporaneous influence on the bilateral exchange rate causing the rate to depreciate
though the magnitude of influence is rather small estimated at about 0.03.
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5.5 RER Misalignment? Then Its Measurement
Though there is no evidence of any real exchange rate misalignment particularly when
,
misalignment is defined as sustained departures of the actual real exchange rate from its
equilibrium level, as a matter of interest we have also attempted to compute indices of
misalignment based upon trade and export weights and on a bilateral basis. By doing so, we
are treating a real exchange rate overvaluation or undervaluation at every period as a
misalignment phenomenon. Following Ghura 8.; Grennes (1993), the index of RER
misalignment (RERMIS) is computed as follows:
RERIVIIS, = (EREI 1?ER,) —1
where ERER = equilibrium real exchange rate
RER= actual real exchange rate
Three pairs of such indices have been computed namely (MTWIA, MTWH), (MEWA,
MEWH) and (MMUSA, MMUSH) based upon the relevant estimated cointegrating vectors.
MTWIA, MEWA and MMUSA are trade-, export-weighted and bilateral (vis-a-vis US$)
indices of misalignment respectively and are based upon actual values of the fundamental
determinants observed. In these cases then the actual values are regarded as sustainable values.
The others namely MTWH, MEWH and MMUSH are also trade-, export-weighted and
bilateral indices but have been computed based upon measured "sustainable" values of the
fundamentals. The measured values of two fundamentals namely MTAXRM (incidence of
import tariffs) and FGTEY (federal government consumption) are their four lowest values
observed over the sample period, 1975Q3-1987Q4 while the actual values of the other
fundamentals namely TOT (terms of trade) and INVGDP (a proxy for technological progress
and capital accumulation) are deemed their sustainable values. Hence this latter set of indices
involves an element of arbitrariness and as contended earlier, the former set of indices
(MTWIA, MEWA and MMUSA) should be granted more credulity. Plots of these indices are
given in figures 5R, 5S and 5T.
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As can be seen from these figures, if the strict definition of a real exchange rate misalignment
were to be adopted and actual values of the fundamentals are being treated as their sustainable
values, the question of Malaysian real exchange rate misalignment does not arise be it
measured on a trade-, export-weighted or bilateral basis. Periods of overvaluation and
undervaluation have been commonly experienced by Malaysia over the entire sample period as
indicated by MTWIA, MEWA and MMUSA. In other words, there has been no long run
overvaluation or undervaluation. However if we go by indices computed based upon measured
sustainable values namely MTWH, MEWH and MMUSH, Malaysia would appear to have had
suffered from a real exchange rate misalignment. Based upon MTWH and MEWH, there has
been a sustained RER overvaluation throughout the sample period though MMUSH indicates
that this only occured over the period 1975Q3-1980Q4. Nevertheless, we shall not attach any
significance to the scenarios painted by MTWH, MEWH and MMUSH given their greater
limitations as pointed out earlier.
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5.6 Exchange Rate Movements Versus NI acroeconomic Performance
In this section we shall discuss the results of our empirical endeavors to link economic
performance specifically real gross domestic product to effective and bilateral exchange rate
indices using Sims VAR technique via real exports. The ordering of the VAR is as follows:
LRETWI (LREXWI or LRMUSI), LREXPOT and LRGDP. The following hypotheses are
then tested based upon a multivariate generalisation of Granger causality test:
Hl: LREXPOT and LRGDP do not Granger cause LRETWI (LREXWI or LRMUSI)
H2: LRETWI (LREXVVI or LRMUSI) and LREXPOT do not Granger cause LRGDP
It is suggested by Tables 5XA and 5XB that the use of 5 vis-a-vis 6 lags is appropriate to
estimate such a system involving LRETWI or LREXWI based upon Ljung-Box and
Likelihood Ratio statistics.
Table 5.XA
Ljung-Box and Likelihood Ratio Statistics of the VAR system: LRETWI, LREXPOT and
LRGDP
Period
(lags)
Eqn
1974Q1 - 1991Q4
(6)
1974Q1 - 1991Q4
(5)
1974Q1 - 1991Q4
(4)
1974Q1 - 1991Q4
(3)
LRETWI Q(24) = 11.4915 Q(24) = 17.6991 Q(24) = 16.4066 Q(24) = 23.2412
[0.9851] [0.8174] [0.8728] [0.5056]
LREXPOT Q(24) = 16.0783 Q(24) = 22.5073 Q(24) = 24.4391 Q(24) = 79.1982
[0.8852] [0.5490] [0.4367] [0.0000]
LRGDP Q(24) = 38.7227 Q(24) = 31.2695 Q(24) = 23.9661 Q(24) = 176.821
0.0292 [0.1462] 0.4635 0.0000
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Likelihood Ratio Statistics
3 vs 4 lags: X 2 ( 9) 44.99453
[0.0000009]
4 vs 5 lags: X 2 (9) 23.76131
[0.00469506]
5 vs 6 lags: X2
 (9) 12.76552
[0.1735064]
Notes:
I) Figures in square parentheses below test statistics refer to the marginal significance
level.
II) Q is the Ljung-Box test statistic for serial correlation with 24 degrees of freedom.
Table 5.XB
Ljung-Box and Likelihood Ratio Statistics of the VAR system: LREKWI, LREXPOT and
LRGDP
Period
(lags)
1974Q1
(6)
- 1991Q4 1974Q1
(5)
- 1991Q4 1974Q1
(4)
- 1991Q4 1974Q1
(3)
- 1991Q4
Eqn
LREXWI Q(24) = 10.9464 Q(24) = 16.7930 Q(24) = 15.6157 Q(24) = 22.1812
[0.9894] [0.8574] [0.9015] [0.5685]
LREXPOT Q(24) = 15.7094 Q(24) = 21.8532 Q(24) = 24.3106 Q(24) = 80.0897
[0.8983] [0.5880] [0.4439] [0.0000]
LRGDP Q(24) = 38.9326 Q(24) = 31.3900 Q(24) = 24.3853 Q(24) = 177.180
[0.0278] [0.1429] [0.4398] [0.0000]
Likelihood Ratio Statistics
3 vs 4 lags: X2(9) 44.6270
[0.0000]
4 vs 5 lags: X 2
 (9) 24.2448
[0.0039]
5 vs 6 lags: X 2
 (9) 12.8444
[0.1698]
Notes:
I) Figures in square parentheses below test statistics refer to the marginal significance
level.
II) Q is the Ljung-Box test statistic for serial correlation with 24 degrees of freedom.
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Tables 5.XIA and 5.XIB indicate that while HI can be accepted marginally, H2 can be
rejected though it is also a marginal case.
Table 5.XIA
Multivariate Generalization of Granger Causality Tests
VAR System: LRETWI, LREXPOT and LRGDP
H1	 X2(10) = 17.7635 [0.0591]
H2	 X2(10) = 18.8022 [0.0429]
Notes:
1) Hl: LREXPOT and LRGDP do not Granger cause LRETWI
H2: LRETWI and LREXPOT do not Granger cause LRGDP
2) Figures in square parentheses refer to the mar ginal significance level.
Table 5.XIB
Multivariate Generalization of Granger Causality Tests
VAR System: LREXWI, LREXPOT and LRGDP
H1	 x2(10) = 17.2930 [0.0681]
H2	 X2(10) = 18.6770 [0.0446]
Notes:
1) Hl: LREXPOT and LRGDP do not Granger cause LREXWI
H2: LREXVVI and LREXPOT do not Granger cause LRGDP
2) Figures in square parentheses refer to the marginal significance level.
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Proceeding on the assumption that real exchange rate movements do influence real exports
and real GDP, a variance decomposition analysis is effected and the impulse response
functions derived. The variance decompostion analysis suggests that real effective exchange
rates (trade-weighted) movements have a very negligible impact on the volume of real exports
as innovations in LRETWI explain only about 0.52% of the variation in LREXPOT at a one-
quarter horizon and 1.25% at an 8-quarter horizon (Table 5.XIIA). With regard to real GDP
(LRGDP), innovations in LRETWI merely account for 6.76% of the forecast error variance of
LRGDP at a one-quarter horizon and 10.55% at an 8-quarter horizon. The impulse response
function also somehow reflects this negligble response (Table 5.XIIB). On the basis of export-
weighted index, broadly similar conclusions can be drawn (Tables 5.XIIIA and 5.XIIIB).
With respect to the system comprising LRNIUSI, LREXPOT and LRGDP, the Ljung-Box and
Likelihood Ratio statistics suggest that the use of 5 lags is appropriate in the estimation
process without any problem of serial correlation (Table 5.XIV). Nevertheless there does not
appear to be any causal relationship existing between real exports and real gross domestic
product on one hand and real bilateral exchange rates on the other as the null hypothesis (H1)
cannot be rejected (Table 5.XV). The same applies to the case of H2.
To verify further that no significant relationship actually exists between RER movements on
one hand and external trade performance and economic activity on the other, Granger
causality tests are conducted on a bivariate basis. Results of the tests suggest that the RER (be
it effective or bilateral) has no causal relationship at all with the real balance of trade (RBOT)
(Tables 5.XVIA, 5.XVIB and 5.XVIC), real gross domestic product (Tables 5.XVIIA,
5.XVIIB and 5.XVIIC) and real exports (Tables 5.XVIIIA, 5.XVIIIB & 5.XVIIIC).
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Table 5.XIIA
Variance Decomposition of Variables
VAR System: LRETWI, LREXPOT and LRGDP
Variables
Explained
Forecast Horizons
(Quarters Ahead)
Due to Innovations in
LRETWI LREXPOT LRGDP
LRETWI 1 100.00 - -
2 97.68 0.31 2.01
3 90.81 2.17 7.02
4 84.83 2.62 12.55
5 80.81 3.01 16.18
6 75.62 5.24 19.14
7 67.12 11.27 21.61
8 57.64 18.27 24.09
12 31.52 44.45 24.03
16 24.43 55.60 19.97
2 0 23.2 59.94 16.86
24 23.12 61.33 15.55
LREXPOT 1 0.52 99.48 -
2 0.25 99.12 0.63
3 0.20 95.91 3.89
4 1.18 92.24 6.58
5 0.98 92.96 6.06
6 0.99 93.22 5.79
7 1.21 92.79 6.00
8 1.25 92.39 6.36
1 2 1.61 93.21 5.18
16 1.80 93.85 4.35
20 1.77 94.39 3.84
2 4 1.64 94.82 3.54
LRGDP 1 6.76 11.04 82.20
2 8.09 19.14 72.77
3 7.94 21.04 71.02
4 8.27 21.76 69 97
5 6.36 29.06 64.58
6 6.60 34.49 58.91
7 7.86 36.36 55.78
8 10.55 36.01 53.44
1 2 13.86 43.97 42.17
16 13.49 54.83 31.68
20 10.51 66.00 23.49
24 7.62 74.58 17.80
Table 5.XIIB
Responses to one-standard deviation shock in LRETWI
Quarters
Impulse Response Functions of
LRETWI LREXPOT	 " LRGDP
1 0.0179 -0.0041 0.0069
2 0.0216 0.00006 0.0053
3 0.0137 0.0023 0.0014
4 0.0110 0.0119 0.0023
5 0.0111 0.0009 0.0041
6 0.0084 -0.0049 0.0046
7 0.0039 -0.0083 0.0056
8 0.0016 -0.0055 0.0078
9 0.0006 -0.0086 0.0063
10 -0.0012 -0.0091 0.0061
11 -0.0035 -0.0081 0.0069
12 -0.0051 -0.0054 0.0085
13 -0.0062 -0.0073 0.0063
14 -0.0073 -0.0083 0.0056
15 -0.0084 -0.0077 0.0061
16 -0.0087 -0.0054 0.0069
17 -0.0087 -0.0059 0.0045
18 -0.0086 -0.0059 0.0034
19 -0.0085 -0.0045 0.0035
20 -0.0080 -0.0022 0.0040
21 -0.0073 -0.0023 0.0018
22 -0.0066 -0.0023 0.0006
23 -0.0059 -0.0011 0.0008
24 -0.0050 0.0007 0.0012
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Table 5.XIIIA
Variance Decomposition of Variables
VAR System: LREXWI, LREXPOT and LRGDP
Variables
Explained
Forecast Horizons
(Quarters Ahead)
Due to Innovations in
LREXWI LREXPOT LRGDP
LREXWI 1 100.00 - -
2 97.90 0.31 1.79
3 91.30 2.13 6.57
4 85.42 2.60 11.98
5 81.41 3.00 15.59
6 76.19 5.28 18.53
7 67.57 11.31 21.12
8 57.98 18.28 23.74
12 31.91 44.06 24.03
16 25.25 54.80 19.95
20 24.38 58.83 16.79
24 24.49 60.03 15.48
LREXPOT 1 0.61 99.39 -
? 0.29 99.06 0.65
3 0.19 95.90 3.91
4 0.99 92.39 6.62
5 0.82 93.12 6.06
6 0.96 93.28 5.76
7 1.34 92.73 5.93
8 1.47 92:27 6.26
12 2.06 92.88 5.06
16 2.39 93.39 4.22
20 7.39 93.89 3.72
24 2.23 94.33 3.44
LRGDP 1 7.18 11.44 81.38
2 8.12 19.83 72.05
3 7.91 21.83 70.26
4 8.09 77.67 69.24
5 6.14 30.09 63.77
6 6.24 35.74 58.02
7 7.26 37.82 54.92
8 9.60 37.68 52.72
12 12p7 46.16 41.57
16 11.72 57.11 31.17
7 0 8.95 67.97 23.08
24 6.44 76.10 17.46
Table 5.XIIIB
Responses to one-standard deviation shock in LREXWI
Quarters
Impulse Response Functions of
LREXVV I LREXPOT ' LRGDP
1 0.0179 -0.0045 0.0071
2 0.0212 -0.0003 0.0050
3 0.0134 0.0011 0.0012
4 0.0107 0.0108 0.0019
5 0.0109 -0.0009 0.0039
6 0.0082 -0.0067 0.0043
7 0.0037 -0.0102 0.0052
8 0.0014 -0.0073 0.0073
9 0.0003 -0.0102 0.0059
10 -0.0015 -0.0106 0.0056
11 -0.0039 -0.0097 0.0064
12 -0.0056 -0.0070 0.0080
13 -0.0067 -0.0089 0.0059
14 -0.0079 -0.0099 0.0051
15 -0.0089 -0.0093 0.0055
16 -0.0093 -0.0069 0.0063
17 -0.0093 -0.0072 0.0040
18 -0.0092 -0.0071 0.0028
19 -0.0091 -0.0057 0.0028
20 -0.0085 -0.0033 0.0033
21 -0.0078 -0.0033 0.0012
22 -0.0070 -0.0032 -0.00004
23 -0.0063 -0.0021 0.00004
24 -0.0053 -0.0002 0.0004
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Table 5.XIV
Ljung-Box and Likelihood Ratio Statistics of the VAR system: LRMUSL LREXPOT and
LRGDP
Period
(lags)
EQN
1974Q1 - 1991Q4
(6)
1974Q1 - 1991Q4
(5)
1974Q1 - 1991Q4
'	 (4)
1974Q1 - 1991Q4
(3)
LRMUS I Q(24) = 27.0255 Q(24) = 21.9659 Q(24) = 22.6872 Q(24) = 23.7894
[0.3033] [0.5813] [0.5383] [0.4737]
LREXPOT Q(24) = 22.5094 Q(24) = 29.3575 Q(24) = 27.6273 Q(24) = 85.2844
[0.5489] [0.2070] [0.2761] [0.0000]
LRGDP Q(24) = 30.3242 Q(24) = 25.9667 Q(24) = 28.1025 Q(24) = 198.689
[0.1742] _ [0.3549] [0.2557] [0.0000]
Likelihood Ratio Statistics
3 vs 4 lags: X2 ( 9) = 33.2905
[0.0001]
4 vs 5 lags: X 2
 (9 ) = 18.7928
[0.0270]
5 vs 6 lags: X 2
 (9 ) = 15.0184
[0.0904]
Notes:
I) Figures in square parentheses refer to the marginal significance level
II) Q is the Ljung-Box test statistic for serial correlation with 24 degrees of freedom
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Table 5.XV
Multivariate Generalization of Granger Causality Tests
VAR System: LRMUSI, LREXPOT and LRGDP
'
H1 X2(10) = 6.5407 [0.7680]
H2 X2(10) = 10.5215 [0.3960]
Notes:
1) Hl: LREXPOT and LRGDP do not Granger cause LRMUSI
H2: LRMUSI and LREXPOT do not Granger cause LRGDP
2) Figures in square parentheses refer to the marginal significance level.
Table 5.XVIA
Individual Equation F-tests*
Bilateral VAR System: RERTWI and RBOT (1974Q1 - 1987Q4)
Target RERTWI RBOT
Causal
RERTWI 28.8250 0.3937
[0.0000] [0.9302]
RBOT 2.4570 28.4551
[0.0269] [0.0000
* Based upon a provision of 9 lags for each variable.
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to marginal significance levels.
Table 5.XVIB
Individual Equation F-tests*
Bilateral VAR System: RERXWI and RBOT (1974Q1 - 1987Q4)
Target RERXWI RBOT
Causal
RERXWI 28.8084 0.4142
[0.0000] [0.9191]
RBOT 2.5224 28.9509
[0.0235] [0.0000]
* Based upon a provision of 9 lags for each variable.
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to marginal significance levels.
Table 5.XVIC
Individual Equation F-tests*
Bilateral VAR System: RMUSI and RBOT (1974Q1 - 1987Q4)
Target RMUSI RBOT
Causal
RMUSI 261.8531 1.0350
[0.0000] [0.3136]
RBOT 0.0405 239.5155
[0.8414] [0.4034]
* Based upon a provision of 1 lag for each variable.
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to marginal significance levels.
Table 5.XVIIA
Individual Equation F-tests*
Bilateral VAR System: LRETWI and LRGDP (1974Q1 - 1993Q3)
Target LRETWI LRGDP
Causal
LRETWI 162.9018 1.7025
[0.0000] [0.1471]
LRGDP 0.7475 741.3623
[0.5909] [0.0000]
* Based upon a provision of 5 lags for each variable.
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to marginal significance levels.
Table 5.XVIIB
Individual Equation F-tests*
Bilateral VAR System: LREXWI and LRGDP (1974Q1 - 1993Q3)
Target LREXW1 LRGDP
Causal
LREXWI 161.3357 1.6359
[0.0000] [0.1636]
LRGDP 0.6819 779.7041
[0.6388] [0.0000]
* Based upon a provision of 5 lags for each variable.
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to marginal significance levels.
Table 5.XVIIC
Individual Equation F-tests*
Bilateral VAR System: LRNIUSI and LRGDP (1974Q1 - 1993Q3)
Target LRMUSI LRGDP
Causal
LRMUSI 55.8126 0.9446
[0.0000] [0.4581]
LRGDP 0.2289 380.8759
[0.9487] [0.0000]
* Based upon a provision of 5 lags for each variable.
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to marginal significance levels.
Table 5.XVIIIA
Individual Equation F-tests*
Bilateral VAR System: LRETW1 and LREXPOT (1974Q1 - 1992Q1)
Target LRETW1 LREXPOT
Causal
LRETWI 82.1178 0.9794
[0.0000] [0.4482]
LREXPOT 1.0484 214.8288
[0.4049] [0.0000]
* Based upon a provision of 6 lags for each variable.
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to marginal significance levels.
Table 5.XVIIIB
Individual Equation F-tests*
Bilateral VAR System: LREXWI and LREXPOT (1974Q1 - 1992Q1)
Target LREXWI LREXPOT
Causal
LREXWI 83.4919 1.0403
[0.0000] [0.4098]
LREXPOT 0.9789 230.7030
[0.4486] [0.0000]
* Based upon a provision of 6 lags for each variable.
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to marginal significance levels.
Table 5.XVIIIC
Individual Equation F-tests*
Bilateral VAR System: LRMUSI and LREXPOT (1974Q1 - 1992Q1)
Target LRMUSI LREXPOT
Causal
LRMUSI 24.9997 1.0042
[0.0000] [0.4312]
LREXPOT 1.3593 94.2036
[0.2458] [0.0000]
* Based upon a provision of 6 lags for each variable.
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to marginal significance levels.
5.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter of the thesis deals mainly with a number of selected issues on exchange rates
namely:
1) the implications for exchange rate, price and income (output) movements given the
presence of equilibrium credit rationing in the domestic banking system. The Dornbusch's
(1976) model has been utilised for the purpose;
2) an empirical establishment of the fundamental determinants of real exchange rates in the
spirit of Edwards (1989). Both bilateral (MS/US$) and effective exchange rate indices (trade-
weighted, export-weighted and import-weighted) have been explored. Long run equilibrium
exchange rate equations have been identified on the basis of cointegrating vectors estimated
using the cointegration technique of Johansen with residuals of cointegrating vectors being
construed as short run departures from the long run equilibrium. The behavior of these
residuals has also been regarded as indicative of the extent of any misalignment of the
Malaysian exchange rate; and
3) an empirical establishment of the links between real exchange rate movements and
economic activity by applying the Sims VAR technique. The direction of causality between
them is also being stressed upon in the empirical endeavors.
An examination of the historical time series of real effective and bilateral exchange rate indices
has revealed the following:
1) The Malaysian nominal effective and bilateral exchange rates have not exhibited any
appreciable long run depreciating or appreciating trend since 1976 though the nominal
effective exchange rates do exhibit an increasing variability. The bilateral rate vis-a-vis US$
however has not displayed an increasing variability in the 1980s. This is presumably due to
some exchange rate policy of the Central Bank of pegging the ringgit more to the US$;
2) Similarly no distinct long run appreciating or depreciating trend can be observed with
respect to real effective and bilateral rates. An increasing variability has also been observed for
all the real effective indices. This may speak of a growing difficulty of attempting to manage
the external competitiveness of the country at least in the short run by managing the exchange
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rate especially if one is inclined to associate exchange rate developments with external
competitiveness;
3) Real effective exchange rate movements have been largely dictated by nominal rate
movements since the mid 1980s though this scenario has already been observed since the
1970s in the case of bilateral exchange rates. At least from a theoretical perspective, managing
the real exchange rate is then synonymous with managing the nominal exchange rate if real
exchange rate movements indeed determine the external competitiveness of the country; and
4) Notwithstanding (1) and (2) above, the Malaysian ringgit has been on a depreciating trend
since 1984Q3 in real and nominal effective terms though there has been some rebound since
1990Q3 in real terms. Though there is also a corresponding steep rise in exports, by no means
can it be solely attributed-to exchange rate developments. The abrupt rise in exports might
have been a major consequence of the government's move in the mid 1980s to step up its
export promotion efforts which had already been initiated in the early 1970s. Even if it cannot
be denied that the depreciation has been catalytic to export growth, merchandise imports have
also increased considerably both in nominal and in real terms. Hence real exchange rate
movements may not be a sufficient condition for economic growth though it may be a
necessary one. Perhaps as a policy lesson for developing countries, economic growth could
only be aided by a real exchange rate depreciation if the industrial complex of a country is
already well in place. It is imperative to maintain some industrial or structural development
policy as well. Having said this, Malaysia's economic growth and development performance
cannot so far be attributed to real exchange rate management. As has been seen in our
empirical section, periods of undervaluation and overvaluation have been quite commonly
witnessed in the nation's past let alone the empirical reality that no strong relationships have
actually existed amongst real exchange rates, exports and income.
A number of interesting implications for exchange rate, price and output movements can be
drawn based upon Dornbusch's (1976) model for an economy plagued with asymmetric
information problems in its banking system. The presence of equilibrium credit rationing is
perceived as a factor that keeps the domestic interest rate low vis-a-vis the foreign one. It
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appears that any measure taken to alleviate information asymmetries would lead to a
depreciation in the long run equilibrium exchange rate and an increase in the long run
equilibrium price level. The higher is the interest elasticity of money ,demand, the greater
would be the depreciation and the increase in the equilibrium price level. On impact, a weaker
domestic currency and a higher output level can be expected. Again this depends on the
interest elasticity of money demand with the weakness of the domestic currency and the rise in
the output level varying directly with the elasticity.
In the spirit of Edwards (1988a, 1988b & 1989), our empirical endeavors reveal that terms of
trade, total federal government expenditure relative to the GDP, import tariff incidence and
the ratio of total imports of investment goods to nominal GDP (which is supposedly a proxy
for technological progress and rate of capital accumulation) have a strong appreciating
influence on real effective exchange rates in the long run. Assuming that these long run
relationships indeed hold, evidence is not found of any sustained overvaluation or
undervaluation of the effective exchange rates (trade- and export- weighted) over the period
1974 through 1987. Moreover the fact that cointegrations exist would also suggest that there
has been no serious exchange rate misalignment in the case of Malaysia. Perhaps we could
then conclude that it has not been a deliberate policy of Malaysia to maintain an 'undervalued'
position for its currency in order to boost its national development.
In assessing the influence of short run macropolicies namely monetary and fiscal policies on
real effective exchange rates, the general-to-specific approach has been employed. Both excess
domestic credit and excess M1 supply have been used interchangeably as a monetary policy
variable while change in the total debt of the federal government relative to nominal GDP has
been relied upon as an indicator of fiscal policy stance. However excess M1 supply has never
emerged as a significant short run determinant of real effective exchange rate movements in
our research experiments. An interesting insight gained from these experiments is that excess
domestic credit leads to a depreciation of effective exchange rates rather than an appreciation,
contrary to the popular belief of Edwards and others. This is somehow more consistent with
297
the view of proponents of the monetary approach to exchange rate determination. The change
in the fiscal policy stance of the government has no bearing at all on the short run movement
of these rates.
With respect to bilateral exchange rate (M$/US$) movements, the fundamental determinants
seem to differ in terms of the direction of influence on the rate in the long run from the case of
effective rates. Though terms of trade improvement and trade restrictions appear to have an
appreciating influence, total federal government expenditure and imports of investment goods
both relative to nominal GDP seem to have a depreciating influence. Presumably this is due to
an intense involvment of US dollars in such transactions. In the short run however only the
extent of government -involvment in the economy is significant in determining
contemporaneously the bilateral exchange rate. Neither the monetary policy nor the fiscal
policy stance variable has any influence at all unlike the case of effective exchange rates.
-Finally based upon our empirical attempt to link real bilateral and effective exchange rate
movements to economic performance via real exports, it is also interesting to note the absence
of any strong relationship between them. In fact there is a total absence of causal relationships
between real exchange rate movements on one hand and external trade balance, exports and
income on the other, each taken in isolation. This may speak of the exchange rate policy
insignificance to national economic development at least in macro terms. In other words,
exchange rate movements need not be a particularly crucial factor in national economic
development planning. Hence even though large swings in the exchange rate or its
overvaluation could be generated by a financial liberalisation programme, this should not be
taken as a worrisome phenomenon since exchange rate movements have no significant bearing
on the economy in the light of these findings. Furthermore despite the fact that Malaysia has
been maintaining a liberal exchange control regime, there has not been any sustained
overvaluation of the Malaysian real exchange rate at all unlike the experience of Southern
Cone countries in the late 1970s when they implemented a capital account liberalisation policy.
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0.0215S1
(-2.3364)
R 2 = 0.5087
F(6,42) = 9.2835 [0.000]
S.E. of Regression = 0.0155
Normality: x2(2) = 2.0083 [0.366]
Heteroscedasticity: x2(1) = 0.0633 [0.801]
ARCH:	 x2(1) = 0.7111 [0.399]
X2(2) = 1.1311 [0.568]
X2(3 ) = 2.0229 [0.568]
X2(4) = 2.3153 [0.678]
Functional Form: x 2(1) = 1.8540 [0.173]
Autocorr:
APPENDIX 5.1
ALRETWIt	 -0.0263 ALFGTEYt + 0.1077 EXCRE,
(-3.2722)	 (2.2874)
0.0417 ECt. i + 0.0537 ALFGTEY1-1
(-5.1817)
	 (4.7469)
0.0314 ALFGTEY i _ 2 + 0.2142 ALRETWI1-1
(4.2845)	 (1.8668)
X 2 ( 1 ) = 0.0308 [0.861]
X 2 ( 2) = 0.6697[0.715]
x2(3) = 1.3299 [0.722]
X 2 (4) = 1.4320 [0.839]
Notes:
(I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
(II) Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels
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APPENDIX 5.2
ALRETWIt	 -0.0218 ALFGTEY, + 0.1195 EXCRE,
(-2.9186)	 (2.4959)
0.0324 EC1 _3 - 0.0304 ALFGTEY,.2
(-4.7994)	 (-3.6364)
0.0884 ALMTAXRM t_ i - 0.0939 ALINVGDPt-i
(-2.4195)	 (-3.7470)
0.3436 ALRETWIt., - 0.0233S1
(3.2902)	 (-2.6210)
R 2= 0.5158	 Autocorr:	 X 2 ( 1 ) = 0.0979 [0.754]
F(7,41) = 8.3044 [0.000]	 X 2 (2 ) = 0.5701 [0.752]
S.E. of Regression = 0.0153	 x2 (3) = 1.2142 [0.750]
Normality: x2(2) = 1.1910 [0.551] 	 X 2 (4 ) = 1.2746 [0.866]
Heteroscedasticity: x2(1) = 1.9705 [0.160]
ARCH: x2(1) = 1.1078 [0.293]
X2 (2) = 1.7031 [0.427]
x2(3) = 1.4926 [0.684]
x2(4) = 3.3095 [0.507]
Functional Form: x 2 (1) = 1.7956 [0.180]
Notes:
(I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
(II) Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels
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APPENDIX 5.3
ALREXWI,	 -0.0857 ALTOT, - 0.0362 .ALFGTEY,
(-2.4447)	 (-4.5S76)
0.1066 EXCRE, - 0.0496 EC1-1
(2.3223)	 (-7.6977)
0.0632 ALFGTEY i _ i + 0.0363 ALFGTEYI-2
(5.9036)	 (5.1741)
-	 0.0226S1
(-2.5228)
R 2 = 0.5266
	
Autocorr:	 X 2 ( 1 ) = 0.0159 [0.900]
F(6,42) = 9.8978 [0.000]	 x 2 (2) = 0.5963 [0.742]
S.E. of Regression = 0.0151	 X 2 ( 3 ) = 2.3072 [0.511]
X
2 (4) = 2.3513 [0.671]Normality: x - (2) = 0.2975 [0.862]
Heteroscedasticity: x 2 (1) = 0.0066 [0.935]
ARCH: x 2 (1) = 0.0149 [0.903]
X 2 ( 2 ) = 1.8639 [0.394]
X 2 (3 ) = 3.0757 [0.380]
X 2(4) = 4.0677 [0.397]
Functional Form: x 2(1) = 1.3007 [0.254]
Notes:
(I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
(II) Figures in square parentheses [1 refer to marginal significance levels
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APPENDIX 5.4
ALREXWIt	 -0.0216 ALFGTEY, + 0.1141 EXCRE,
(-2.8751)	 (2.3611)
0.0286 EC 1 .3 - 0.0883 ALNITAXRMt_t
(-4.6249)
	 (-2.3998)
0.0916 ALINVGDP,_, - 0.0300 ALFGTEYI-2
(-3.6304)	 (-3.5307)
0.3532 ALREXWI,_, - 0.0229S1
(3.3277)	 (-2.5549)
R 2 = 0.5004
	 Autocorr:	 x2(1) 0.2375 [0.626]
F(7,41) = 7.8679 [0.000]	 x 2 ( 2,) 0.6558 [0.720]
S.E. of Regression = 0.0155 	 x 2 (3) 1.2132 [0.750]
Normality: x2 (2) = 1.5288 [0.466]	 x 2 (4) 1.2654 [0.867]
Heteroscedasticity: x 2(1) = 2.0240 [0.155]
ARCH: 2 (1) = 1.1140 [0.291]
x2 (2) = 1.7629 [0.414]
x2 (3) = 1.3364 [0,721]
x 2 (4) = 2.9979 [0.558]
Functional Form: x 2 (1) = 1.5708 [0.210]
Notes:
(I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
(II) Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels
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APPENDIX 5.5
ALRMUSI,	 =	 0.0294 ALFGTEY, - 0.4929 EC,.,
(3.4047)	 (-6.7526)
0.0307 ALFGTEY,_, - 0.0999 ALTOT,_,
(1.9509) (-2.4500)
0.4388 ALRMUSI,_, 0.0570S2
(4.5086) (3.6220)
R 2 = 0.5553	 Autocorr: x 2 (1) = 0.4210 [0.516]
F(5,44) = 13.2354 [0.000] x 2 (2) = 0.9702 [0.616]
S.E. of Regression = 0.0180 x 2 (3) = 0.9726 [0.808]
Normality: x 2 (2) = 0.1923 [0.908] x 2 (4) = 1.4502 [0.835]
Heteroscedasticity: x 2(1) = 0.0456 [0.831]
ARCH:	 x2 (1) = 0.0230 [0.879]
x`(2) = 1.7562 [0.416]
x 2 (3) = 3.5157 [0.319]
x 2 (4) = 4.5581 [0.336]
Functional Form: x - (1) = 1.5683 [0.210]
Notes:
(I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
(II) Figures in square parentheses [ refer to marginal si gnificance levels
APPENDIX 5.6
ALRMUSI,	 =	 0.0294 ALFGTEY, - 0.4808 EC1-2
(3.4646)	 (-7.6286)
+	 0.0744 ALFGTEY,., - 0.1065 ALTOT,_,
(4.5834)	 (-2.6398)
-	 0.0846 ALMTAXRM 1 0.0553S2
(-2.0201)	 (3.5972)
Autocorr:	 X 2 ( I ) = 0.2716 [0.602]
X 2 ( 2 ) = 1.3469 [0.510]
X
2 ( 3 ) = 1.3480 [0.718]
X 2 (4) = 1.9270 [0.749]
R 2 = 0.5682
F(5,44) = 13.8938 [0.000]
S.E. of Regression = 0.0178
Normality: x 2 (2) = 0.1754 [0.916]
Heteroscedasticity: x 2 (1) = 0.0723 [0.788]
ARCH: x 2 (1) = 0.0345 [0.853]
X - ( 2) = 2.1901 [0.335]
x 2 (3) = 3.0368 [0.386]
X 2(4) = 3.6662 [0.453]
Functional Form: x 2(1) = 1.0902 [0.296]
Notes:
(I) Figures in normal parentheses ( ) below estimated parameters refer to t-statistics
(II) Figures in square parentheses [ ] refer to marginal significance levels
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Chapter 6
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
To recapitulate, this is principally a three-part thesis pertaining to money demand, credit and
exchange rates with specific reference to the Malaysian economy. The econometric techniques
employed herein are mainly Johansen's maximum likelihood approach to cointegration, the
error correction approach and vector autoreuession (VAR) as advocated by Sims.
With respect to money demand, long and short run real money demand functions with money
variously defined as MO, Ml and M2 have been estimated against the backdrop of financial
liberalisation and innovation processes in Malaysia. The application of Johansen cointegration
technique to the study of Malaysian money demand functions has been unprecedented.
Previous Malaysian money demand studies have neglected the possible influence of expected
exchange rate movements on mone y demand. Indeed it has been found that an expected
exchange rate depreciation could yield a negative impact on real Ml demand with a
contemporaneous exchange rate elasticity of -0.23. Hence the effectiveness of an expansionary
monetary policy aimed at boosting economic activity may be compromised to some extent if it
is executed when confidence in the domestic currrency is lacking.
Cointegrations have been found to exist between real money demand as variously defined on
one hand and real gross domestic product, interest rates and expected exchange rate
movements on the other. This suggests the presence of a stable long run relationship amongst
them in spite of financial liberalisation and innovation. However a possibly interesting insight
gained from this study is that while long run relationships exist amid the liberalisation and
innovation processes, stable short run money demand functions do not over the entire sample
period under review. Hence it may not be appropriate for one to conclude that the monetary
policy effectiveness has been unaffected by the liberalisation and innovation processes on the
basis of the presence of cointegrating vectors. This is especially so as monetary policy is
essentially a short run stabilisation policy aimed at ironing out undue macroeconomic
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fluctuations. This prompted us to reestimate short run money demand functions over more
recent periods in order to boost the policy relevance of the estimated parameters.
,
The part of the thesis relating to the study of bank credit in Malaysia stresses the possibility of
equilibrium credit rationing (a la Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981 & 1983) being practised by
commercial banks and the significance of bank credit relative to other monetary variables in
influencing economic activity. The significance of the study is underscored by the fact that the
ratio of commercial bank loans to GDP has been rising steadily.
One of the major implications of equilibrium credit rationing is the virtual insensitivity of
lending rates to movements in the determinants of loan demand and supply. Our empirical
analysis has shown that the lending rate would only respond negligibly to loan supply factors
thou gh not to a single loan demand factor. Another major implication is the presence of a
'ceiling' on the lending rate chargeable by banks. The presence of the ceiling could spell a
doom to any financial liberalisation strategy aimed at harnessing more savings for the purpose
of channelling them to productive uses. The ceiling acts as a constraint on the ability of banks
to attract deposits by offering attractive rates of return. Nevertheless, the effect of equilibrium
credit rationing on the volume of deposits and hence loanable funds secured by banks and the
interest rate payable on them may depend on the interest elasticity of their flows.Our
empirical analysis has suggested that deposits with banks have a virtually zero elasticity.
Hence banks in Malaysia could always adjust their deposit rates downward when the market
for loans deteriorates without undermining their deposit flows. Coupled with the fact that
Malaysian banks have limited alternative investment opportunities, this could imply a
prevalence of relatively smaller excess demand for loans in Malaysia in the event of
equilibrium credit rationing.
In a separate consideration however, the larger is the interest elasticity of deposits, the greater
will be the volume of deposits secured besides the possibility of a higher interest rate payable
on them. This has been demonstrated with a simple profit-maximising model of a bank.
306
Perhaps we could then conclude that the negative impact of equilibrium credit rationing on the
amount of deposits mobilised and the deposit rate will be more limited the higher is the interest
elasticity of deposits. However there may be a more severe credit crunch in the event of an
adverse twist in the optimal lending rate precipitated by an economic recession when deposits
are interest elastic as this could involve a greater loss of loanable funds. Hence equilibrium
credit rationing coupled with a high interest elastic condition could have a procyclical effect on
the economy with the amplitude of the economy being accentuated.
In our exploration of the significance of bank credit to the Malaysian economy relative to
other monetary variables, commercial bank credit has been found to exert a larger influence on
the economy compared with Ml, N12 and the lending rate. Hence in the conduct of monetary
policy, perhaps more attention should be devoted to credit rather than monetary aggregates or
lending rates.
The third part of the thesis on exchange rates has considered the following:
I) The implications for exchange rate, price and output (income) movements amid the
presence of equilibrium credit rationinu, in the domestic banking system via an
adaptation of the Dornbusch's (1976) model;
II) The fundamental determinants of equilibrium real bilateral and effective exchange rates
a la Edwards (1988a, 1988b 1989) that has also permitted us to establish whether
Malaysian real exchange rates have been misaligned in particular a deliberate
undervaluation. The pertinency of this study can be found in the high regard that some
other developing countries have for Malaysia in economic development especially in
the light of the tendency amongst developing countries to maintain a real exchange rate
overvaluation; and
III) The causal relationships between real exchange rate movements on one hand and
exports and economic growths on the other in Malaysia.
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Prior to examining these issues, an examination of the historical time series of bilateral and
effective exchange rate indices (in nominal and real terms) has revealed the absence of any
distinct long run depreciating or appreciating trend. However both nominal and real effective
indices did display a growing variability. In fact the real effective exchange rate movements
have been largely caused by nominal exchan ge rate movements with no offsetting influence
from relative price movements since the mid 1980s. This may imply that exchange rate
management for the sake of maintaining the external competitiveness of the country has
become a formidable task especially if one has a strong conviction that exchange rate
developments have a bearing on exports and economic growths.
In our application of the Dornbusch's model, equilibrium credit rationing in the domestic
banking system is perceived as a factor that keeps the domestic interest rate low relative to the
foreign one. Our analysis has suggested that any measure taken to curb information
asymmetries could result in a depreciation in the long run equilibrium exchange rate and a
surge in the long run equilibrium price level. On impact, a weaker domestic currency and a
higher output level are likely. However the strength of the long run effect and the impact
effect would vary positively with the interest elasticity of money demand.
One of the salient results derived from our analysis of the fundamental determinants of
equilibrium real exchange rates is the absence of any sustained overvaluation or
undervaluation of the Malaysian rates. Thus the question of a real exchange rate misalignment
does not arise. In the light of these findings, Malaysia's achievements in economic
development so far cannot be attributed to any deliberate policy of real exchange rate
undervaluation. Moreover our analysis of causal links has revealed no strong relationships
existing between real exchange rate movements on one hand and exports and income on the
other. All this may allude to an exchange rate policy insignificance to national economic
growths or development at least from a macroeconomic perspective. Another interesting
revelation of our analysis is that a depreciation rather than an appreciation of real effective
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exchange rates can be expected from an excessive domestic credit expansion. This is in fact
inconsistent with conventional wisdom.
Finally, it is also noteworthy from our review of the Malaysian financial system that the
present state of development of the Malaysian financial system (which is only second to
Singapore in the South-East Asian region) cannot be attributed to a preservation of positive
real interest rates on bank deposits. In spite of the October 1978 interest rate liberalisation
measures, negative real yields could still be observed in recent years.
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